

POLITIKE EVROPSKIH INTEGRACIJA

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION POLICIES



POLITIKE EVROPSKIH INTEGRACIJA

Izdava i: Fondacija Heinrich Böll i Udruženje za političke nauke u BiH

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Layout: Compis d.o.o.

Tiraž: 500

Štampa: Tipografija d.o.o.

Stavovi i mišljenja iznesena u ovoj publikaciji su autorska i ne predstavljaju izričite stavove i mišljenja izdava i.

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CIP - Katalogizacija u publikaciji
Nacionalna i univerzitetska biblioteka
Bosne i Hercegovine, Sarajevo

061.1EU:341.24(497.6)

POLITIKE evropskih integracija / [priredila
Nermina Mujagi]. - Sarajevo : Fondacija "Heinrich
Böll" : Udruženje za političke nauke BiH, 2012. -

161 str. ; 24 cm

Bibliografija i bilješke uz tekst.

ISBN 978-9958-577-05-5 (Fondacija "Heinrich Böll")
COBISS.BH-ID 20222982

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Sarajevo, 2012.

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UVOD

Imaju i u vidu da proces evropskih integracija na prostoru Zapadnog Balkana, koji se u politi koj praksi manifestira kroz pristupanje zemalja Evropskoj uniji (EU), otvara niz pitanja na koje je potrebno pokušati dati odgovore, Fondacija Heinrich Böll > Ured za Bosnu i Hercegovinu, i Udruženje za politi ke nauke u BiH realizovali su projekat pod naslovom „Politike evropskih integracija“, u okviru kojeg je organizovana i istoimena me unarodna konferencija, koja je održana u Sarajevu 2. i 3. novembra 2012. godine, te je objavljena ova publikacija, koju vam toplo preporu ujemo.

Proces evropskih integracija predstavlja jedinstvenu šansu za modernizaciju i demokratizaciju ne samo u BiH nego i u cijeloj regiji. Tako je ova konferencija upravo izraz nastojanja da tu šansu iskoristimo za konstruktivan dijalog o procesu evropskih integracija, koji je postao sastavnim dijelom naše društvene, politi ke i ekonomске realnosti. Stoga je organizirana konferencija na kojoj su u javnosti predstavljeni razli iti stavovi, osvrni i promišljanja te iskustva iz procesa evropskih integracija kao i implikacije ulaska pojedinih zemalja regionala na susjede koji ostaju izvan granica EU.

U jeku ulaska Hrvatske u Evropsku uniju nužno je pojasniti koliko je region uistinu spreman na izazove koje pristupanje ove zemlje EU sa sobom donosi, posebno ako znamo kakve su bile politi ke i društvene implikacije na Hrvatsku kada je Slovenija, kao njen prvi susjed, pristupila EU. Srbija i Makedonija o ekuju datum za otpo injanje pregovora sa EU. Pregовори sa Crnom Gorom otvoreni su od 29. juna. Albanija je podnijela zahtjev za lanstvo u EU. U slu aju Kosova tematizira se pitanje usvajanja mape puta za liberalizaciju viznog režima. BiH je na putu EU integracija ostala na potpisivanju Sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju iz 2008. godine.

Zbog odga anja ustavne reforme neophodne za napredak i razvoj BiH, brojni analiti ari i eksperti ve navode kako BiH nespremna do ekat ulazak Hrvatske u EU. Trgovina izme u BiH i Hrvatske bi e, nažalost, otežana, jer Hrvatska pristupanjem EU istupa iz *Srednjoevropskog ugovora o slobodnoj trgovini* (CEFTA), koji je osnova njene vanjskotrgovinske razmjene. Pitanja imovinsko-pravnih odnosa kao i dvojnog državljanstva, tako er, mogu biti kamen spoticanja ukoliko se na vrijeme ne regulišu; zatim pitanje tretiranja radne snage, zapošljavanja, socijalnog osiguranja, penzija i sl. Bosna i Hercegovina i Hrvatska imaju neriješeno pitanje i kada je rije o grani nom statusu Neuma. Dakle, sve su to pitanja koja zahtijevaju hitno regulisanje i rješavanje ukoliko

se žele izbjie i sporovi, odnosno njihova spektakularizacija, koja može narušiti ionako ‘klimave’ me ususjedske odnose Hrvatske i Bosne i Hercegovine.

S obzirom da su više nego o igledni paternalisti ki odnosi me u zemljama u regionu (Slovenija je željela da pomogne Hrvatskoj, pa joj je prvom prilikom blokirala pregovore o pristupanju EU zbog neriješenog pitanja granice u Piranskom zalivu), nas je zanimalo zašto se u politi kim i medijskim diskursima pojavljuju ovi ‘superiorni’ stavovi. Kakva je uloga ‘malih država’ u Evropskom parlamentu prema svojim susjedima, a kakva EU u tom kontekstu? Zbog toga su nam bile zna ajne analize i iskustva evropskih parlamentaraca, te iskustva Slovenije, Hrvatske, Srbije, BiH. Važno je bilo propitati koliko odgovorno djeluju politi ke elite, kakva je uloga javnosti, civilnog društva i medija u oblikovanju ‘nove’, ‘evropske’ politi ke kulture.

S druge strane, pristupanje Hrvatske EU može biti i šansa za Bosnu i Hercegovinu, kao i za cijelu regiju. Za razliku od nekih autora/ica koji drže da e ulaskom Hrvatske u EU biti spuštena nova ‘gvozdena zavjesa’, odnosno da zbog aktuelne nestabilnosti u eurozoni i stanja u Gr koj i Španiji ne e biti novog, skorijeg prijema novih država u EU, drugi autori/ice misle upravo suprotno > da se region Zapadnog Balkana tzv. domino efektom može integrisati u EU.

Svjesni smo injenice da ovim projektom, ne smo riješiti probleme koje imamo na tom integracijskom putu, ali smo podsjetiti na ono što je i kako je do sada postignuto, te smo – što je veoma bitno – dati korisne preporuke nosiocima i kreatorima politika u BiH. Nadamo se da e te preporuke doprinijeti bržem i boljem procesu integracija.

Mirela Grünther e evi , Fondacija Heinrich Böll
Nermina Mujagi , Udrženje za politi ke nauke u BiH

Sarajevo, decembar 2012.

BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA I PROCES EVROPSKIH INTEGRACIJA

Željko Komši *

Želim se zahvaliti organizatorima ove konferencije, Udruženju za političke nauke u BiH i Fondaciji Heinrich Böll, na pozivu i prilici da s vama razmijenim svoja viđanja i shvatanja politike evropskih integracija u aktualnom trenutku u kojem se Bosna i Hercegovina nalazi.

U pozivu za ovu konferenciju istakli ste nekoliko ocjena i iznijeli nekoliko teza na koje bih se htio osvrnuti. Ocijenili ste da je integracija Bosne i Hercegovine u EU temeljni politički imperativ. To uistinu tako i jeste kada pogledate zvanične dokumente i strateška opredjeljenja institucija ove zemlje. No, kao i mnogo toga u ovoj zemlji, i ta opredjeljenja, koja možemo vidjeti i na nivou političke retorike, ne postižu svoje oživotvorene u realnom trenutku naših života.

Sporazum o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju još nije stupio na snagu:
> probili smo mnoštvo rokova iz Privremenog sporazuma;
> politički lideri nisu u stanju postići dogovor oko implementacije presude Sejdi -Finci;
> tokom ove godine usvojili smo samo jedan „evropski“ zakon i donijeli odluku o uspostavi samo jedne institucije za provedbu tog zakona;
> od liberalizacije viznog režima nismo postigli niti jedan strateški korak naprijed prema EU.

Na kraju, nismo se pripremili ni za ulazak Hrvatske u EU, koji jeste historijski trenutak koji će utjecati na politiku i društvenu dinamiku unutar Bosne i Hercegovine. No, taj uticaj je takav da će naše proizvodi i izvozničke staviti u teži položaj, ne njihovom krivicom ni krivicom Hrvatske već isključivo krivicom naših institucija, zbog njihove neažurnosti i politizacije svih procesa. Tako ćemo, slažem se i da moramo raditi na ‘evropeizaciji’ naših prostora i normalizaciji društvenih odnosa i demokratizaciji političkog ambijenta; no, nažalost, od posljednjih opštih izbora imamo upravo obrnut proces.

Nismo normalizirali društvene odnose, jer su oni na više nivoa sukobljeni više nego ikada prije, na etničkom, političkom i egzistencijalnom, a funkcija države upravo jeste da rješava nepomirljive sukobe u društvu.

* Istanica Predsjedništva Bosne i Hercegovine

Nismo demokratizirali politi ki ambijent; on je manje demokrati an nego u posljednjih deset godina. Politi ki lideri su, jednostavno, oteli demokratiju od gra ana i drže je kao taoca sopstvenih interesa.

Ja sam zaista vjerovao da je period od 2006. do 2010. godine, dakle od pada „aprilskog paketa“ pa do op ih izbora 2010., bio vrhunac politi ke krize u Bosni i Hercegovini. Nažalost, pokazalo se da može biti i gore, a odgovornost politi kih elita nismo imali priliku još vidjeti.

I kona no, kad pri amo o „evropeizaciji“ ovih prostora, ona se ne e desiti tako što e je provesti elite ve cijelo društvo, tako što e po eti razmišljati i djelovati u Bosni i Hercegovini onako kako bi razmišljali i radili da su u nekoj zemlji Evropske unije. Tu nevini nisu ni predstavnici EU, ili popularno re eno „me unarodne zajednice“, koji pokušavaju u BiH instalirati nešto što ne bi prihvatali kao rješenje u svojim zemljama iz kojih dolaze. Sve što oni trebaju jeste da budu dosljedni i insistiraju na ispunjenju standarda koji vrijede u EU, a ne da serviraju polurješenja koja nas betoniraju za narednih nekoliko desetlje a.

Ovdje, prije svega, mislim na implementaciju presude Sejdi -Finci. Znate, kod nas sví pokušavaju da ovu presudu iskoriste za svoje osobne politi ke ciljeve i naprave aranžmane ko e koga prevariti i osigurati bolje predizborne pozicije. Politi ki lideri se bave svime osim onim što jeste esencija presude Sejdi -Finci, a to je da su svi gra ani Bosne i Hercegovine jednakopravni na cijeloj njenoj teritoriji, bez obzira jesu li konstitutivni ili su Ostali ili nacionalne manjine. Samo ako su svi gra ani jednakopravni, onda e i narodi biti jednakopravni u BiH.

Kada je u pitanju regija, proces evropskih integracija i dosadašnja integracijska politika EU prema zemljama u regiji pokazao se strožiji nego u prethodnim krugovima proširenja. Kako sada stvari stoje, mislim da se ostatak Zapadnog Balkana koji nije u EU, dakle: Bosna i Hercegovina, Srbija, Crna Gora, Makedonija i Albanija moraju više okrenuti jedni drugima, sura ivati više ekonomski inera unataproširenje unarednih deset godina, ali jednakotakoraditi na implementaciji EU standarda i poboljšanja standarda života svojih gra ana.

Politi ke i ekomske implikacije ulaska Hrvatske u EU na Bosnu i Hercegovinu e biti velike. Naša granica s Hrvatskom postaje granica s EU, pri emu se mijenja režim izvoza, uvoza, transporta, putovanja gra ana i mnogo toga što e uticati na živote naših gra ana. Da li smo mi uspjeli da iskoristimo neke teoretske mogućnosti za privlačenje investicija kroz stacioniranje firmi koje će nakon ulaska u EU eventualno seliti iz Hrvatske u BiH zbog nižih standarda i

plasmana na tržište CEFTE iz koje RH izlazi, opet je do nas. No, ne treba izgubiti izvida da smo na samom dnu u Evropi po kriteriju jednostavnosti pokretanja biznisa.

Ovdje moram spomenuti i naš put ka lanstvu u NATO savezu i izraziti svoje razo arenje stagnacijom u ovom procesu. Li no smatram NATO esencijalnim strateškim prioritetom naše zemlje, koji treba da nas uozbilji i doneše nam stabilnost i sigurnost, prije svega u umovima ljudi, gra ana Bosne i Hercegovine, kako bismo se ozbiljno mogli okrenuti drugim temama i putu ka EU. NATO je za sve nove lanice EU bio gotovo kao pripremna faza stabilizacije nakon koje slijedi pridruživanje.

I opet je dogovor politi kih lidera postignut – na elno, Sporazum o uknjižbi perspektivnih vojnih lokacija postignut, i onda ništa, dogovor pao, a mi ostali s „uvjetnim“ lanstvom u Akcionom planu za lanstvo. Pri tome, dogovor je svima bio prihvatljiv i u skladu s Ustavom ove zemlje.

Nakon ovih veoma pesimisti nih vi enja, dozvolite i da izrazim svoje uvjerenje u potencijale demokratije u ovoj zemlji i otvorenost društvenog dijaloga, koji e prevazi i kratkoro ne politikantske interese i doprinijeti istinskoj demokratizaciji države i društva. No u tome svi moramo u estvovati i pokazati da je druga ija Bosna i Hercegovina mogu a.

POLITIKA PROŠIRIVANJA EU: ULAZAK REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE U EU I BIH

Stjepan Mesi *

Prije svega, želio bih zahvaliti na pozivu na ovaj skup – zna ajan ne samo za Bosnu i Hercegovinu, ne samo za odnose BiH i Hrvatske, nego i za cijelu regiju. Dodatno, zahvaljujem na mogu nosti da iznesem svoje poglede na politiku proširivanja Evropske unije, a potom – makar i samo u naznakama > i na u inke o ekivanog hrvatskog ulaska u Uniju na Bosnu i Hercegovinu.

Po et u s konstatacijom koja bi se svakome tko me pozna i tko zna moja politika opredjeljenja mogla u initi suvišnom. Ja sam bezrezervni pristaša procesa evropskog ujedinjavanja i smatram da je ujedinjena Evropa ne samo naša želja, nego i naša sudbina. I smatram još nešto: da je završetak toga procesa, što podrazumijeva i uvo enje svih zemalja jugoistoka Staroga kontinenta u ujedinjenu Evropu, zadatak ove, sadašnje, generacije.

Ocijenio sam potrebnim to ponoviti i naglasiti, jer mislim da mi upravo takvo stanovište daje pravo na dozu kriti nosti – kako prema Evropskoj uniji tako i prema na inu na koji se odnosimo prema Uniji. Kritika je, naravno, dobromanjerna, i do kraja je u funkciji razjašnjavanja odre enih odnosa i situacija, i u Uniji, i u našim zemljama, konkretno: u Hrvatskoj i u Bosni i u Hercegovini, ali i u drugim zemljama regije.

Iznosim svoja razmišljanja neoptere en bilo kakvim državnim funkcijama, ali imaju i u vidu iskustva iz moja dva predsjedni ka mandata na elu Hrvatske. Dakle, niti govorim, niti mogu govoriti u ime Republike Hrvatske, drugi su danas za to pozvani, ali govorim ne zaboravljuju i politiku koju sam vodio dok sam bio hrvatski predsjednik i saznanja što sam ih tada stekao.

Zemlje regije, Jugoisto ne Evrope, Zapadnog Balkana, svejedno je koji emo naziv upotrebljavati, dakle – zemlje nastale na podru ju nekadašnje jugoslavenske federacije stekle su neovisnost kada je do tada ujedinjena Evropa, kao dio demokratskog svijeta, živjela u svojevrsnoj euforiji zbog sloma sustava što ga se – i kod nas i u svijetu – pogrešno naziva komunisti kim. Neposredni je plod te euforije proces proširivanja Unije, jer – tako se procijenilo – zemlje koje su se oslobostile komunizma treba nagraditi.

* *Bivši Predsjednik Republike Hrvatske*

Bila je to, doduše, svojevrsna uvjetovana nagrada. Do tada, naime, lanstvo u Atlantskome paktu, vojno-politi kom savezu formiranom u svrhu obrane od mogu egnapada Sovjetskog Saveza, ninakojina innijebilopovezanosa lanstvom u Evropskoj zajednici, kako se tada zvala, nakon što je po elu svoj život pod imenom Zajedni ko evropsko tržište. Bilo je zemaljakoje subile lanice NATO-a, ali ne i Evropske zajednice. I obratno. Nakon godine 1990. stanje se mijenja.

Uvodi se za tzv. tranzicijske zemlje, dotadašnje države realnoga socijalizma, ali slijedom toga i za države nikle na tlu bivše Jugoslavije, nepisano, ali vrlo vrsto pravilo: najprije se ulazi u NATO koji je, objektivno, nestankom Sovjetskog Saveza izgubio smisao postojanja, ali koji se upravo zato pretvara i pretvorio u nešto drugo, a tek potom – nakon pristupnih pregovora koji su za prve nove lanice bili vrlo jednostavnii, mada ne i kratki, slijedi lanstvo u Evropi koja se ujedinjuje.

Da ne bi bilo zabune oko NATO-a: smatrao sam da je lanstvo u tome savezu za Hrvatsku, nakon iskustva krvavih ratova u kojima se raspala Jugoslavija, ali i nakon razdoblja potpune i krajne opasne politizacije oružanih snaga, itekako potrebno. Iz istih razloga mislim da je ono potrebno i Bosni i Hercegovini. Ho emo li se mi, kao lanovi, složiti sa svakom akcijom Pakta, to je druga stvar, tako dugo dok je jedino što nas obvezuje odredba da se mora prisko iti u pomo napadnutoj lanici Saveza. To sam držao nužnim napomenuti, da ne bi bilo – ponavljam još jednom – bilo kakvih zabuna.

I, da se vratim evropskome ujedinjavanju. Njegov je izvor u Zajednici za ugljen i elik, iji su tvorci jasno rekli kako je njihov cilj ujedinjavanje ljudi a ne država. A ujedinjavati ljudi na kontinentu podijeljenom u niz država mogu e je samo ako se državne granice brišu. Tehni ki, to je u injeno. Evropskom zajednicom danas se putuje a da granice niti vidite niti osje ate.

No, granice su ipak ostale, i to one u glavama. Duh nacionalnoga još uvijek jasno preteže nad evropskim duhom. Nacionalni partikularizam prevladava nad evropskim univerzalizmom.

I to robovanje nacionalnome, a nerijetko i nacionalisti kome, zajedno s jednako tako slijepim i pogubnim robovanjem sistemu neoliberalnog kapitalizma, u korijenu je svih problema s kojima se danas suo ava Evropska unija, a s kojima se suo avaju i naše dvije zemlje – Hrvatska kao skora lanica, a Bosna i Hercegovina kao aspirant na status kandidata za lanstvo. Ako nam to nije jasno, ništa nam i ne e biti jasno.

Sumarno, o dosadašnjem procesu proširivanja Unije rekao bih prije svega da

je on potreban i nezaobilazan, ako ideju evropskog ujedinjavanja iole ozbiljno shva amo. No, taj proces nije bio jednolik, uravnotežen, i od godine 1990. bio je pod snažnim utjecajem politi kih ra unica, koje jedva da su uzimale u obzir ekonomske zakonitosti. Ili, da budem još jasniji: proces proširivanja, u vidu bonusa za lanstvo u Atlantskome paktu, nije primarno tražio odgovor na pitanje: je li ova ili ona zemlja zaista, ponavljam: zaista zadovoljila sve uvjete koji je kvalificiraju za članstvo u Evropskoj zajednici, kasnije: Uniji.

Osnovni je kriterij bio: jesu li to naši, odnosno, prevedeno na jezik što ga svi dobro razumijemo: jesu li to podobni. Ako su bili podobni, a to su postajali čim su se izvukli iz zagrljaja sustava koji se nazivao komunisti kim, odnosno socijalisti kim, i im su održali višestrana ke izbore, bilo je – ne u spominjati konkretne zemlje – dovoljno u pristupnim pregovorima preuzeti obvezu da će se nešto uraditi, da bi se dobilo prolaznu ocjenu. Dakle: obećalo se, a uradilo se nije nikada!

Naravno, i starim je lanicama Unije nakon nekog vremena postalo jasno da tako ne može i i dalje, pa su uvjete po eli formulirati strože i umjesto rije i tražiti djela. Hrvatska je u pregovore ušla nakon prijema dviju zemalja na kojima se Evropska unija „opekla“. Primila ih je uz uvjet nastavka monitoringa nakon primanja, ali od toga malo je koristi. Može se samo konstatirati da nije onako, kako bi trebalo biti. Sredstvima pritiska prišlo se tek u uvjetima ekonomske krize, a baš tu nije trebalo tako postupati.

Zašto to kažem? Pa zato što se pritiskom nastoji iznuditi provo enje posve pogrešne politike koja ekonomsku krizu želi riješiti radikalnim štednjom, što neizostavno zna i i gušenjem proizvodnje i zaustavljanjem razvoja, uz doslovno ubijanje socijalne države. A samo proizvodnja, nova radna mjesta i razvoj mogu biti izlaz iz krize, dok opstanak socijalne države može biti garant unutrašnjeg mira i stabilnosti.

Posebna je pri a zajedni ka evropska valuta – Euro. Kao simbol zajedništva i prerastanja Evrope nacionalnih država u zajedni ku, jednu i jedinstvenu Evropu, Euro je više nego dobrodošao. No, vrsni ekonomisti kažu da je uveden preroano, da je zapravo nametnut državama na vrlo razli item stupnju razvoja. Sadašnja kriza koja trese Eurozonu, kažu oni, dobrim je dijelom posljedica i te brzopletosti.

A svemu tome, pri emu se još jednom vra am onome što sam ve rekao, nije slijedilo istim tempom i istim entuzijazmom formiranje evropske svijesti; svijesti o zajedni kim interesima, zajedni kim potrebama i nužnosti da se unutar toga evropskogazajedništva problemi pojedinih lanicarješavaju zajedni ki, solidarno.

Hrvatska je imala sreću da je vodila pristupne pregovore nakon definitivnog stvaranja spoznaje u EU kako obećanja nisu kvalifikacija za članstvo. Od nas se tražilo da sasvim konkretnie stvari, i to mnogo njih, uradimo, baš kao što e se tražiti i od Bosne i Hercegovine. Svjesno kažem da je to bila naša sreća, jer u suprotnome – gotovo sam siguran – podlegli bismo iskušenju da i mi samo obećavamo, a da potom ne izvršavamo.

Naravnodase uvijek može postaviti pitanje: jesmoli u pristupnim pregovorima mogli „izvući“ neku odgodu, ili neki izuzetak? Mislim da jesmo, i mislim da to nismo dovoljno koristili. To je moj dojam i, ako je doista tako, onda preporučam svim budućim kandidatima da i u tome uče od nas, odnosno na našemu iskustvu.

A jednoga dana, kada se načelo u okrilju Unije, stvar je naše političke volje i pameti da – zajedno s drugima – radimo na tome da ispravimo sve što u Uniji nije dobro – od vladavine inovni kog aparata iz Bruxellesa, pa do „borbe do posljednjeg metka“ za potrošeni sistem neoliberalnog kapitalizma, a na štetu socijalne države, odnosno građana.

I, napokon, odnosi naših dviju država u svjetlu skorog ulaska Hrvatske u Evropsku uniju. Mislim da smo tu u pristupnim pregovorima napravili najviše propusta, ne samo što se tiče Bosne i Hercegovine, nego što se tiče cijele regije. Od BiH, takve kakva jest, i nije se moglo očekivati da će dati poticaj takvome hrvatskome angažiranju. Ne, to je morala biti naša inicijativa. Jer, ispuni li se sve što bi hrvatskim ulaskom u Uniju trebalo stupiti na snagu, mi ćemo – govorim to krajnje otvoreno – ugroziti bitne rezultate i postignuća regionalne suradnje, koju smo uz mnogo otpora otvarali i gradili.

Paradoksalno je u svemu tome to, da spuštanjem „gvozdene zavjese“ Shengena na hrvatskim granicama prijete upravo oni koji su – uz ostalo – hrvatsku spremnost za članstvo u Uniji procjenjivali i po sposobnosti i volji uspostavljanja suradnje sa zemljama regije. A nama je svima ta suradnja itekako potrebna. Ne samo iz političkih razloga, da prevladamo u inke zlosretnih ratova u kojima se raspala nekadašnja zajednica država, nego i da zadovoljimo potrebe naših nacionalnih ekonomija, odnosno onoga što je od njih još ostalo. Mi u regiji upućeni smo jedni na druge.

Možda nekome u Uniji i jest interes da nas pretvori samo u tržište za robu druge klase iz dosadašnjih zemalja članica. Naš interes to svakako nije.

Naš je interes uzajamna suradnja, pa i više od toga – zajedničko

nastupanje na tre im tržištima. Svakako, i suradnja s dosadašnjim zemljama Unije, ali s onima visoko razvijenima mi jedva da u ne emu možemo sura ivati, a još manje imamo proizvode koje bismo im mogli ponuditi. Barem ne toliko, da bismo od toga mogli živjeti.

Ostaje nam, dakle, regija i ostaju nam zemlje Tre eg svijeta. To su dvije komponente koje bismo ljubomorno morali braniti, ak i po cijenu razilaženja sa zajedni kom evropskom vanjskom politikom – kada bi tako nešto postojalo. Sve ovo što sam rekao, moje je osobno mišljenje. Nemam nikakve mogu nosti utjecati na politiku aktualnih vlasti. Ali, imam pravo izre i konstataciju da ulaskom u Evropsku uniju za Hrvatsku posao ne e biti završen.

Onoga dana kada Hrvatska postane 28. lanica Unije, pred njom se otvara novi, veliki zadatak, novo polje djelovanja: uskladiti to lanstvo s interesom i potrebama suradnje sa zemljama regije, a u samoj Uniji neumorno ponavljati kako proces evropskoga ujedinjavanja ne može i ne e biti završen tako dugo, dok se u Uniji ne na u i sve države Jugoisto ne Evrope.

Hrvatska ulaskom u Uniju nikamo ne odlazi. Hrvatska ulazi da bi postala lanicom velike evropske obitelji država, nerijetko razjedinjene, kao što su i mnoge obitelji, ali i zato da bi držala vrata otvorenima za ostale zemlje regije, odnosno bivše Jugoslavije. Hrvatska ulazi da bi postala dijelom milenijskog poduhvata evropskog ujedinjavanja, poduhvata koji naprsto ne smije biti doveden u pitanje, ali i zato da bi stalno podsje ala na rije i njegovih utemeljitelja: mi ujedinjujemo ljudi, a ne države.

Hrvatska ne ulazi u Uniju da bi se od bilo koga odijelila.

Mislim da bi to morala biti poruka službenoga Zagreba svima u regiji, ali i Evropi.

PRISTUP MOŽE BITI PRIMAMLJIV KAO MRKVA, ALI NE I MAMAC

Marije Cornelissen*

“Brisel” ne postoji. Dobro, možda u nekom obliku i postoji – kao lijep glavni grad jedne male evropske zemlje, gdje dosta ljudi iz drugih zemalja Evropske unije živi i radi. Ali, “Brisel”, kako se esto pojavljuje u razgovoru i u medijima, ne postoji.

U mojoj zemlji, Holandiji, sliku “Brisela” kao depersonalizirane mase esto prizivaju lijeni novinari i skepti ni politi ari. Ljeni novinari, koji misle da njihovi itaoci ne mogu da podnesu zasebno pominjanje Parlamenta, Komisije i Vije a. Politi ari, koji misle da glasa i ne e mo i podnijeti istinu o tome da jedna mala zemlja kakva je Holandija nije u stanju da samostalno kontrolira sve internacionalniju privredu. U njihovom diskursu, “Brisel” je zlo esto tijelo koje želi da prigrabi što je mogu e više mo i, da bi je koristilo da jadnim, naivnim Holan anima na prevaru otme novac i radna mjesta i potkopa ponos koji gajimo prema svojoj nekad mo noj zemlji. To nekad se odnosi na vrijeme prije nekoliko stolje a. Slika “Brisela” donekle je sli na u balkanskim zemljama koje tek pristupaju EU. To je jedno zlo esto tijelo koje je stvorilo megalomanski plan da nedavno ste eni suverenitet otme od balkanskih zemalja, da nametne vladavinu neoliberalizma i da svoje progresivne vrijednosti gura prema stanovništvu koje ništa ne sumnja.

Kao evropska politi arka koja radi u Briselu, uvijek sam zbumjena koli inom sile i dugoro nom vizijom koju ljudi misle da EU ima. Gotovo mi je žao što moram re i da politi ari EU imaju premalo mo i, premalo saradnje i premalo uzajamne saglasnosti, da bi uop e bili u stanju da izrode veliki plan koji bi se protezao na nekoliko decenija, a kamoli da ga provedu. Slika “Brisela” kao jedinstvenog tijela s velikim planom je isti mit.

“Brisel” se sastoji od tri razli ite institucije, u kojima su stvarni ljudi, bilo izabrani ili imenovani, ali se mijenjaju sa svakim izborima. Najvažnija za zemlje u procesu pristupanja je Evropska komisija. Komisija u svakoj od tih zemalja na terenu ima državne službenike. Zemljama koje pristupaju govori šta su pokazatelji i šta treba da se uradi da ih se ispoštuje, prikuplja informacije o poštivanju i provedbi i o tome izvještava Evropsku uniju, koja odlu uje koji koraci predstoje u procesu pristupanja.

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Komisija formalno ne odlu uje o tome da li neka zemlja može poduzeti naredni korak u procesu pristupanja, ali ima mo zato što je ona izvor informacija na kojima se takve odluke temelje. Njihov savjet je od klju nog zna aja. Uvijek kažem: ako narodi i politi ari u zemljama koje pristupaju odlu e da ikoga slušaju, trebalo bi da slušaju Evropsku komisiju. Ne zato što je bezgrešna, jer to sigurno nije, ve zato što je najmanje politi ka od svih institucija Evropske unije, najmanje pod utjecajem anketa o javnom mnjenju i populizma.

Tu je, dalje, Evropski parlament, ija sam ja lanica. Mi dosta govorimo o procesu proširenja i o svim zemljama u procesu pristupanja, svake godine pripremamo izvještaj o svakoj zemlji, posje ujemo ih što je mogu e e, razgovaramo sa svakim novinarom koji je spreman da nam pod nos gurne mikrofon, šaljemo oštra pisma vladama zemalja u procesu pristupanja, održavamo mrežu kontakata s gra anskim društvom. I nemamo skoro nikakvu mo donošenja odluka. Mi u Parlamentu možemo odlu ivati o tome da se s Makedonijom otpo nu pregovori dok nam svima ne pozli, ali ugovori EU ne daju nikakvu nikakvu mo da u vezi s tim pitanjem išta suštinski u inimo. Jedino što možemo jeste da zajedni ki odlu ujemo o stvarima kao što su liberalizacija viznog režima ili donošenje kona ne odluke o pristupanju nakon što zemlja završi cijeli proces pristupanja, kako je nedavno bio slu aj s Hrvatskom. Za zemlje u procesu pristupanja obi no je lijepo da slušaju Parlament. Uglavnom je proevropski i podržava proširenje. U našim debatama politi ari nastoje naglasiti neke kriterije u skladu sa svojim politi kim sklonostima, kao što ja, recimo, naglašavam prava LGBT populacije i prava žena, a desno orijentirane kolege isto ine s organiziranim kriminalom i korupcijom. Me utim, u cjelini, mi kao Parlament uvijek emo pozdraviti svaki korak unaprijed, ma kako mali bio.

Evropski parlament može kriviti i sramotiti, može usmjeravati debatu, ali ne može donositi odluke. Mo je u Vije u. Nažalost, Vije e je od svih evropskih institucija najviše politi ko i najmanje evropsko. Daleko od toga da ima zajedni ki, veliki plan, Vije e uop e nema ni zajedni ki ni dalekosežan plan. Ljudi koji se u Vije u bave proširenjem su ministri vanjskih poslova zemalja lanica EU. Najve i dio vremena provode u raspravama sa svojim državnim parlamentima, u razgovoru s novinari ma u svojim zemljama i u provjeri najnovijih ispitivanja javnog mnjenja u zemljji. Uglavnom tek jednom mjesecu dolaze u Brisel da s kolegama iz drugih zemalja EU razgovaraju o vanjskoj politici. Dok Komisija i Parlament ostaju uglavnom isti u periodu od pet godina, svaki put kad se u nekoj zemlji održe izbori, u stalno promjenjivoj grupi ministara pojavi se neko novo lice. Trenutno su to ministri koji su uglavnom desno orijentirani demokrš ani ili desno orijentirani liberali. Prvenstveno brinu o onome što misle

da njihovo glasa ko tijelo želi da uje. Strogi su prema korupciji, okljevaju kad je u pitanju liberalizacija viznog režima, ne žele da Turska u e u EU.

Moraju odlu ivati jednoglasno, tako da svako od njih ima pravo na veto. Gr ka može blokirati Makedoniju, Kipar može blokirati Tursku, Slovenija može blokirati Hrvatsku. Pet zemalja može blokirati priznanje Kosova, iz razloga koji nemaju nikakve veze s Kosovom. Narod i politi ari u zemljama u procesu pristupanja, ako slušaju Vije e, moraju uvijek imati na umu da za ono što ministri kažu oni nisu prava publika. Jasan primjer za to je liberalizacija viznog režima. Holandska vlada je ta koja je tražila “ko nicu za hitne slu ajeve” u slu aju da se pojavi previše lažnih tražilaca azila, a sad je jedna od najglasnijih u diskusiji o mogu oj suspenziji bezviznog režima za Srbiju i Makedoniju. Ovo je vrlo udno s obzirom na to da je u Holandiji prošle godine bilo ukupno jedanaest zahtjeva za azil državljanima balkanskih zemalja. Ali i nije udno s obzirom na to da desno orientirana vlada misli da e ovim ponovo osvojiti glasove svog skepti nog glasa kog tijela.

Vjerujem da uslovljavanje, konzistentnost i vjerodostojnost predstavljaju klju uspješnog procesa pristupanja. Sam proces treba biti što je mogu e više tehni ki: to su uslovi za sljede i korak, na zemlji koja ho e da pristupi je da ih ispunji, pa kad budu ispunjeni, ide se na sljede i korak. Sve bi uvijek trebalo biti na vlastima zemlje u procesu pristupanja, da samo oni budu odgovorni za reforme i napredak. Jedan politi ar iz BiH nedavno je prezrivo izjavio da je “Evropska komisija puna birokrata”. Jali no mislim da je to veliki kompliment. U Komisiji i treba da budu birokrati, koji kažu: “To su vam uslovi, ispunite ih i možete ra unati na sljede i korak”, bez ikakvog utjecaja neprimjerenih politi kih stavova.

Komisija nastoji da tako radi, ali je ugrožena iz tri pravca. Prvo, od Vije a. Vije e ugrožava uslovljavanje time što donosi politi ke odluke, a ne odluke zasnovane na kriterijima. Makedonija može koliko god ho e ispunjavati uslove za otvaranje pregovora, ali pitanje imena, koje nema gotovo nikakve veze s procesom pristupanja, uvla i se u njega i blokira mu napredak. Srbija, s druge strane, može ostaviti neispunjениm nekolikouslova za proces liberalizacije viznog režima, ali ga je dobila u prvoj transi kao podršku proevropskim snagama u zemlji.

Drugi izvor ugrožavanja su vlade zemalja koje pristupaju. Obi no su manje otvorene po pitanju toga šta su ta no uslovi za naredni korak i šta se od njih o ekuje. Hrvatska je pokazatelje uvala kao strogo povjerljive sve dok proces pregovora nije bio potpuno završen, mada nije bilo nikakvog razloga da se to tako radi. Ništa u pregovorima ne e biti ugroženo otvorenos u, jer

su pokazatelji, kad se o njima odlu i, nepromjenjivi. Teško je nevladinim organizacijama i medijima, a kamoli gra anima, da saznaju šta to vlada treba uraditi kako bi se njeni zakoni reformirali i uskladili s propisima EU. Tako izgleda da se brojni uslovi, pokazatelji i kriteriji najednom pojave i djeluju novo i nepravedno, ime se potkopava povjerenje koje bi gra ani trebalo da imaju prema procesu pristupanja. I sama se esto suo im s takvim osje anjem u balkanskim zemljama. U Srbiji je, recimo, dosta ljudi mislilo da bi njihova zemlja mogla biti primljena odmah nakon što je Mladi bio uhapšen. I vlada i Evropska komisija premalo su u inile da ispravno objasne sve korake i uslove za pristupanje. Stoga ne udi da se ljudi osje aju kao da su ih i jedni i drugi prevarili i izdali, kad se o njihovim o ekivanjima vodi tako malo ra una.

Tre a sila ugrožavanja je sama Evropska komisija. Po mom mišljenju, Komisija previše miješa proširenje i diplomatiju. Pokušava riješiti diplomatske probleme tako što e ih u initi dijelom procesa pristupa, ili tako što e isti ljudi voditi proces pristupanja i voditi diplomatske odnose. Mada na površini korištenje proširenja za napredak u diplomatskim odnosima može djelovati kao dobra ideja, što duže traje to više potkopava kredibilitet procesa.

Diplomatija i proces pristupanja se razlikuju po svojoj prirodi. Diplomatija je stvar uzimanja i davanja, kompromisa, jednakih strana koje pregovorima pokušavaju otkloniti razlike. Proces pristupanja je pitanje kriterija koje treba zadovoljiti, bez mogu nosti pregovora, pitanje toga da EU jasno kaže šta treba da se uradi, bez mogu nosti kompromisa. Kad se to dvoje pomiješa, i jedno i drugo postaje političko i specifično za datu zemlju. Političari u zemljama koje pristupaju po inju smatrati da su kriteriji za pristup “meki” i podložni kompromisu. Gra ani po inju misliti da se odluke donose proizvoljno i *ad hoc*. Vije e ministara ima potvrdu da je prihvatljivo da se odluke donose politi ki a ne na osnovu kriterija.

To ne zna i da diplomatske probleme ne treba rješavati. Pitanje imena Makedonije treba riješiti, bosanski ustav treba promijeniti, albanski parlament treba reformirati, status Kosova treba riješiti. Ali, pitanja koja nisu direktno dio kriterija za pristupanje treba rješavati u druga ijoj areni. U Evropskom parlamentu su Zeleni upravo zato uveli ideju mehanizma arbitraže EU, gdje bi se izvan drugih procesa rješavala bilateralna pitanja, recimo pitanje imena, ali i pitanja poput Neuma i Plo a, ako se ne riješe prije pristupanja Hrvatske. Ne bi trebalo dozvoliti da ta pitanja zatruju proces pristupanja i ometu prijeko potrebne reforme. Nadalje, Evropska komisija ne samo da ima komesara Fülea za proširenje, ve i visoku predstavnici Ashton za vanjske poslove. On bi trebao voditi proces pristupanja na osnovu kriterija, a ona bi

se trebala baviti diplomatskim pregovorima. S Kosovom se to trenutno ne dešava tako. Dijalog sa Srbijom vodi Ashton, a ne Füle. Me utim, postoji mogunost da će Füle nagraditi Srbiju za saradnju narednim korakom u pristupanju, zanemarujući kriterije koje Srbija tek treba da ispunji.

Naravno, vrlo esto postoje veza između diplomatskih ili političkih kriterija i pristupnih kriterija. Dobrosusjedski odnosi su jedan od kriterija iz Kopenhagena, tako da je dijalog između Srbije i Kosova potreban radi ispunjenja tog kriterija. Djelotvorna uprava i funkcionalne demokratske ustanove takođe su kriterij iz Kopenhagena, pa je ustavna reforma u BiH potrebna da bi se ona ispunio. Ali > mada rješavanje nekog političkog problema može biti preduslov za ispunjenje kriterija da bi se poduzeo sljedeći korak > to ne bi smjelo zamijeniti sam kriterij. A sad se upravo to dešava, previše esto. Srbija je u UN predložila jedno agresivno rješenje, samo po sebi nevezano za pristup, i bila nagrađena sljedećim korakom u procesu pristupa zato što je to pitanje uklonila sa stola. Bosanskohercegovački političari uspiju u formiranju vlade i izglasavanju budžeta, što je samo po sebi nevezano za pristup, i po injetu se vršiti radnje da se zatvori OHR a da nisu zadovoljeni svi uslovi. Ovo miješanje diplomatije i proširenja sam proces proširenja čini previše specifičnim za održenu zemlju i proizvoljnim,ime se ostavlja previše prostora za emocije i manipulaciju, što u koncu nici potkopava kredibilitet samog procesa.

Vjerujem da bi sljedeći korak u procesu pristupa mogao uvijek biti primamljiv, ali nikako i mamac. Mamac nikad nema hranjivu vrijednost, uvijek je to sredstvo za sasvim drugačiji cilj. Koristiti sljedeći korak kao mamac zna i da razmišljanje započinje od same zemlje. Razmišljanje koje ide u pravcu "Šta treba da se uradi u BiH kako bi se ona što je moguće više pretvorila u kopiju jedne države lanice EU, i koji bismo od narednih koraka u pristupanju EU mogli upotrijebiti da se to tako i uradi?". Mrkva je zaista zdrava hrana, sama je sebi cilj. Korištenje narednog koraka kao primamljive mrkve zna i da razmišljanje započinje od Ugovora o osnivanju EU, od njenih propisa i vrijednosti. Razmišljanje u pravcu "Kako da pomognemo BiH u njenoj želji da postane država lanica EU, koja je spremna da se nosi sa svim pravima i obavezama koje idu uz državstvo?"

Nakon svega ovoga dozvolite da zaključim tako što u reči da sam ja predan pobornik procesa proširenja, uz sve nedostatke koje on ima. Mada to možda i ne izgleda uvijek tako, tempo napretka i reformi u svim zemljama Balkana je uđeno, naročito za ranjive grupe. Još je dug put pred nama, ali uvijek sam impresionirana kad se susretjem s grupama za prava žena, s LGBT populacijom, Romima, grupama za zaštitu okoline i drugim građanskim organizacijama, i kad vidim

kako se njihov položaj popravio u manje od jedne decenije. Oni su objetu ke prigrlili ono što nudi proces pristupanja i velikim koracima idu naprijed. Ja želim da se koncentriram na to kako se proces proširenja može u initi što korisnijim za one koji žele napredak, koji žele postati građani EU zbog jedne od najboljih stvari koje, po mom mišljenju, EU nudi: njenih fundamentalnih prava.

EU: AMBULANTNA ZAJEDNICA KAO POSLJEDNJI STADIJ ETNONACIONALIZMA?

(Euroskepti ka tematska perspektiva)

Žarko Puhovski*

Promotrena iz (višedesetljetne) balkanske ekaonice, Evropska se unija dugo inila bitnom orijentacijskom vrijednoš u, najbližom aproksimacijom onoga što su postkomunisti ke zajednice službeno navodile (i, uglavnom, neslužbeno osje ale) kao svoj *credo*. U gotovo svim segmentima poslijejugoslavenskih društava smatralo se je neupitnim da je rije o zajednici zajednicâ koja jam i materijalno blagostanje, uz zajam ena ljudska prava, politi ku slobodu, socijalnu sigurnost i stabilan mir (što se, s obzirom na lokalni poratni kontekst inilo nadasve važnim).

1. S približavanjem fakti koj „eurointegraciji“ slika se je po eli mijenjati, ne toliko zbog promijenjene perspektive (iako, dakako, i zbog toga), koliko zbog objektivnih promjena u unutrašnjem i vanjskom funkcioniranju same EU koje su zbole u posljednjih desetak godina. Ma koliko su se poslijejugoslavska društva približavala lanstvu, ipak su i dalje izvan EU (s izuzetkom Slovenije), pa je njezino vanjsko funkcioniranje bilo – i ostalo – za njih najvažnijim imbenikom promijenjenoga vrednovanja nekadašnjega idealja.

1. 1. Sa stajališta koje – svim ostalim razlikama unato – neprijeporno dijele politi ke zajednice koje su naslijedile Jugoslaviju, prvi je traumati ni trenutak nastao primitkom Slovenije u EU. Pritom prvenstvo Slovenije kao kandidatkinje, ve i zbog njezine relativne razvijenosti, uop e nije dovo eno u pitanje, nego je šok izazvala injenica da je to lanstvo bitno otežalo (osobne, ali i ekonomski) kontakte sa svim ostalim nekadašnjim YU republikama. Jer, ovoga se puta – za razliku od ranijih prigoda – nije moglo govoriti o lokalnome „uskogrudnom nacionalizmu“ i sl., nego se o ito radilo o „direktivama iz Bruxellesa“. Ispalo je, dakle, da „zajednica evropskih zajednica“ nije nužno u funkciji promicanja slobodne komunikacije me u ljudima, nego obratno, da, eto, u najboljem slu aju važi: bit e mnogo gore prije nego što postane znatno bolje.

1.2 Pravi je šok uslijedio, me utim, u razdoblju u kojem se EU – doslovce – pokazala ambulantnom zajednicom (termin, naime, dolazi od latinskoga *ambulare* – šetati). Lakonogo je prošetala najve im dijelom nekadašnjega jugoslavenskog teritorija i smjestila se u Bugarskoj i Rumunjskoj, koje – kao

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države i društva – u mnogome zaostaju ne samo za Hrvatskom, nego i za još ponekima od poslijejugoslavenskih država (u Srbiji je, primjerice, mogu e sresti *gastarbeiter* iz Rumunjske, pa je EU izgubila poziciju isklju iva uvoznika i postala, djelomice, izvoznikom radne snage).

1.2.1. Razlozi su ove odluke – uz neke posebne interese „utjecajnih lanica“ EU – bili pretežito geostrategijske naravi. Željelo se je (pravno, a to u realnosti znači: fizički) ograditi budući teritorij EU od ruskih (i drugih isto nih) intervencija, pa je tako stvorena svojevrsna politi ko-geografska crna rupa unutar EU (za razliku od Švicarske, koja – vjerojatno zahvaljuju i longitudinalnome Rousseauovu utjecaju > predstavlja svojevrsnu ruži astu rupu). Ova je ograda ivanjem nastala rupa razumljena ujedno kao neka vrst socijalno-politi koga mo varnog podru ja, koje treba postupno meliorirati kako bi ga se u inilo podobnim za daljnje integriranje. Prvi je stupanj ovoga melioriranja izveden posredstvom Pakta stabilnosti za Jugoisto nu Evropu. Dobrohotne pomaga e, izgleda, nije smetala injenica da je „regiji“ mnogo toga trebalo znatno više (i prije) no stabilnost (npr. razvoj, koji, prema definiciji, svagda destabilizira postojeće stanje).

1.3. Otkako je EU elegantno preskoila „bivšu Jugoslaviju minus Slovenija plus Albanija“ sve je više analiti ari i politi ari, diplomata i novinara po elo na nekadašnju obe anu zemlju gledati kriti nije. A nije baš trebalo odviše kriti nosti da se sagleda problem „dvostrukih kriterija“ – kako se to uobi ajenom neobrazovanoš u javno naziva (rije je, dakako, o nijekanju kriterija uop e, jer jednostrukost je u biti samoga pojma kriterija).

1.3.1. Ulazak Bugarske i Rumunjske u EU pokazao je da je „insistiranje na najvišim kriterijima za ulazak u lanstvo EU“ obična fraza kojom se pokrivaju (ina e posve legitimne) politi ke odluke vodstva Unije, ali i unutrašnji nacionalisti ki sukobi. Još ranije to se moglo vidjeti i kod primanja balti kih država i Maarske (kada je, primjerice, rije o politici spram etni kih manjina), ili Slova ke (kada je rije o demokratskim ustanovama); 1.3.2. S druge strane, repetitivno službeno upozoravanje Bosne i Hercegovine na to da „ovako podijeljena nije podobna za ulazak u EU“ hladnokrvno je „zaboravljaljalo“ da je u EU (i to djelomice!) primljena država koja je znatno dulje (možda i dublje) podijeljena od BiH, naime Cipar.

1.3.3. Srbiji je, primjerice, jasno re eno da mora prestatи pomagati politi ke i socijalne strukture na sjeveru Kosova koji je izvan kontrole Prištine, želi li napredak u pristupnim pregovorima, dok istovremeno država (Turska) koje veetrdesetak godina okupira dio teritorije jedne od novih lanica EU (Cipra) i dalje vodi (doduše ve poslovi no neuspješne) pregovore o pristupu EU.

1.4. Još su drasti nije razlike standarda koji se nameće državama kandidatkinjama i realnoga stanja u samoj EU (ak i onoj „staroj“); diskrepancija se zaoštrava do te mjere da, možda ak, opravdava i radikalni stav pristupnica u skladu s glasovitom marksisti kom formulom: „Ne želim biti lanom kluba koji bi me prihvatio za lana“ (dakako, injenica da je pritom rije o Grouchu, a ne o Karlu Marxu, samo dodatno ilustrira problem). Jer, s vremenom je postajalo sve o itije da napredak u reformama država kandidatkinja (i njihovih društava posebice) nije, po sebi, dostatan, za prispjeće do lanstva, dok, istovremeno prakse unutar same EU ne tako rijetko zaostaju za onime što su kandidatkinje ve davno obavile. Rije ju, samo („punopravno“) lanstvo nije jamstvo da su države (a kamoli društva) doista promijenjene u onome smislu koji je potreban – kako na razini vladavine prava, tako i na razini funkcionalne države blagostanja, itd.

1.4.1. Potreba daljnje demokratizacije neupitna je odrednica svih rasprava o primanju novih lanica, no EU je istovremeno bitno obilježena demokratskim deficitom, činjenicom da Evropska komisija donedavno predstavljala najveću koncentraciju politike moći bez parlamentarne kontrole na svijetu (s izuzetkom Politbiroa Centralnoga komiteta Komunističke partije Kine), a ni sada stanje još ne odgovara standardima parlamentarne demokracije. Daljnja demokratizacija EU nemoguće je naprsto stoga što ne postoji evropski narod (ili bolje: puk), pa se razvija koloplet institucija koje bi trebale jednu drugu kontrolirati – navodno nadomeštajući i graanstvo.

1.4.2. U procesu pristupa od kandidatkinja je, pored ostalog, uvijek tražena „liberalizacija radnoga zakonodavstva“, što je, zapravo, floskula kojom se skriva injenica da su posloprimci u tradiciji EU slabije zaštićeni no u tradiciji iz koje su se emancipirale poslijejugoslavenske zajednice, pa, dakle, barem u tomu EU nije uzor (u trenucima aktualne socijalne krize upravo to dovodi u pitanje funkcionalnost EU – što uvjerljivo demonstriraju miliioni prosvjednika u većini njezinih lanica).

1.4.3. „Otklon od nacionalističkih koncepcija“ stalno se ponavlja kao pretpostavka budućih integracija, no iz integrirane unije grada nacionalistička politika pogubno djeluje na politike život tзв. FYROM (naime Makedonije, kojoj Grci zabranjuju korištenje vlastita imena).

1.4.4. „Zaštita etničkih manjina“ opetovano je naglašavao kao *conditio sine qua non* za ulazak novih lanica, premda „stara Evropa“ posve oito ne pretjeruje u zaštiti manjinskih prava (Njemačka i Francuska, primjerice, uopće nisu strane potpisnice Okvirne konvencije za zaštitu nacionalnih manjina Vijeće Evrope – s obrazloženjem da kod njih nacionalnih manjina i nema). Diskriminacija je Roma (nacionalistička, ili, dapaće, rasistička) svakodnevica većeg broja lanica EU, pa im je – politički i pravno – u

nekima od država koje je još dugo ekati na lanstvo bolje no u EU. Druk ije re eno, na Balkanu je trebati nau iti da nije dopušteno diskriminiranje pripadnik(c)a drugih nacija – uz uvjet da imaju državu iza sebe, što s Romima, zna se, nije slu aj.

1.4.5. Zahtjevi iz EU da se „zaoštari borba protiv korupcije u zemljama kandidatkinjama“, vjerojatno posve svjesno, zapostavljuju injeniku da je zna ajan aspekt lokalnih korupcija uvozne naravi, nerijetko i iz EU (opetovani skandali s finskom Patrijom, ili s Daimlerom dobro to ilustriraju).

1.4.6. Na posve pojavnjoj razini, ova se disproporcija izme u prakse u klubu i onoga što se o ekuje od kandidata za lanstvo u novije doba jasno iskazala u (na elno posve razumnome) zahtjevu Srbiji da prizna Kosovo prije ulaska u lanstvo Unije > ijjih pet lanica Kosovo ne priznaju.

2. Prethodni se prigovori u javnosti naj eš e smatraju dijelom pojmovnoga arsenala „euroskeptika“, jer je, i u ovome pogledu, na djelu nevješto baratanje stranim riječima. Logički se radi o trojstvu – eurofili, euroskeptici, eurofobi; pritom je rije o dva emocionalno optere ena stajališta – onoga koje se boji integracija i onoga koje ih voli, dok je samo tre e stajališta doista racionalno, naime: skeptiko.

2.1. Euroskeptici nisu – kako to nevježe tvrde – protivnici EU, nego su to oni koji dvoje, dakle razmatraju smislenost nadolaze ih integracija. Takvo stajalište u postjugoslavenskome kontekstu zna i naglašenu svijest o:

2.1.1. demokratskome deficitu EU;

2.1.2. njezinu socijalnom deficitu (pa i klasnoj pristranosti);

2.1.3. inkonzistentnoj politici EU spram „regije“;

2.2. Ali, euroskeptiko stajalište jasno poima i to da:

2.2.1. su sve postjugoslavenske države ve objektivno u EU (njezini su politički, ali, još više, tržišni objekti);

2.2.2. EU ima zna ajnu i pozitivnu ulogu u (više-manje) „demokratskome pripitomljavanju“ lokalnih nacionalizama, militarizama i patrijarhalizama;

2.2.3. EU kao koncept omogu uje unutrašnje razlu ivanje ljubitelja doma e primitivnosti (u paradigmi „Barbarogenija“ > decivilizatora Ljubomira Micića, koji, indikativno, završava s „betonskim aeroplantom“) spram onih kojima je, u svakome pogledu, stalo do poboljšanja životnih uvjeta, kako materijalnih, tako i kulturnih, kako pravnih, tako i zdravstvenih.

3. Na pozitivnoj strani predstoje ih integracija ini se nedvojbenim:

3.1. Evropski je identitet tradicijski ozna en pluralizmom nacionalno ustrojenih političkih zajednica, a njihovo je pretpostavljeno vrijednosno jedinstvo svagda korelirano jezičnom, kulturnom i tradicijskom različitošću; moderna je

„Evropa“ institucijski izvedena iz opere prihvaenosti koncepta demokratske države blagostanja;

3.2. Nadnacionalna politika integracija u Evropi (za razliku od privredne) stoga je ograničena dvostrukim temeljnim zahtjevom > o uvanjem nacionalno-tradicijskoga pluralizma i održanjem zadane razine demokratskoga ustroja;

3.3. Ustanovni postav današnje Evropske unije ove zahtjeve nužno relativizira – što je, barem dijelom, i neizbjegljivo. Problem je, međutim, u tomu što se ovo relativiziranje odvija bez dostatne demokratske legitimacije.

4. Ulazak u EU stoga je u procijepu stalno promjenjivih političkih zahtjeva iz Bruxellesa i nedvosmisleno nazo na potrebe da se stanje u državama „Zapadnoga Balkana“ stubokom mijenja. Dosadašnje su iskustva pritom pokazala:

4.1. realni deficiti društva i zajednice miješaju se, u nalazima eurokrata, s njihovim neznanjem, unutrašnjim nesuglasicama i predrasudama;

4.2. polaganje ispita (pred ispitiva ima dvojbenih kompetencija) naziva se „pregovorima“;

4.3. isti politički status imaju razumni, nedvojbeno opravdani zahtjevi za promjenama s kapricima vlada država-lanica, pa i pojedinih diplomatata;

4.4. konačna odluka, neovisno o komplikiranim domaćim zadatama biti donesena na posve političkim, vjerojatno ak: dnevno-političkim osnovama. Primjerice, neovisno o pojedinim političkim „ispadima“, Hrvatska će za nekoliko mjeseci postati lanicom EU – ak i ako nije posve spremna u svim aspektima (ne uzmu li se, dakako, brojni deficiti ranijih kandidatkinja kao mjerilo). Jer, to je jedini uspjeh što ga eurokrati u dugome razdoblju mogu podastrijeti javnosti. Ostale države regije će barem još desetljeća ak i da su > nekim udalom > na prepostavljenoj razini napretka, jer EU naprsto nema institucijskoga kapaciteta za daljnje proširenje (pitanje je ak kako bi reagirala da se odjednom kandidiraju Švicarska ili Norveška).

5. Dakako, EU je umnogome poželjna, premda podjednako i zakašnjela, perspektiva za poslijerugoslavensku državnu ikebanu. Njezina kritika nema smisla kako bi lokalne prilike u inila prividno manje zaostalima, ali zato ima imanentnu svrhu – naime, sa stajališta onih vrijednosti koje su Evropu (idealno) definirale (dijelom barem zemljopisu nasuprot). Te su vrijednosti umnogome kompromitirane i ponašanjem EU u recentnoj krizi, ali i njezinom navadom da samoj sebi tepe: „Evropa“, bez ikakve svijesti o tomu što su „preostalim dijelovima kontinenta“ (makar na razini nekoga *think tanka*). No, i takve pružaju okvir za poželjnu društvenu promjenu, ali, kako se vidi, tek ako im se pristupi s barem malo zdrave, iskustvom podržane, skepsisom.

FISKALNA POLITIKE EU I ZAPADNOG BALKANA KAO OSNOVA (DEZ)INTEGRACIJE

*Fikret auševi **

1. Fiskalna politika Evropske unije kao osnova politi ke ekonomije integracije

Ekomska i finansijska kriza koja je obilježila posljednjih pet godina u svjetskoj ekonomiji potaknuta je kriom tzv. *arm-length* finansijskog sistema u anglosaksonskom civilizacijskom krugu. Me utim, produbljavanje svjetske ekomske krize tokom protekle dvije godine najve im je dijelom vezano za probleme upravljanja javnim finansijama zemalja Evropske unije, odnosno eurozone. Transformacija Evropske ekomske zajednice u Evropsku zajednicu, a potom u Evropsku uniju, zahtjevala je ve i stepen odricanja od politi ke i ekomske suverenosti zemalja lanica Evropske unije u cilju stvaranja ekomsko-politi ke zajednice koja bi imala potencijal za konkurentsko nadmetanje sa Sjedinjenim Amerikim Državama i zemljama Dalekog istoka tokom 21. vijeka. Nakon uvo enja jedinstvene valute (eura) centralno pitanje efikasnog ekomskog upravljanja jeste pitanje uskla ivanja djelovanja jedinstvene monetarne politike sa fiskalnom politikom. Monetarna politika je 1999. postala nadnacionalna (eurozona), dok je fiskalna politika ostala na nacionalnom nivou.

Dostignu a ekomske nauke u oblasti makroekonomskog upravljanja u otvorenoj ekonomiji, sa liberalizovanim finansijskim tržištima, sugerisu da nije mogu e voditi konzistentnu i jedinstvenu monetarnu politiku bez barem jednog jedinstvenog segmenta fiskalne politike na nivou integracije zemalja koje emituju jedinstvenu valutu. Održavanje vrijednosti eura u skorijoj i daljoj budu nosti će izravno zavisiti od zainteresovanosti i povjerenja finansijskih investitora da ulažu u finansijske imovine denominovane u eurima. Stoga vrijednosni papiri koje bi trebalo da emituje zajednica (eurozona) predstavljaju jednu od nužnosti za dugoročno održavanje stabilnosti eura, konkurentnosti finansijskih institucija iz eurozone, i stabilnosti finansijskog servisiranja realnog sektora u ovoj zajednici. *Međutim, prihvatanje barem dijela jedinstvene fiskalne politike (indirektnog oporezivanja) na nivou eurozone, kao osnove za emitovanje obveznica eurozone i smanjivanja sistemskog rizika, jeste prevashodno pitanje politi ke ekonomije ujedinjavanja ovog dijela svijeta.* Jedinstvena fiskalna politika nužno podrazumijeva dodatno odricanje od ekomske suverenosti.

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Odricanje od ovog dijela ekonomске suverenosti doti e temeljna pitanja zapadnoevropske demokratije i (ne)sposobnosti izabranih predstavnika vlasti u zemljama koje čine eurozonu da efikasno upravljaju javnim finansijama.

2. Fiskalna (ne)disciplina Evropske unije

U junu 1998. godine osnovana je Evropska centralna banka, najmla a od velikih svjetskih centralnih banaka. Iz Evropskog monetarnog instituta, koji je naslijedio ulogu Evropskog fonda za monetarnu saradnju, nastala je Evropska centralna banka. Šest mjeseci kasnije uvedena je jedinstvena evropska valuta – euro, prva jedinstvena valuta u jednoj od najrazvijenijih svjetskih grupacija zemalja. Time je ostvaren jedan od osnovnih ciljeva evropskih integracija, zapo et osnivanjem Zajednice za ugalj i elik, iz koje je nastala Evropska ekonomkska zajednica, potom Evropska zajednica i na kraju Evropska unija.

Stabilizacija javnih finansija i postizanje fiskalne discipline u zemljama Evropske zajednica nametnula se kao jedan od prioriteta, odnosno jedna od osnova za uvo enje jedinstvene valute. Stoga su Maastrichtskim ugovorom (u februaru 1992.) određeni fiskalni i monetarni kriteriji kao preduslov za ulazak u zonu jedinstvene valute – eurozonu. Ugovor je stupio na snagu 1.12.1993. godine. Dva fiskalna kriterija koja je trebalo ispuniti, a bili su odre eni Maastrichtskim ugovorom, odnosila su se na dozvoljeni budžetski deficit od 3% BDP (kao maksimalan nivo), dok se alternativni fiskalni kriterij odnosio na ukupan javni dug. Ukupan javni dug, formalno dozvoljen Ugovorom, bio je odre en na nivou od 60% BDP.

Kada je osnovana Evropska centralna banka, a potom i uvedena jedinstvena evropska valuta (januar 1999.), više od polovice tadašnjih zemalja lanica eurozone imalo je ukupan javni dug znatno viši od “dozvoljenih” 60% BDP. Rekordno visoke javne dugove 1998. imale su Italija (122% BDP) i Belgija (124% BDP). Gr ka je primljena u eurozonu 2001. godine – budu i da je te godine zadovoljila jedan od dva fiskalna kriterija. Naime, Grčka je smanjila budžetski deficit na ispod 3% BDP, dok je njen javni dug u to doba bio približno na nivou javnih dugova Italije i Belgije (oko 120% BDP).

Ulazak zemalja lanica euro-zone bio je striktno uslovljavan prvim kriterijem – smanjenjem budžetskog deficita na ispod 3% BDP, uz obavezu zemalja koje su imale znatno ve e javne dugove u odnosu na utvr eni kriterij (60% BDP) da javne dugove postepeno svedu u prihvatljive i održive okvire. Obaveza Italije i Belgije je bila da smanje javne dugove na nivo od 90%

BDP do 2005. godine. Belgija je svoj javni dug smanjila na ispod 100% BDP do navedene godine, dok je javni dug Italije te iste godine bio 104% BDP.

U oktobru 2002. tadašnji predsjednik Evropske komisije Romano Prodi dao je svoj uveni intervju francuskom *Le Mondu*, u kojem je istaknuo da su fiskalni kriteriji utvrđeni u Maastrichtu suviše rigidni. Ta pravila, koja su potvrđena evropskim Paktom za stabilnost, Prodi je nazvao "... *these stupid rules...*" U to doba, dakle u posljednjem kvartalu 2002. godine, tri najrazvijenije zemlje Evropske unije i lanice eurozone (Njemačka, Francuska i Italija) kršile su kriterij da fiskalni deficit ne smije biti veći od 3% BDP. Ove zemlje su svoje budžetske deficite pravdale time da ne postoje opasnosti od kršenja fiskalnog kriterija budžetskog deficit-a iznad 3% BDP. Naime, njihov argument sastojao od tvrdnje da bi bila mnogo veća šteta imati recesiju nego budžetske deficite na nivou od 4% BDP.

3. Fiskalna (ne)disciplina u zemljama Zapadnog Balkana i uticaj Globalne krize na region

U petogodišnjem periodu koji je prethodio globalnoj krizi 2003-2008. zemlje Zapadnog Balkana bile su fiskalno disciplinovanije od većine zemalja eurozone, koriste i budžetske bilanse u procentima BDP kao kriterij. U periodu 2003-2005. Bosna i Hercegovina (BiH) je ostvarivala budžetske suficite u prosjeku na nivou 2,5% BDP. Crna Gora je u periodu 2005-2007. bila još uspješnija – ustvari najuspješnija zemlja Zapadnog Balkana. Ona je 2007. ostvarila budžetski suficit na nivou 6,1% BDP. Srbija je 2005. ostvarila budžetski suficit, dok su budžetski deficit-i ove zemlje u 2003. ili 2007. bili ispod 2% BDP. Najveće budžetske deficite ostvarivala je Albanija u cijelom navedenom periodu – kako u pretkriznom periodu tako i u kriznoj 2009. godini. Prosječan budžetski deficit Albanije u periodu 2003-2007. kretao se na nivou od približno 4,2% BDP, dok je u recessionaloj godini iznosio 7,4%.

Za razliku od fiskalne discipline/nediscipline mjerene budžetskim deficitom u procentima BDP, ukupni javni rashodi mjereni procentima BDP u pretkriznom i kriznom periodu u prosjeku su bili na nivou 42% BDP u BiH, Hrvatskoj, Srbiji i Crnoj Gori u periodu 2003-2006. godina. U 2007. i 2008. najviše javne rashode imala je BiH (47,5% BDP prosjek za dvije navedene godine). Najniže ukupne javne rashode imala je Albanija (za razliku od budžetskog deficit-a). Ukupni javni rashodi u ovoj zemlji kretali su se u prosjeku na nivou od 26% BDP. Najviši javni rashodi u BiH, i razmjerno visoki javni rashodi u ostalim zemljama bivše Jugoslavije, posljedica su injenice da

su ove zemlje, a prije svega BiH, pretrpjeli velika ratna razaranja – kako u pogledu ljudskog kapitala tako i u pogledu fizičkog kapitala i infrastrukture.

Razmjerno visoku fiskalnu disciplinu mjerenu budžetskim bilansima zemlje Zapadnog Balkana (s izuzetkom Albanije) ostvarile su, međutim, najvećim dijelom zahvaljujući i nagloj ekspanziji kreditne aktivnosti banaka: ekspanzije kredita odobrenih preduzećima ima i kredita odobrenih domaćinstvima. Dakle, po dva dominantna segmenta kreiranja BDP (potrošnja stanovništva i poslovne investicije), kreditna aktivnost je stvorala uslove za rast BDP i, na taj način, porast fiskalnog kapaciteta ovih zemalja.

Izraziti primjer izravne veze rasta fiskalnih prihoda i suficita budžeta sa kreditnom aktivnošću u bankarskog sektora je Crna Gora. Ova zemlja je bila apsolutni rekorder, ne samo u regionu Zapadnog Balkana već i među vodećih deset zemalja svijeta, po ekspanziji kreditne aktivnosti 2006. i 2007. godini. U navedene dvije godine krediti odobreni domaćinstvima porasli su za 198% i 155% respektivno, a krediti preduzećima za 102% i 187% respektivno. Enorman rast kupovne moći po obje osnove naglo je povećao poresku bazu, pa je Crna Gora povećala budžetski suficit sa 2,1% (2005) na 6,4% BDP (2007). Efekti Globalne finansijske krize na kreditnu aktivnost i fiskalne prihode u Crnoj Gori i Srbiji bili su različiti. U 2009. i 2010. krediti odobreni domaćinstvima u Crnoj Gori smanjeni su za 11,4% i 6,1% respektivno, a krediti preduzećima za 17,5% i 9,4% respektivno. Budžetski suficit od 6,4% BDP iz 2007. pretvoren je u budžetski deficit od 5,3% BDP 2009. godine.

Za razliku od Crne Gore, u Srbiji su stope rasta kredita domaćinstvima i preduzećima znatno smanjene, ali je zadržan trend *rasta kredita*. Krediti domaćinstvima su 2009. i 2010. porasli za 8% i 23,5% respektivno, a krediti preduzećima za 18,4% i 27% respektivno. Ovakvi trendovi na kreditnom tržištu u Srbiji imali su za posljedicu ublažavanje efekata eksternih šokova i značajno smanjivanje deficitu tekućeg računa. Međutim, budžetski deficit u Srbiji je zbog pada kupovne moći uslijed rasta nezaposlenosti i smanjenja obima trgovinske razmjene povećan sa 1,9% na 4,5%. Zbog ovakvih trendova Srbija je, slično kao i BiH, ugovorila *stand-by agreement* sa MMF-om. U posljednjem kvartalu 2011. godine Srbija je potpisala novi *stand-by agreement* kao kreditnu liniju kojom se iz predostrožnosti osigurava od potencijalnih negativnih efekata krize u eurozoni tokom 2012. Važno je napomenuti da je kreditna aktivnost u Srbiji tokom 2011. bila znatno slabijeg intenziteta u odnosu na prethodnu godinu. Premda je ostvaren rast kredita, stopa rasta je bila za gotovo deset puta manja u odnosu na prethodnu godinu.

Crna Gora je tokom 2011. nastavila sa trendom pada kreditne aktivnosti.

U Albaniji je prosje na stopa rasta kredita odobrenih doma instvima u periodu 2005-2007. bila 69%, a kredita odobrenih preduze ima 56,6%. Budžetski deficit Albanije smanjen je sa 4,9% (2003.) na 3,5% BDP (projek za period 2005-2007). Tokom 2009. i 2010. kreditna aktivnost banaka znatno je smanjena. Krediti odobreni doma instvima porasli su za svega 3,8% i 1,3% respektivno u navedene dvije godine, dok su krediti preduze ima porasli za 13,8% i 14,7% respektivno. Budžetski deficit Albanije je više nogo udvostručen – sa 3,5% (2007) na 7,4% BDP (2009). U periodu 2005-2007. u Makedoniji je prosje na stopa rasta kredita doma instvima bila 45,4%, a kredita preduze ima 23,3%. U skladu s ovim podacima, ekspanzija kredita odobrenih preduze ima u Makedoniji je bila uporediva s kreditnom ekspanzijom u BiH i Hrvatskoj, dok su krediti odobreni doma instvima bilježili zna ajno više stope rasta u odnosu na dvije navedene zemlje. Makedonija je u navedenom trogodišnjem periodu ostvarivala budžetske suficite na nivou od 0,6% BDP. Tokom 2009. i 2010. godine krediti doma instvima rasli su po stopi od 3,1% i 5,1% respektivno, a krediti preduzećima po stopi 3,4% i 8,5% respektivno. Budžetski suficit Makedonije u periodu krize pretvoren je u budžetski deficit od 2,3% BDP (2009).

4. Fiskalna disciplina i kontrolisana fiskalna ekspanzija za Zapadni Balkan

Fiskalna disciplina zasnovana na smanjivanju rashoda za neproduktivne svrhe, posebno rashoda za administraciju i, u nekim slu ajevima, neopravданog porasta socijalnih davanja, jeste korisna i bi e nužna. Me utim, gotovo nijedna zemlja u Evropi u skorijoj i nešto daljoj istoriji nije uspjela iza i iz recesije, odnosno prevenirati prerastanje recesije u depresiju oštrim smanjivanjem javnih rashoda – posebno rashoda namijenjenih otvaranju novih radnih mesta i povezivanju ekonomija s okruženjem. Naravno, ovdje govorim o kapitalnim rashodima kojima je neophodno pove ati kvalitet poslovnog okruženja i povezati zemlje regiona, što bi stvorilo temelje za realizaciju zajedni kih poslovnih poduhvata i razvoja klastera na me udržavnoj osnovi. Neke od zemalja regiona, kao što su Bosna i Hercegovina i Srbija, a dijelom i Hrvatska, još uvijek u svom vlasništvu imaju dominantne ili značajne udjele u vlasništvu velikih i profitabilnih kompanija. To vlasništvo može biti korišteno kao garancija za emisiju državnih vrijednosnih papira isključivo namijenjenih finansiranju razvojnih projekata.

Region Zapadnog Balkana raspolaže zna ajnim razvojnim potencijalima u oblasti razvoja cestovne, željezni ke i energetske infrastrukture na me udržavnom nivou. Nažalost, ovi potencijali nisu iskorišten. Regionalni

projekti razvoja infrastrukture mogu zna ajno doprinijeti smanjivanju razlika u ekonomskom razvoju izme u zemalja Zapadnog Balkana i Evropske unije. Finansiranje ovih projekata emisijom državnih obveznica s rokovima dospije a 10 ili 15 godina denominiranih u nacionalnim valutama može doprinijeti podsticanju ve eg stepena ekonomske saradnje u regionu i smanjivanju jaza u ekonomskom razvoju. Kako bi bio smanjen trošak finansiranja kapitalnih ulaganja emisijom državnih obveznica za finansiranje međudržavnih projekata, bilo bi neophodno povećati stepen povjerenja finansijskih ulagača u te vrste imovina i sniziti zahtijevani prinos.

Novi kvalitetniji finansijski instrumenti koji bi bili nerizični, odnosno najmanje rizični, a istovremeno bi povećali profitabilnost (smanjili potrebu držanja zna ajnih viškova rezervi) komercijalnih banaka u regionu i podstakli brži ekonomski rast i razvoj Zapadnog Balkana, morali bi imati novi kvalitet, koji omogu ava niži stepen sistemskog rizika. Drugim rije ima, emisiju državnih obveznica Zapadnog Balkana trebalo bi osigurati specijalizovanim garantnim fondom za Zapadni Balkan. Osnovnicilj fondabilo bigarantovanje emisija državnih obveznica zemalja Zapadnog Balkana kojima bi bili finansirani ili sufinansirani projekti razvoja infrastrukture i poslovnih klastera. Prednost prilikom dobivanja garancija ovog fonda imali bi projekti razvoja me udržavne infrastrukture i projekti koji bi bili realizovani na principu javno-privatnog partnerstva.

Emisijom ovih obveznica i njihovom kupovinom od strane komercijalnih banaka koje dominiraju u regionu Zapadnog Balkana bilo bi omogu eno uspješnije upravljanje portfolijima. Kamatna stopa na obveznice bila bi vezana za prosje ne kamatne stope na državne obveznice istih rokova dospije a u eurozoni uve ana za premiju rizika u regionu. Premija rizika bi, me utim, bila manja u odnosu na postoje u koja je ukalkulisana u emitovane državne vrijednosne papire zemalja Zapadnog Balkana, budu i da bi njenu emisiju garantovao fond EU. Garantni fond bi imao opciju pretvaranja duga u dioni ki kapital infrastrukturnih kompanija u državnom vlasništvu, iji bi kapital bio korišten kao zalog za emisiju obveznica, ili pravo na "zlatnu dionicu" u velikim kompanijama, ijjim bi se prihodima garantovala otpusta dospjelih kamata i glavnice na emitovane euro-balkanske obveznice. Tako er, garantni fond i EU na temelju osnivanja ovog fonda imala bi izravno pravo kontrole vo enja politike javnih prihoda i javnih rashoda, odnosno eksplicitno ustanovljeno pravo uticaja na vođenje fiskalne politike zemalja regiona.

Uprkos činjenici da ekonomska kriza izazvana neodgovornim fiskalnim politikama zemalja lanica eurozone još traje, ni ekonomska teorija ni praksa,

odnosno historijsko iskustvo sa ekonomskim krizama, ne pokazuju da je izlazak iz recesije moguć zahvaljujući oštrim mjerama fiskalne restrikcije. To se posebno odnosi na zemlje u kojima su stope nezaposlenosti preko 20 procenata – a većina zemalja Zapadnog Balkana su u toj grupi zemalja. Poenta ovog teksta nije vođenje neodgovorne i rasipničke fiskalne politike, već ciljana i kontrolisana fiskalna ekspanzija isključivo korištena za finansiranje kapitalnih projekata u funkciji razvoja poslovnih veza zasnovanih na klasterima.

Infrastrukturno povezivanje regiona je vrlo važno, pa zbog toga postoji prostor za zajedničku saradnju. Međutim, razvoj infrastrukture same po sebi neće biti dovoljan uslov dugoročne ekonomске održivosti. Infrastrukturno povezivanje regiona treba da bude osnova za izmjenu modela ekonomskog rasta. Sa rasta zasnovanog na domaćoj tražnji na rast zasnovan na zajedničkim izvoznim projektima u kojima bi učestvovale kompanije iz više zemalja regiona Zapadnog Balkana.

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BALKANIZACIJA KAO EUROPEIZACIJA

Asim Mujki *

Premda se ‘evropeizacija’ danas u zemljama Zapadnog Balkana, ali i šire, uglavnom razumijeva kao relativno skoro otvoreni proces, bezrezervno vezan za procese pristupa ovog dijela kontinenta Evropskoj uniji, evropeizacija > šire poimana kao ‘vesternizacija’ ili ‘modernizacija’ > pošto je mnogo ranije. Mišljenja sam da dominantna površna, pragmatična, potpuno ahistorijska shvaćanja tog dugotrajnog historijskog procesa, koja dijele važni politički i intelektualni akteri i s jedne i s druge strane šengenske granice, u znatnoj mjeri otežavaju proces pristupanja, odnosno proširenja, dovodeći do frustracija i nerazumijevanja i jednih i drugih. Proces evropeizacije Marija Todorova opisuje kao proces vesternizacije ili modernizacije „Balkana u 19. i 20. stoljeću koji je podrazumijevao širenje racionalizma i sekularizacije, intenziviranje komercijalnih djelatnosti i industrijalizaciju... formiranje buržujske i drugih novih društvenih grupa u ekonomskoj i društvenoj sfери, a povrh svega trijumf birokratske nacionalne države“ (Todorova, 1997: 13). Situaciju vesternizacije u drugoj polovini 19. stoljeća na Balkanu potanko opisuje Stavrianos:

Utjecaj dinamičnih zapadnoevropskih država nije se zadržao samo u njihovim kolonijalnim posjedima. On se širio i na druga područja, koja su ekonomski i vojno bila slaba, ali koja su, zbog ovog ili onog razloga, ostala neanektirana. To je bio slučaj s Ottomanskim Carstvom (...) Iako su sultanske zemlje još uvek bile pod njegovom kontrolom, one su, uprkos tome, došle u doticaj s novim imperijalizmom. I Ottomansko Carstvo i nove balkanske države bile su podvrgнутi intenzivnoj zapadnjačkoj ekonomskoj penetraciji, očivenoj u vladinim pozajmicama koje su dovodile do financijske ovisnosti, te izgradnjom željezničke mreže koja je povećala inostranu zaduženost, što je direktno dovelo do priliva zapadnjačkih industrijskih dobara. Pojava ovog novog imperijalizma ... transformirala je Balkan i Bliski istok iz onog što se tada smatrao profitabilnim poljem za investicije i špekulacije u samu žigu međunarodnog rivalitet“ (Stavrianos, 2000: 415, 416, 417).

Dakle, izuzetno važan element evropeizacije – kako u 19. tako, i u 21. stoljeću, jer se ne možemo oteti povlačenju paralela između današnjeg Balkana i onoga iz 19. stoljeća, osobito u slikama priliva zapadnjačkih industrijskih dobara, dužni kog je privatnog, investicija i špekulacija kapitala i slično – predstavlja umrežavanje ovog dijela svijeta u funkcionalnu mrežu kapitala i njegovih tokova.

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Prodor kapitala zahtijevao je i sigurno okruženje, koje je on u toj fazi historijskog razvoja nalazio u formi klasi ne nacionalne države. Stavrianos to detektira na sljedeći način:

Pojavljaju se i nove političke institucije, one u usponu modernih državnih struktura zapadnjačkog tipa. Političko oslobođenje stvaralo je fluidniju društvenu strukturu, koja je bila prijem ivija za izvanjske sile i za inovaciju. Politika oslobođenja takođe je dovelo do pojave moderne države, koja je zauzela mjesto starog feudalnog gospodara. Država je rapidno stvarala ogromnu birokratiju i armiju, koje su sa svoje strane iziskivale ogromne troškove i porast javnog duga. Mržnja koju je seljak imao prema feudalnim gospodarima sada se okretala prema birokratu, porezniku i žandarmu“ (Stavrianos, 1997: 419, 420).

Nepogodnostima kapitalisti kog oblikovanja novih političkih zajednica neobično je, s početka 20. stoljeća, pogodovala, nazovimo je tako, nepogodnost etničke slike zamišljenih teritorija nacionalne države. Poimanje nacionalnog državnog prostora među nacionalnim elitama na prijelazu 19. u 20. stoljeće podrazumijevalo je državnu zajednicu s dominantnom, etničkim homogenom većinom, na razređenom principu vestfalske države. Uvođenje nacionalne države kao drugog važnog elementa evropeizacije (vesternizacije, modernizacije itd.) na podoruju 'beznadežno pomiješanih rasa', koje su bukvalno dijelile isti prostor, naišlo je na ogromnu prepreku s kojom se, čini se, u procesu svog moderniziranja suočava i danas – naime, nepoklapanja etničkih s administrativnim granicama. S početka 20. stoljeća ova etnička beznadežna ispmiješanost poslužila je za skretanje mržnje podanika prema glavnom gradu u kojem vladaju buržujske elite u povoju prema etničkim drugom, služeći kao pogonsko gorivo za teritorijalnu ekspanziju i uobičajenuavanju nacionalnog državnog prostora. To je doba balkanskih ratova 1912-1913. godine. Kako je izgledalo to 'nacionaliziranje' balkanskog prostora beznadežno pomiješanih rasa plastično opisuje Lav Trocki: „Srbi u staroj Srbiji, u svom nacionalnom poduhvatu ispravljanja onih podataka u etnološkim statistikama koji nisu na njihovu korist, jednostavno uništavaju muslimansko stanovništvo u selima, gradovima i itavim okruzima“ (Trocki, u Balje, 2012: 55). Uđnom ironijom, projekt evropeizacije Balkana, koji je podrazumijevao prodor kapitala i stvaranje klasičnih nacionalnih država s Balkanskim ratovima, uslijed rata svih protiv svih i ogromnih zvjerstava koja su pri tome počinjena, biva okarakteriziran u zapadnoj štampi i intelektualnoj imaginaciji u pežorativnom smislu kao balkanizacija – termin koji se pojavio do danas i odnosi se na teritorijalnu fragmentaciju preteću izvanrednim kolosalnim nasiljem. Termin balkanizacija, koji je dosta brzo zaživio u upotrebi, zamaglio je svoje pravo značenje, koje proističe iz

procesa evropeizacije. U onom pežorativno shva enom balkanskom izgleda da nema ništa balkansko ve dubinski evropsko. Dominik Schnapper nas podsje a na taj dubinski evropski kontekst kad kaže: „Sve nacije ro ene su u ratu. Njihove su vo e anektirale provincije koje su se kasnije oblikovale u nacionalni teritorij uz pomo nasilja, a potom nametnute zajedni ke kulture. Nacije su rezultatima historije uronjene u osvajanje i agresiju. ‘Jedinstvo se uvijek postiže kroz brutalnost’. Ali s vremenom nacije postaju ‘prirodnim’ i ‘objektivna istina’ njihove historije prestaje biti predmet živog iskustva njenih novih pripadnika“ (Schnapper, 20087: 73). Tome u prilog, Delanty, na primjer, tvrdi da je „evropska ideja u biti poja avala, a ne potkopavala ideologiju nacije“ (Delanty, 1995: 8).

Poziv na stvaranje nacionalnih država s homogenom etni kom ve inom na zamišljenom nacionalnom teritoriju koji je došao u pratinji s tokovima kapitala, na podru ju Balkana kao beznadežno izmiješanih rasa urođio je samo djelomi nim uspjehom – rije je o malim narodima, s vrlo slabim buržujskim slojem, koji je po definiciji nositelj nacionalne integracije, s previše spornih, relativno malih teritorija koje su trajni izvor konfliktova i sporenja, dakle sve ono što potпадa pod definiciju balkanizma. Masovni zločini, etnička čišćenja, teritorijalne prekompozicije nisu doveli do ‘kona nog rješenja nacionalnog pitanja’ i ono se, uz petodecenjsko zamrzavanje pod vlaš u komunisti ke ideologije, proteglo do današnjegdana, reaktiviraju isetokomantikomunisti kerevolucije 1989. godine.

Balkanizacija, stoga, ne treba biti shva ana kao suprotnost evropeizaciji, ve naprotiv, kao njezin sastavni dio, istina njezin opresivni i prešu eni dio. Ona je svojevrsno neprijatno ogledalo evropeizacije, koje podsje a na historiju stvaranja Evrope, odnosno njezinih komponenti u vidu nacionalnih država, kao duh iz nemirne prošlosti koji proganja, uznemirava u tolikoj mjeri da se mora preimenovati u nešto drugo, nešto kao *balkanizacija*. Duh naciotvorstva nije mnogo kasnije zapljušnuo podru je Zapadnog Balkana: on je ve prisutan u jezi koj reformi Vuka Karadži a, u ilirskom pokretu Ljudevita Gaja. On je otpo eo procese naciotvorstva homogeniziraju im narativima, osobito u Srbiji i Hrvatskoj tokom devetnaestog stolje a, koji su se sudarali i preklapali i koji su se, kada su im to dozvoljavali najprije geopoliti ki razlozi, razrješavali na evropski na in koji je najbolje izrazio Oto von Bismarck – krvlju i željezom: najprije za vrijeme balkanskih ratova, potom za vrijeme Drugog svjetskog rata, a zatim nakon panevropske demokratske revolucije iz 1989., koja je neizostavno istovremeno bila i uspostava kapitalističkih odnosa i reafirmacija etnonacionalnog identiteta nakon dugog perioda komunisti ke vladavine. Ono što je uznemiruju e u procesu naciotvorstva na Zapadnom Balkanu upravo je to što je on svojevrsna, zbog geopoliti kih razloga zakašnjela rekaptulacija

ontogeneze evropske nacionalne države u oba njezina segmenta – prvo, kao prvobitna nasilna akumulacija kapitala, i drugo, kao nasilni proces politike, ekonomiske i kulturne uniformizacije željene nacionalne države. Imamo li to u vidu, onda termin balkanizacija nije ništa drugo do prazni označitelj, odnosno fantazma o bezgrešnom začetu, koja mutni talog svoje prošlosti projicira na svog primitivnog, maloumnog rođaka sa sela. Balkanizacija se stoga može shvatiti kao istina evropeizacije u smislu u kojem se otkriva kako se Zapad neko ponio prema svojim heterogenostima. Balkanizacija je skrivani opresivni mehanizam modernizacije, to jest neemancipatorna strana evropeizacije, koja ponajprije otkriva pravu prirodu odnosa prema Drugom i druga ijem.

Europeizacija kakva je na djelu mora se, onda, shvatiti u ovom dvostrukom smislu – kao kapitalistička reappropriacija koju neizbjegno prati i etnonacionalna reappropriacija s jedne strane, te kao ‘usaglašavanje s evropskim vrijednostima’, s dominantnim pravnim i političkim standardima koji se temelje na fundamentalnim pravima i slobodama građana, odnosno koji se temelje na liberalno-demokratskom imaginariju i republikanskim principima vladavine. Slom komunista kog bloka i njegova evropeizacija koja je uslijedila, precizno je slijedila ovaj dvostruki obrazac. U državama Istočne i Srednje Evrope koje su zbacile komunizam desila se kapitalistička reappropriacija – u raznim vidovima takozvane ‘privatizacije’. Tako je, u svakoj od tih zemalja, desila se i reaffirmacija klasične nacionalne države, najprije u vidu etnonacionalne reapproprijacije svoje nacionalne države u smislu da je u svakoj od tih zemalja reiteriran dominantni etnonacionalni domaćin (Poljaci u Poljskoj, Mađari u Mađarskoj itd.), kojem pripadaju institucije te nacionalne države. Pri tome je u državama s većim postotkom nacionalnih manjina dolazilo, u prvoj polovini devedesetih godina XX. Stoljeća, do etničkih konfliktova (Mađari u Rumuniji i Slovaci, Rusi u Litvaniji), dok su se multinacionalne federacije (SSR) raspale. Sve ove države Istočne i Srednje Evrope danas su više-manje stabilne nacionalne države, upravo liberalne-demokratije.

Raspad jugoslavenske federacije, upravo zbog pomenute beznadežne izmiješanosti rasa, odnosno zbog nepoklapanja administrativnih s etničkim granicama, nije mogao propasti bez problema. Etnonacionalna reappropriacija na tom prostoru, kao dio šire etnonacionalne reapproprijacije u Evropi, dovela je do niza novih balkanskih ratova ili, u većem dozoru cinizma danas možemo reći, revolucija za nacionalno oslobođenje, koje su baš kao i u prvim balkanskim ratovima podrazumijevale etnički inžinjeriranje i uklanjanje Drugih s ciljem zaokruženja etnonacionalnog prostora i finalnog rješenja pitanja vlastite nacionalne države. Slovenija je manje-više uspješno izvršila

svoju etnonacionalnu reappropriaciju nacionalne države, uz kolateralnu štetu u vidu administrativno izbrisanih Drugih, kojima je oduzela sva gra anška i politi ka prava. Hrvatska je nakon „Oluje“ – u zanosu odbrambenog rata – svela broj nacionalnih manjina na razinu koja se može kontrolirati i sada kao liberalna demokratija i stabilna nacionalna država ulazi u uniju evropskih nacija. Ostaje, nažalost, Zapadni Balkan, osobito njegova neuralgi na ta ka – Bosna i Hercegovina, odnosno nekoliko zemalja ove regije koje nisu imale snage ili nisu bile uspješne u svojim etnonacionalnim reapproprijacijama – tu pored BiH ubrajam Srbiju, Makedoniju i još uvijek neriješeno albansko nacionalno pitanje. Ostaje cijeli jedan arhipelag nedovršenih etnonacionalnih entiteta, paradržava, kantona, zajednica, regija me usobno suprotstavljenih i neprijateljski raspoloženih, suštinski nemo nih da dovrše procese etnonacionalnih reappropriacija vlastitih zamišljenih nacionalnih država. Ostaje, ponad svega, Bosna i Hercegovina kao ubita na kombinacija evropske drugosti *par excellence* percipirana kao otomansko-komunisti ka zemlja, dakle zemlja koja i u svom otomansko-islamskom elementu i komunisti kom elementu pripada onom Drugom evropske identitetske samopredodžbe, što se u etnonacionalisti kojim imaginacijinjezinihsusjedasuvise estonaglašavalosciljem legitimacije vlastitih etnonacionalisti kih reappropriacija njezinih teritorija.

Zapadni Balkan je, stoga, daleko ve i izazov za Evropsku uniju nego što se na prvi pogled ini i nego što je Bruxelles to spremam priznati dok monotono ponavlja svoje poruke mira, ljubavi i tolerancije. Na Balkanu su za eti evropski procesi s kojima se Evropa mora suo iti. Zapadni Balkan se doti e samog evropskog identiteta. Naime, ako evropeizacija, nekriti ki kao do sada, ostane ovako definiran dvojaki historijski proces, dalja etnonacionalizacija na Balkanu može dovesti do novih podjela i etnonacionalnih posezanja. Etnonacionalne reapproprijacije država podrazumijevaju nove krugove homogenizacija i etni kih mobilizacija. Rezultiraju e pobjede u vidu novih stabilnih nacionalnih država s manjinama koje se mogu kontrolirati i tolerirati, pobjede liberalnih demokratija, mogle bi lako biti takozvane Pirove pobjede.

S druge strane stoji pitanje, i mislim da je to odsudno pitanje ne samo za budu nost Zapadnog Balkana nego i same EU, koje glasi: možemo li misliti evropeizaciju bez etnonacionalne reapproprijacije, bez modela nacionalne države, možda na tragu postnacionalne konstelacije? Možemo li evropeizaciju misliti isklju ivo u njezinoj emancipatorskoj, liberalno-demokratskoj dimenziji? Ta pitanja, ini mi se, prevazilaze zna aj BiH ili Zapadnog Balkana. Slutim da zavise od prethodnog odgovora na pitanje o nužnosti reapproprijacije kapitala. Može se ak ustvrditi da ima nade za jednu takvu

rekonceptualizaciju evropeizacije jer nacionalna država ve neko vrijeme sve manje treba kapitalu, postaju i mu smetnja. Hardt i Negri nas podsje aju:

Republikanska forma vladavine koja se historijski pojavila kao dominantna sa središnjim ciljem da zaštiti i služi imovini, dugo je funkcionalala kao adekvatna podrška kapitalu, podstičući njegov razvoj, regulirajući njegove ekscese i garantirajući njegove interese. Republika imovine, međutim, danas više nije dobar sluga kapitalu. Ona, namjesto toga, postaje preprekom proizvodnje (Hardt, Negri, 2011: 301).

Prepreku cirkulaciji kapitala i proizvodnji predstavlja upravo korpus liberalno-demokratskih vrijednosti. Želim vjerovati da taj imaginarij ima snagu za emancipatorsku rekonstrukciju Evrope od Rejkjavika do Istanbula.

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INTEGRACIJSKA POLITIKA EU NA ZAPADNOM BALKANU U 3 SLIKE

Tanja Petrovi *

U ovom prilogu u najpre predstaviti tri dominantne karakteristike politika pridruživanja zemalja (Zapadnog) Balkana Evropskoj uniji – performativnost diskursa, arbitrarost procesa pridruživanja i paternalistički odnos prema državama kandidatima; u drugom delu u pokazati kako se predstave koje se kroz ta tri diskurzivna i politička mehanizma oblikuju odražavaju na unutrašnjopolitičke procese u zemljama kandidatima u regionu, na njihove međusobne odnose, kao i na predstave o sebi, regionu i Evropi. Pri tome je važno imati u vidu da su slike i predstave koje se oblikuju upotrebo jezika mnogo više od diskurzivnih sredstava – one su osnova za legitimizaciju političkih i ekonomskih odnosa i sredstvo za preoblikovanje simboličke geografije u današnjoj Evropi. Ne smemo, uostalom, zaboraviti na upozorenje Ernesta Laclaua i Chantal Mouffe da nijedna diskurzivna struktura “nije samo ‘kognitivna’ ili ‘kontemplativna’ celina, nego i artikulacijska praksa, koja uspostavlja i organizuje društvene odnose” (Laclau i Mouffe 1987, 81).

1. 1. Performativnost evropskih diskursa

Politički diskurs Evropske unije je izrazito metaforičan; diskurzivne obrasce odlikuje formalizovanost, ponavljanje, predvidljivost i ritualizacija. Germanista Andreas Musolff je na osnovu opširnog korpusa političkih javnih govora u Velikoj Britaniji i Nemačkoj proučavao najčešće metafore u raspravama o Evropskoj uniji. Metafore i koncepte koje je ovaj autor izdvojio nalazimo i u diskursima o pridruživanju država Zapadnog Balkana Evropskoj uniji. To su, pre svega, metafore porodice, zatim metafore iz konceptualnog domena putovanja/puta i zgrade/građevine (Musolff 2004).¹

Te metafore, međutim, imaju u diskursima koji se odnose samo na EU drugu ulogu u političkoj kategorizaciji i argumentaciji i formiraju sasvim druga odnose nego što to su iste metafore upotrebljene u političkim izjavama o Zapadnom Balkanu. Ove metafore i njihove diskurzivne realizacije zaslužuju posebnu pažnju jer se njihovom upotrebo oblikuje slika Evrope i određuje mesto država sa prostora bivše Jugoslavije na toj slici.

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1 Detaljno o ovim metaforama pišem u Petrović 2009. i 2012.

Metafori nastaju u političkim diskursima o pridruživanju zemalja Zapadnog Balkana Evropskoj uniji, uz njihovu formalizovanost i repetitivnost, dovode do "porasta performativne dimenzije, dok se sadržajna dimenzija otvara za nova značaja" (Yurchak 2006: 24). Performativnost diskursa u sferi politike, sa druge strane, formira okvir u kojem političke izjave ne podrazumevaju nužnost odgovornosti autora za izreku. Ove osobine diskursa treba sagledati u širem, neoliberalnom kontekstu, u kojem, kako isti u Dominic Boyer i Alexei Yurchak (2010: 183), dolazi do "tematske i žanrovske normalizacije na inačice i stilove političkih delovanja i reprezentacija".

1. 2. Arbitrarnost procesa pridruživanja

U diskursu pridruživanja taj se proces predstavlja kao *evropski put* i *evropska perspektiva*. Oni se prikazuju kao zagarantovani državama kandidatima, ali taj diskurs istovremeno karakteriše "paradoks postmoderne neodredljivosti" (Busch i Krzyżanowski 2007): to je diskurs u kojem je niz uslova za ulazak u EU u velikoj meri arbitrar, dok se sam proces pridruživanja i tranzicije predstavlja kao put sa jasno definisanim početkom i ciljem (Fairclough 2005, 4; Majstorović 2007). Svaki korak na tom putu evropski političari pohvali, ali za pohvalom obavezno dolazi izjava o tome da je cilj još uvek daleko, a da se razlozi za to precizno ne navode. Dobra ilustracija takvog diskursa su izjave nemačkog ministra spoljnih poslova Steinmeiera o Srbiji: (1) Sadašnja vlada Srbije je jasno zauzela kurs prema Evropi... Svi mi vidimo reformske napore koji se preduzimaju u vašoj zemlji. Naravno, još mnogo toga treba da se uradi, ne samo ovde u Srbiji nego u svakom regionu; (2) Osećam se u svakoj rečenici kada razgovaramo [sa lansirima vlade Srbije]. Naravno, treba savladati još mnogo prepreka, to vlasti u Beogradu znaju isto kao i ja. Ali, pravac je ispravan, a tu je i volja – odlučuju i uslovi da plan na kraju uspe (b92.net, 27. 1. 2009).

Srpski portal sa lažnim vestima *njuz.net* u nekoliko tekstova efektno podvrgava parodiji ovaj diskurs uslovljavanja: 12. oktobra 2011. objavio je "vest" pod naslovom "Srbija dobila preporuku da postane kandidat za kandidata za lansirvo u EU", a 28. juna iste godine objavljeno je da su "EU i SAD raspisale konkurs za novi uslov Srbiji za prijem u EU, nakon što Srbija prizna Kosovo".

1. 3. Paternalizam

Brojne studije su pokazale da su paternalizam i slika društava kandidata kao dece konstante evropskih diskursa o pridruživanju (Velikonja 2007, Petrović 2009, Mominik 2012). Evropski političari esto isti u da društva

Zapadnog Balkana treba da *dokažu svoju zrelost*. Takva reprezentacija povezana je sa samom prirodnom procesa pridruživanja, sa *putem u Evropu/EU*, na kojem bi države *Zapadnog Balkana* trebalo da se od neevropskih preobraze u evropske. Na tom putu te države moraju *sazreti*, dakle od neodgovorne, nezrele dece moraju postati odgovorne, odrasle osobe.

Predstava o državama *Zapadnog Balkana* kao o deci reprodukuje i legitimizuje paternalistički odnos EU: deca nisu u potpunosti odgovorna za sopstveno ponašanje, iracionalna su i potrebna im je pomoć, kontrola, vaspitanje i obrazovanje. Uopšte, to je osobina kolonijalističkog diskursa i različitih metafora tih oblika autoritarnog paternalizma, koji je karakterističan i za odnose između društava na Balkanu i na periferiji EU: dok je Slovenija do 2004. godine i sama bila *dete*, sa Španjolskom u EU preuzeala je ulogu *roditelja* koji *pomaže deci* na *Zapadnom Balkanu*, a Srbija vidi Kosovo kao dete nesposobno da *sazri* (da postane civilizovano, *evropsko* društvo) ukoliko nije pod njenim okriljem, itd.

Kolonijalistički momenat u ovim diskursima je, otkrivano, najizrazitiji u onim društvima Zapadnog Balkana u kojima je izrazito prisustvo međunarodne zajednice, poput Bosne i Hercegovine i Kosova. Ova se društva tretiraju kao „novi“ i „prazni“ prostori – kao *tabula rasa* otvorena za sve moguće eksperimente u izgradnji demokratiskog društva „iz temelja“. Ljudima na tim prostorima međunarodna zajednica se obraća ne samo kao ljudima bez prošlosti, dakle kao deci (v. Buden 2012), nego kao ljudima bez ikakve autonomije i mogućnosti da budu politički subjekti, a vrlo često i kao deci sa sumnjivom sposobnošću u zdravog rasanja. Filozof Slavoj Žižek tako navodi primer sa Kosova, gde je međunarodna kampanja za suživot između Srba i Albanaca sprovedena uz pomoć plakata sa fotografijom psa i mačke i s natpisom „Ako mogu oni da žive zajedno, zašto ne možete vi?“ (Žižek 2010).

Slike u ogledalu

2. 1. Evropa kao prazni označitelj

Nekritičko preuzimanje metafora i ostalih diskurzivnih obrazaca, i njihovo ponavljanje u različitim sferama društvenog života u društвima bivše Jugoslavije, nije samo rutinizacija koja dovodi do “tupljenja političke svesti” (Billig i Macmillan 2005, 459) i svojevremeno Evropi na političke floskule, nego se ovakvom nekritičkom i sveopštrom upotreboom zatvara svaka mogućnost artikulacije druge ije predstave o Evropi koja bi za građane ovih

društva bila prihvatljivija. Na taj na in Evropa postaje prazni ozna itelj, za kojim može posegnuti svako, bez obzira na politi ku poziciju koju zastupa, a diskursi o evropejstvu postaju (jeftino) sredstvo za zadobijanje politi kih poena. Pri tome je na podru ju konkretnog politi kog delovanja izbrisana svaka podela na levicu i desnicu kada je u pitanju stav prema ulasku u EU.

Ilustrativan primer za to je Stranka srpskog jedinstva Dragana Markovi a Palme, koji je istovremeno i gradona elnik Jagodine. Ta stranka je ideološka naslednica stranke ratnog zlo inca Željka Ražnatovi a Arkana, ali je bez obzira na to nakon parlamentarnih izbora 2008. godine odbacila mogu nost pregovora sa nacionalisti kim strankama DSS Vojislava Koštunice i Nove Srbije Velimira Ili a, i zajedno sa koalicijom “Za evropsku Srbiju” i Socijalisti kom partijom Srbije omogu ila formiranje proevropske vlade. Markovi je tu odluku objasnio na slede i na in: “Ja sam pragmati an ovek i preduzetnik i zato znam da patriotizam ne možeš da sipaš u traktor. Za koaliciju sa Demokratskom strankom sam se odlu io zbog njene odlu nosti kada je u pitanju pristupanje EU.” Danas Markovi svoju opštinu promoviše kao *Evropu u malom*, iako je u njegovoj politici, koju odlikuje otvorena homofobija, diskriminacija na osnovu porekla i kontrolisanje svih podru ja politi kog i ekonomskog života, vrlo teško prona i išta evropsko.

2. 2. *Evropski kolonijalizam “na naš na in”*

Uslovljavanje se sa evropskog plana lako prenosi na lokalni kontekst, gde se obrasci preuzimaju, internalizu i koriste kao veoma važno sredstvo za redefinisanje međusobnih odnosa na ovim prostorima. Ovdašnji nosioci mo i, koji uzimaju za pravo da oblikuju iste diskurse iji objekti su u širem kontekstu i oni sami, postaju oni koju su *bliži* lanstvu u Evropskoj uniji. Pri tome se naj eš e poseže za tropom nu enja pomo i, što je jedna od konstanti kolonijalisti kog diskursa, ali i za blokiranjem procesa pridruživanja, kao u sporu izme u Slovenije i Hrvatske oko granice na moru u Piranskem zalivu, kojem smo bili svedoci tokom 2009. godine.

Na unutrašnjopoliti kom planu, sama priroda procesa pridruživanja osloba a politi ke elite od odgovornosti i ovaj proces postaje još jedan na in za prikupljanje politi kih poena. Pošto datumi koje pominje Evropska unija u procesu integracije pojedinih zemalja Zapadnog Balkana nisu obavezuju i ni za samu EU, te se ne mogu shvatiti ozbiljno zbog neprestanih izmena i novih uslova, i lokalni politi ari posežu za datumima bez preuzimanja ikakve odgovornosti za izre eno. Autori vesti na portalu *njuz.net* ovo su pozivanje na

datume efektno podvrgli kritici kroz parodiju: u vesti pod naslovom “Srbija bi mogla da uđe u Evropsku uniju” navodi se “izjava” tadašnjeg premijera Srbije Mirka Cvetkovića da bi, “ako nastavimo sa reformama i realizacijom plana, Srbija mogla da postane lanica Evropske unije možda već u 2016. godine, a sigurno do 2027. godine; ipak, prema mišljenjima eksperata realno je očekivati da se to desi 2019. godine, dok predviđanja Brusela govore da će to najverovatnije biti 2022. godine > dodata je premier”. U vesti se dalje navodi da “iz Kancelarije za harmonizaciju i pridruživanje poručuju da bi Srbija trebalo da uđe u Evropsku uniju do 2026. godine, dok je realno očekivati da se to desi 2017. godine. Ipak, sve su šanse da smo postati lanica Evropske unije posle 2020. godine”. Nenad Slović, vođa ekspertskega tima, za *Njuz* objašnjava da će Srbija “2025. godine naverovatnije postati punopravna lanica Evropske unije” i dodaje da je “presudna godina za Srbiju 2023., jer prema našim saznanjima te godine bismo konačno bili primljeni u Evropsku uniju”. “Vest” se završava konstatacijom da bi “Evropska unija mogla da prima Srbiju u svoje lanstvo već 2024. godine, a 2021. bismo postali njen punopravni lan”.

2. 3. Građani kao deca

Evropska predstava o društвima Zapadnog Balkana kao nezreloj deci vrsto je povezana sa ideološkom konstrukcijom socijalističke proшlosti kao neevropske: Boris Buden detaljno opisuje simptome i posledice ove predstave u svojoj knjizi *Zona prelaska* (2012). On ističe da sintagma “deca komunizma” nije metafora i ukazuje na predstavu da *transition to democracy* kao radikalna rekonstrukcija po inje nije ni izveđena. “Isto na Evropa posle 1989. ljudi i na pustoš s ruševinama koju naseljavaju još samo deca, nezreli ljudi, nesposobni da bez tuđeg vođstva demokratski organizuju svoj život” (Buden 2012: 51-52). Za ilustraciju toga kako se ova predstava transponuje i koristi unutar društava Zapadnog Balkana u procesu njihove “evropeizacije”, posluži u se ponovo primerom Jagodine i njenog gradonačelnika Dragana Markovića Palme. Za mnoge u Srbiji Jagodina je “prije a o uspehu” i “grad budunosti”, dok je u stranim medijima uglavnom predstavljena kao ostrvo bizarnosti, do krajnosti dovedena manifestacija “balkanske” nenormalnosti i groteska srpske tranzicije. Kao što slika o Jagodini kao gradu budunosti i narativ o Palminoj modernizaciji nemaju mnogo veze sa realnošću, tako ni poruka koju pružaju strani mediji ne odgovara realnosti – Jagodina sa svojim gradonačelnikom nije nikakav eksces i neplanirana posledica demokratizacije i evropeizacije Srbije, niti su ova dva narativa – “spoljašnji” i “unutrašnji” – tako suprotstavljena kao što se na prvi pogled mogu smatrati. Jagodina nije nikakvo “udo tranzicije”, ni u pozitivnom ni u negativnom smislu. S jedne strane, kao je već istakao Saša Ilić (2012), Jagodina “odražava globalno”

politi ko ustrojstvo Srbije u malom”. S druge strane, situacija u ovom gradu posledica je preuzetog evropskog narativa o gra anima bivših socijalisti kih društava kao deci: i Palmina “rekonstrukcija” Jagodine po inje ni iz ega – u njoj se ignoriše sve što je postojalo do njegovog dolaska na vlast, a znanja, iskustva i afiniteti građana Jagodine brišu se zajedno sa sećanjem na socijalističku modernizaciju nametanjem nove vizije modernog kroz neukusna gra evinska rešenja i projekte poput Aqua parka, zoološkog vrta i muzeja voštanih figura.

U ovom gradu njegovi gra ani nisu politi ki subjekti nego deca za koju se treba pobrinuti – i gradonačelnik kao domaćin i *otac nahije* (Živkov 2011) to radi na najbolji način: obezbeđuje im posao, vodi ih da “vide svet”, nalazi im životnog saputnika i brine o njihovom potomstvu. On toliko drži sve pod kontrolom i poznaće “svoju decu” do te mere da može da izjavи kako on garantuje da *u Jagodini nema homoseksualaca*. Koliko malo mesta za samostalno delovanje građana ima u ovom gradu osetili su svi oni koji su pokušali da sproveđu neku ligu nu poslovnu ili kulturnu inicijativu. Alternativnih kulturnih sadržaja nema već godinama, a bilo kakav posao nemoguće je zapretiti bez blagonaklonosti gradske vlasti, što po pravilu podrazumeva lanstvo u partiji Jedinstvena Srbija. U logici postsocijalističke tranzicije, “pitanje budućnosti slovi kao pitanje na koje je odgovor već dat” (Buden 2012: 52). I u Jagodini je pitanje budućnosti rešeno – Jagodina već jeste grad budućnosti. I grad bez prošlosti, baš kao što u logici tranzicije “pitanje prošlosti više nema smisla. Deca komunizma su (...) upravo stoga pretvorena u decu da se ne bi mogla se ati prošlosti” (Buden 2012: 52-53). Dete kao “vodeći politički slika i prilika postkomunizma” u Jagodini je dovedena do krajnosti. Palmina stranka je, uostalom, bila odlučujuća za formiranje proevropske koalicije na izborima 2008. godine. Na svojim konvencijama oni gosti ambasadore najznačajnijih evropskih država. Oni su, zajedno sa udovicicom Željkom Ražnatović i Arkana, redovni gosti na slavama, na svadbama i ostalim gozbama koje Marković organizuje u rodnom selu Konarevo. Bivši predsednik Srbije Boris Tadić, Markovićev koalicioni partner, takođe redovan gost na ovim gozbama, nekom prilikom je izjavio da “nema evropske Srbije bez evropske Jagodine” (www.reuters.com, 18. maj 2012). Ovaj grad, dakle, nije nikakav eksces, nego krajnji domet “evropeizacije” postsocijalističke Srbije.

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JEDANAEST TEZA O EVROPSKOJ UNIJI U DEJTONSKOJ BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI

Nerzuk urak*

1. Da li je 17 godina dejtonske BiH dovoljno za izvo enje sumornog zaklju ka u ijoj osnovi leži mišljenje kako je jedina mogu nost BiH da opstane kao država u njenoj nemogu nosti da bude država? Iz naše stvarnosti možemo izvu i mnogo zaklju aka koji e nas uvjeriti da BiH od raspada uva samo to što je iznutra raspadnuta. Da li to zna i da BiH od nestanka iz svijeta država uva samo injenica da iznutra stvarno nije država?
2. Ako prethodne elaboracije prihvatimo kao argumentacije zasnovane na racionalnosti a ne emocionalizmu, onda možemo iz zone politi ke korektnosti pre i u zonu oštrog radikalnog govora o subjektima koji *de facto* spre avaju mogu nost konstitucije samoodržive politi ke zajednice. Koji su to subjekti? To su oni subjekti koji su bili uklju eni u advokaturu mirovnog ugovora za BiH. To su SAD, EU, odnosno klju ne zemlje evropskog geostrateškog jezgra, Kontakt skupina, Srbija, Hrvatska i doma e dejtonske politi ke elite. Nabrojani subjekti zarobljenici su permanentno *rastuće fikcionalizacije stvarnosti*. (Toffler, 1998) Ta *rastuća fikcionalizacija stvarnosti* podržana je od nabrojanih aktera idejom koja pripada politi koj patologiji. To je ideja o nepromjenjivosti dejtonske konstitucije države, ili o njenoj promjenjivosti samo i samo ako to žele unutrašnji politi ki akteri. Ova iritiraju a redukcija u koliziji je sa imperijalnom strukturon vladanja koja je za BiH predvi ena mirovnim ugovorom.
3. Defanzivni obrazac *me unarodnog imperijuma* primijenjen u BiH neka je vrsta *epistemološke i ontološke oholosti* (Toal, 2007), koja u misle im gra anima BiH može proizvesti i proizvodi osje aj gradnje novog statusa > statusa nižih bi a. Zašto? Konstitucija države na premisama mirovnog ugovora koji zahtijeva stalni angažman SAD-a kao zbiljskog kreatora Sporazuma (a ve dugo smo u fazi izostanka ameri kog primarnog aktiviteta), proizvela je udnu situaciju: zemlja zahtijeva *deus ex machina*, ali spuštaju eg subjekta koji e narasle antinomije privesti progresivnom kompromisu nema. Naprotiv, ve nekoliko godina Washington, a s njim i Bruxelles, šalju poruke kako subjekt promjene mora do i iznutra, iako je struktura politi ke zajednice takva da subjekt promjene ne može do i iznutra.

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4. Bosna i Hercegovina na vrlo je skliskom terenu: autenti no onemogu ena da bude država, ona ne može prestati biti država. U takvoj šizofrenoj ambijentalnosti, u frustriraju oj napetosti izme u toga da bude i toga da ne bude, odvija se povijest naše sadašnjosti. Nažalost, naša sadašnjost pripada pretpovijesnom dobu, dobu leda, jer Bosna i Hercegovina jedina je zemlja u Evropi kojoj se zabranjuje promjena. I kao što se u *Sto godina samo e* pukovnik Aurelijano Buendija sje a onog dalekog popodneva kada ga je otac poveo da, kao udo nevi eno, *upozna led* (Markes, 2010), tako e i u BiH dolaziti ljudi sa raznih strana svijeta da vide politi ki mirakul: zemlju zale enu u ameri koj vojnoj bazi Wright Patterson, zemlju u kojoj su entiteti svete krave, nepromjenjive kategorije, ak i po cijenu redukcije naših života na goli život, na Agambenovog *homo sacera*.¹

5. Me unarodna zajednica pristala je na goru sadašnjost kao izvjesnu formu budu nosti. Hinje i odsustvo iz zemlje u kojoj je me unarodnim ugovorom ovjerila svoje, *sui generis*, prisustvo, uputila nas je na slijede i paradoks: klju ni akteri me unarodne zajednice dopustili su BiH, kao zarobljenoj i nedovršenoj državi, da pokuša unutar sebe prona i sopstvene snage koje je mogu iz stanja konfuzije, obamrsti, letargije i ne injenja podi i na viši nivo politi ke aktivnosti, na nivo prakti ne djelatnosti u kojoj e doma i subjekti politi ke igre smisleno djelovati s ciljem konstitucije samoodržive zajednice.

Istovremeno, država je institucionalno dizajnirana tako da ne može posti i svoju održivost apelima da je promjena zemlje jedino mogu a ako to žele doma i politi ki akteri.

¹ Marina Gržini lucidno primje uje da "Agamben govori o svijetu u kojemu vlada autoritet što nije utemeljen ni u jednom zakonu, pa o golog životu, o životu i smrti, odlu uje izvan zakona. Ono što danas opažamo upravo je proizvodnja golog života. Tre i svijet sada se pokazuje kao svijet u kojemu ljudi imaju samo goli život. Ipak, važno je razumjeti da je shva anje po kojemu u svijetu ili djelu svijeta postoji samo goli život presuda o svijetu koji nije utemeljen ni na kakvoj zakonitosti. Štoviše, oznaka dijela svijeta kao svijeta golog života oblik je uvo enja teritorija bez zakonitosti ili zone golog života, koji se od tamo širi na sav svijet." (Gržini , 2003) Što je drugo postdejtonска Bosna i Hercegovina nego teritorij bez "bezli ne zakonitosti", zona golog života, antropološka budu nost Evrope i njenih država, ako je Evropa ne uklju i u svoju sadašnjost? Pretjerano? Sumnjam. Evropska Unija ne primje uje kako je boravak na Balkanu u obliku sigurnosnog menadžmenta a ne ljudskog razvoja truje metafizikom statičnosti.

Doma i politi ki akteri jedino ne žele promjenu (ili žele onu vrstu partikularne ustavne promjene koja esprije iti mogu nost promjene dejtonskog ugovora) politi ke matrice koja iznova generira nacionalizam kao pogonsko gorivo rasta državne birokracije na svim nivoima odlu ivanja, rasta odanih sljedbenika partikularnih politi kih ideja iza kojih stoji jedno veliko troglavo ništa. To je projekat ništenja domovinske svijesti i on je u velikoj mjeri uspio.

6. Nema nikakve sumnje: BiH oblikovana mirovnim ugovorom iz Ohioa proizvod je vojnopoliti kog uma SAD-a. Taj um mogao je zamisliti dvojnu zemlju zato što taj um u trenutku oktroiranja ugovora za takvu zemlju ra una na snažnu ameri ku favorizaciju izgradnje države kojoj je Washington udahnuo imperijalni smisao. Arhitekta mirovnog ugovora Richard Holbrooke upravo je, na fonu ameri ke apriorne predanosti izgradnji bosanskohercegova ke države, mogao zamisliti kako se pod snažnim ameri kim pe atom iz pepela diže jedna originalna politi ka zajednica.

Nakon što su na fonu dejtonske ambivalentnosti prevladale sile unutrašnje secesije, itanje Dejtona nastavljeno je u dezintegracijskom klju u, kroz kontinuirano favoriziranje entiteta kao pseudodržava, pa smo dobili dva Kosova u BiH, sa tendencijama da zbir dva izmišljena entitetska suvereniteta daju suverenitet državi. Rekao bih da vode i politi ki prvaci u zemlji upravo ovih dana pokušavaju izjedna iti suverenitet sa fakticitetom, što se može završiti triumfom entitetskih volja kao suverenih volja. Blizu smo razumijevanja državnog suvereniteta kao koordinacijskog suvereniteta. Koordinacijski suverenitet ubleha je dosta dosta ironiziranja.

7. Da budem precizan: SAD su ispustile BiH kao postkonfliktnu zajednicu iz svojih imperijalnih klješta. Budu i da godinama BiH više nije u registru ameri kog nacionalnog interesa, dejtonska politi ka laboratorija batgra se u okovima me unarodnog ugovora, za koji su najjedgovornije SAD, a koje su, u me uvremenu, svoju odgovornost spustile na najnižu ta ku.

Budu i da su svoju odgovornost za BiH spustile na najnižu ta ku, zemlja nema pozitivni i djelotvorni vanjski poticaj koji je *apriori* sadržan u ameri koj ambiciji kreiranja mirovnog ugovora . U takvoj situaciji klju nu ulogu u BiH preuzima Evropska unija. Nevjerovatno je da EU (što samo govori o odsustvu vizije i dominaciji birokracije nad analiti kim, stvarala kim umom zasnovanim na skepsi) pristaje na danjski dar SAD-a. U emu se sastoji danjski dar? Sastoji se u tome da država koja je mirovnim ugovorom iznutra tek lakonski strukturirana, te može i i naprijed samo uz snažan i kontinuiran

pritisak Washingtona, prestaje biti leno Washingtona i postaje leno Bruxellesa. Brisel ima zadatak pomo i izgradnju samoodržive BiH bez dominiraju e uloge SAD-a, a bez te dominacije Bruxelles ne može suštinski pomo i u oblikovanju samoodržive zajednice. To geopoliti ko na elo je napušteno. Washington je pozajmio BiH Bruxellesu, a Bruxelles s tom pozajmicom ne zna šta e jer ne posjeduje instrumentarij da, s kapacitetima meke mo i kao zaštitnim znakom evropskog postmodernog raja, u ini nešto dubinski važno sa ameri kim teritorijem na Balkanu. Zato se BiH ponovno mora izgraditi kao ameri ki svijet, kao punktna balkanska ta ka *Pax Americane*, jer samo je to garant briselske kompetencije u stvarima transformacije BiH u eurounijsku zemlju. Iako BiH, svojom modernom poviješ u, pripada *moralnom univerzumu evropske civilizacije* (Toal, 2000), mirovnim ugovorom iz Dejtona ona naglašeno po inje pripadati i moralnom univerzumu ameri ke civilizacije. Ipak, pravo je pitanje: da li je aktualni svjetski poredak još uvijek ameri ki, a ako nije, emu ovaj pledoaje za veliki povratak Washingtona na malu šahovsku tablu Bosne i Hercegovine? Pa ja mislim da je postameri ki svijet još uvijek ina ica ameri kog svijeta, bez obzira na prigovore koji pripadaju kvalitetnim suprotnim uvidima. Današnja BiH divizija je tog postameri kog ameri kog svijeta, i bilo bi krajnje suspektno da Washington provincializira svoju ulogu u najuspješnijem (sa stanovišta menadžmenta konflikta) američkom vanjskopolitičkom projektu u posthладnoratovskom svijetu. Veliki ameri ki nobelovac je neumoljiv: "Najviši cilj dobrog društva nalazi se u domenu spoljne politike. Taj cilj je postizanje trajnog mira me u narodima. Ne postoji ništa važnije od tog cilja, jer ništa u tolikoj mjeri ne prouzrokuje patnje, siromaštvo i smrt kao što to ine ratni sukobi... Dobro društvo ne može sebi dozvoliti da se u potpunosti identificuje sa nacijom-državom (sa realpolitikom zasnovanom na procjeni mo i, *opaska N.* .); ono mora da priznaje i podržava šire me unarodne snage kojima je pojedina zemlja podre ena. To nije stvar izbora > to je imperativ modernog vremena." (Galbraith, 1997: 93, 101) Budu i da je BiH podre ena me unarodnim snagama, da bi se izgradilo dobro društvo u BiH, te snage iznova trebaju vo stvo SAD-a kao sile koja je od BiH napravila globalnu državu u lokalnom opticaju.

8. Da je Washington doveo BiH do stanja održivosti, tada bi krucijalna i dominiraju a uloga Bruxellesa bila poželjna, nužna, imperativna i najvažnija. Ovako, imamo situaciju da je Bruxelles zadužen za europeizaciju države koja se europeizaciji opire svojom dubinskom amerikanizacijom. Budu i da je amerikanizacija u fazi samoponištenja, imamo ovu formulu: normativna apoliti ka europeizacija minus amerikanizacija = Rusija u BiH kao probu eni igra koji je od PIC-a napravio nemo no lice Zapada. Dakle, to je elementarni nivo velike slike koji zahtijeva poentu: EU je naivno pristala

da politi ku zajednicu, koja može i i naprijed tek uz klju nu asistenciju Washingtona, preuzme od Washingtona a zna da nema instrumente da se ponaša kao Washington. Tako dolazimo do zaklju ka da je EU klju ni generator nemogu nosti BiH da u e u Evropsku uniju. O tome imamo sijaset dokaza. Ponudimo neke koji se ti u života EU u dejtonskoj BiH.

9. Evropska unija treba se zamisliti nad slijede im stavom: ne postoji zemlja u Evropi u kojoj je me unarodna zajednica, pa tako i Evropska unija, intenzivnije prisutna nego što je to od 1996. pa do danas Bosna i Hercegovina. Bez obzira na tu notornu injenicu, upravo je BiH ona zemlja u kojoj je maksimalizacija evropskog prisustva proizvela minimum evropske zemlje sa stanovišta klju nih aksioloških kategorija u svim podru jima života i rada. To je, prije svega, poraz Evropske unije, a onda i BiH. Kakvo *obe anje sre e* nam nudi Bruxelles ako je zemlja u kojoj je Bruxelles intenzivno prisutan toliko udaljena od Bruxellesa!? Mogli bismo kazati: intenzitet briselskog prisustva obrnuto je proporcionalan europeizaciji BiH, odnosno ispunjavanju uvjeta za proces priklju enja. To bi po eti kim mjerilima trebalo proizvesti stid klju nih evropskih faktora. Ne, nema stida. Imamo genijalnu mantru briselskog birokratskog uma: Mi smo tu da vam pomognemo, ali znate, vi sami trebate, tra-la-la... tra-la-la... tako da je ta floskula (*ispraznica!*) svedena na nemaštovito „Mi smo tu“. I? Ova zemlja je o igledno osu ena da samu sebe degradira i hendikepira i da njeni ljudi o sebi misle najgore. Dakle, sedamnaest godina agonije probudilo je i u meni, kao dobrom i empati nom stvorenju, pomisao da smo mi idioti, ljudi koje je Zapad osudio da budu niža bi a. Ali ova *moja grubost samo je od uvrede pomahnitala nježnost*, (D. Suši , 1983), jer nikome ova zemlja nije vjerna kao Zapadu. Zapad je naše zlatno tele. Uprkos Zapadu. Uprkos Evropskoj uniji.

10. Evropska unija bježi od uzroka problema i bavi se posljedicom kao da je posljedica uzrok. Kako? Tako što smatra da je klju ni problem zemlje Federacija BiH, a ne zakovana dvoentitetska struktura države; zato što smatra da u BiH najbolje funkcionira unitarni entitet, a onda ne završava tu logiku o ekivanim zaklju kom: ako najbolje funkcionira unitarni entitet, da li to zna i da cijelu zemlju treba izgraditi kao unitarnu? Budu i da sam protiv unitarnog na elu u multinacionalnoj zemlji, pozivam one koji favoriziraju postoje i unitarizam u BiH da budu egzekutivni do kraja i otkriju se ili kao politi ki lažovi ili kao prijatelji unitarizma. Ne možete biti za decentraliziranu zemlju a podržavati unitarizam! Iz te politi ke laži može se ispiliti samo novih sedamnaest godina agonije. Budimo do kraja jasni: zbog prirode politi kog poretki, smisao dejtonske BiH je Republika Srpska. Bosna i Hercegovina svoj politi ki smisao iscrpljuje u europeizaciji RS, koja svojom europeizacijom

spreava europeizaciju BiH. To je tako. Šta nam je initi? Treba demaskirati *tu rastuću fikcionalizaciju stvarnosti*. Unitarizacija države koja ide iz Banjaluke bespredmetna je (primjera radi, isto ni dio RS-a, kako u Bosni tako i u Hercegovini, svijet je tuge, o aja i bezna a, istinski svijet golog života. Decentralizacija RS-a zahtjev je jednako važan kao i transformacija federalnog entiteta.). Pristati na transformaciju Federacije, koja je nužna, a da to ni na koji način ne tangira drugi dio BiH, zna i pristati na stav da je RS višak BiH. Promjene u Federaciji imaju smisla samo ako ih prati deunitarizacija RS-a. To Washington i proamerički Bruxelles mogu potaknuti. Ovo su tako o igledne istine da se, valjda zato što su o igledne, ne primje uju. Da li je samo nasilje uvjet da se te o iglednosti primijete? Ili BiH samo proizvodnjom nasilja postaje neka Stvar oko koje vrijedi razmišljati u centrima globalne moći i globalne odgovornosti? Budimo nerealni, tražimo moguće. A šta je moguće? Promjena paradigme: nužno je stvoriti konsenzus o izgradnji decentralizirane politike zajednice koja je samoodrživa i koja nudi mogućnost građanske odanosti. To je moguće uraditi tako što ćemo, uz najveći zagrljaj Washingtona i Bruxellesa, napraviti još decentraliziraniju državu, ako treba najdecentraliziraniju državu u svijetu država. Taj veliki dar građana BiH > izgradnja decentralizirane države je obaveza za one koji se protive promjeni iako njome najviše dobijaju.

Izgradnja decentralizirane države po najradikalnijem shvatanju na elasupsidijarnosti istovremeno zna i izgradnju države koja jest država i u kojoj je decentralizirana struktura izraz pravednosti, u inkovitosti, funkcionalnosti i mogućnosti *zajedničke svrhe na državnom nivou*. Zahtjev za još decentraliziranjem državom u sebi sadrži zahtjev za izgradnjom države, a ne za njenom razgradnjom. Ako, pak, izgradnja organizirane decentralizirane države ponovo nailazi na odbijanje onih koji žele da ostanemo u mezozoiku kao frendovi dinosaurusa, onda se, kad-tad, međunarodna zajednica dovodi u situaciju da djeluje. Ja očajni ki prizivam upumpavanje nove energije u OHR, energije koja će akterima politike igre poručiti da je besmisleno ne izgrađivati politiku ku zajednicu, da je to protiv ljudi ije interes politici ari navodno zastupaju. Na kraju krajeva, ako je Visoki predstavnik vrhovnog tuma Dejtonskog sporazuma, evropske institucije u BiH dio su tog tuma enja. Ako nisu, šta prije i Evropsku uniju da napusti Dejton i pristupi izgradnji države koja je sposobna biti član EU? Prije i je jedanaesta teza o Evropskoj uniji, koja glasi

11. *Najviše dočeka dolazi euronijiski normativni institucionalizam koji Bosnu i Hercegovinu ne poima kao svoj najradikalniji izazov već kao otjecanu birokratsku djelatnost, jeste opažanje pojedinačnih individua i njihovih građanskih potreba bez percepcije naše ljudske nemoćnosti zbog izostanka države. Evropske birokratice*

*i njihovi birokratizirani think-tankovi svojim nezamjeraju im djelovanjem i mišljenjem samo potvrđuju podijeljenost države i društva u BiH, a trebalo bi da uine sve što je u njihovojo moći i izvan njihove moći da se to stanje izmijeni.*²

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CIVILNO DRUŠTVO I PRISTUP EUROPSKOJ UNIJI: ISKUSTVA IZ HRVATSKE

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Prvi službeni korak u institucionalizaciji odnosa Republike Hrvatske (RH) s Europskom unijom (EU) dogodio se 29. listopada 2001. godine potpisivanjem Sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju izme u Republice Hrvatske s jedne strane i Europskih zajednica i njihovih država lanica s druge strane.¹ Ovaj korak desio se u kontekstu tadašnje promjene vlasti u RH i s jasnim politi kim porukama nove koalicione Vlade o strateškoj namjeri pristupanja Republice Hrvatske EU. Time je zapo elo i stvaranje nacionalnog konsenzusa me u politi kim strankama o pristupanju RH Europskoj uniji. Do tada pristup RH EU nije bio jasno istican cilj vanjske politike RH, a u vremenu prije po etka pregovora od osamostaljena RH civilno društvo bilo je jedan od rijetkih nositelja tzv. *europskih tema* u doma oj javnosti. Zaštita prava manjina, inzistiranje na procesuiranju svih ratnih zlo ina, zabrana diskriminacije, borba protiv korupcije, neovisnost pravosu a i sl., samo su neke od tema na kojima je civilno društvo radilo mnogo ranije i predanije negoli institucije države. U tom kontekstu pogled na proces pristupanja Europskoj uniji iz perspektive organizacija civilnog društva (OCD) nastalih ve inom u vrijeme 90-ih godina 20. stolje a bio je pogled u svojevrsnog saveznika.

Danas, s vremenskom distancem, slobodno možemo govoriti kako su teme vezane uz demokratizaciju i zaštitu ljudskih prava živjeli primarno upravo u organizacijama civilnog društva – me u manjim brojem gra ana, te su se (te teme) sustavno gurale sa margine u centar. Trebao je pro i niz godina da se one preliju i u dominantne politi ke diskurse.

Republika Hrvatska zapo ela je formalno pregovore s Europskom unijom 3. listopada 2005. godine, nakon što su politi ke elite još odlu nije prionule baviti se tzv. „europskim temama“, tj. po eli su ispunjavati zahtjeve koji su neprekidno dolazili od Europeke unije. Samo dva mjeseca nakon po etka pregovora, 7. prosinca 2005. godine dolazi do uhi enja Ante Gotovine, posljednjeg bjegunca iz RH kojega je tražio Me unarodni kazneni sud za bivšu Jugoslaviju. Za ljudskopravaske organizacije civilnoga društva (OCD) bila je to dodatna simboli na potvrda njihova višegodišnjega marginaliziranog i osporavanog rad. Ono što se je prije desetak godina inilo apsolutno nemogu e, iz dana u

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dan postajalo je politi ka stvarnost. U narednih šest i pol godina RH je vodila pregovore sa EU i više ili manje uspješno usklaivala svoje zakonodavstvo sa zakonodavstvom Unije. Tijekom samoga procesa pregovora OCD su uvelike koristile politiku *mrkve i batine*, te je Europska komisija bila prepoznata kao jedan od konstruktivnih saveznika OCD-a, ne samo zbog mogunosti sustavnijeg financiranja njihovog rada već i zbog političkog utjecaja koji je OCD-ima upravo omoguio proces pristupanja. Naime, još u 1990-im godinama OCD koje su radile na temama vezanim uz demokratizaciju i ljudska prava dobivali su epitet izdajnika i smetnji u voenu politike nove samostalne Republike Hrvatske. Ova slika najbolje je sažeta u govoru tadašnjeg predsjednika RH Franje Tumana, koji se u jednom od svojih govora obrušava na OCD optuživši ih za *politički dilentatizam* i vezu sa *crnim, žutim i crvenim vragovima* i njihovu *prodaju za judine škude*. Za rastoto iti tu predrasuda bio je potreban itav niz godina, iako sama predrasuda vjerojatno i dalje postoji u dijelu političkih elita.

Ipak, epitet „izdajnika“ više se nije mogao tako olako koristiti iz jednostavnog razloga što su politi ke elite sada vodile politiku pristupanja prema EU, te htjeli-nehtjeli morale su priznati da su OCD uistinu bile nekoliko koraka ispred njihova vremena. Za tzv. europske teme kojima se sada vode a politika počela baviti, OCD su jednostavno mogle reći: „*Pa o tome vam priamo ve jedno desetljeće e*“. Sa manje predrasuda, ali i dalje s političkom marginalizacijom OCD-a, vladajuće stranke započele su proces demokratizacije zemlje.

Posljedica toga je da su zagovaračke inicijative bile primarno usmjerene prema Briselu (nakon što bi ih službeni Zagreb olako odbio ili marginalizirao), te je komunikacija sa Briselom u pravilu imala više smisla nego li razgovarati sa službenim Zagrebom. U tom procesu, nažalost, došlo je do dodatnog poljuljanja povjerenja između vlasti i druga. S druge strane, pozicioniranje OCD-a bliže institucijama EU nego vladinim institucijama osiguralo je kontinuitet nezavisnosti OCD-a od vladajućih elita, pa se s te strane proces može ocijeniti kao pozitivan. Ipak, tek posljednjih nekoliko godina primjeđuje se mnogo otvoreniji pristup vlasti OCD-ima, iji komentari se sve više interpretiraju kao konstruktivna a ne zlonamjerna kritika.

Sam proces pridruživanja pojedine OCD koristile su sukladno svojim kapacitetima i zagovaračkim vještinama, neki u većoj neki u manjoj mjeri, s ključnim naglaskom na doprinos OCD redovnim izvješćima Europske komisije o napretku RH u pregovorima, koji su se napokon u RH potvrdili itati sa mnogo više razumijevanja i s više ozbiljnosti. Sami pregovori na potoku nisu bili od velikog sadržajnog interesa za OCD i zato što se radilo o iznimno širokom i

kompleksnom podruju. Kapaciteti OCD-a koji su se razvijali kroz 1990-te i kasnije ponajviše su se ticali pregovora vezanih uz *Poglavlje 23 – Pravosu e i temeljna prava* i eventualnodijelomuz *Poglavlje 24 – Pravda, sloboda i sigurnost*, te *Poglavlje 27 – Ookoliš*. Ostala poglavlja prošla su gotovo bez interesa OCD-a.

Na po etku samog procesa pregovora dio OCD-a iscrpljivao se zagovaranjem oko deklasifikacije samih pregovora i povećanjem transparentnosti pregovora, sa željom da što ve i broj gra ana kontinuirano bude informiran što se dešava iza zatvorenih pregovara kih vrata. Ta inicijativa nije bila prihva ena ni od vladaju ih niti od europske komisije, iz straha od manipulacije informacijama iz pregovora kroz medije i gubljenja povjerenja gra ana u EU. Dodatno, postojao je i strah od strana ke politizacije pregovora kroz medije. Nakon neuspjelih inicijativa otvaranja pregovora ka doma oj javnosti, OCD i dalje samostalno ili u manjim koalicijama nastavljaju zagovarati teme iz podru ja demokratizacije i zaštite ljudskih prava. U ovoj fazi po prvi put nailaze i na injenice kako pojedini me unarodni standardi zaštite ljudskih prava nisu integrirani u minimalne standarde koje promovira EU; štoviše, u pojedinim temama EU ide ispod me unarodnih standarda, što je posebno vidljivo u azilantskoj politici. Jednako tako sve eš e se primje uje kako RH, uskla uju i svoje zakonodavstvo sa EU zakonodavstvom, i to uskla ivanje vrši na na in da prihva a samo one minimalne standarde koje direktive Europske unije propisuju. Rijetko se išlo iznad minimalnih standarda, kao što je to bio slu aj npr. u Zakonu o suzbijanju diskriminacije, koji pokriva šira podru ja i osnove nego li to zakonodavstvo EU traži.

U ovom periodu dolazi i do zna ajnog institucionalnog ja anja manjeg broja zagovara kih OCD-akoje, uspiješno se koriste i primarnosredstvima EU za razvoj civilnog društva, uspijevaju prerasti u ve e i vidljive zagovara ke organizacije, s programskim fokusima na razli ite javne politike. Negativna strana toga procesa svakako je da manje organizacije ne uspijevaju opstatи na „tržištu donacija“ i mnoge od njih se polako gase. Veliki dio OCD-a nastalih „odozdo“ u 1990-im godinama nije se uspio transformirati na na in da se prilagodi novim okolnostima financiranja i političkih prioriteta. To je posebno pogodilo one OCD koje ne djeluju u gradu Zagrebu, gdje se ve inom kreiraju i donose politi ke odluke.

Gotovo pred sam kraj pregovora shvatilo se kako se sinergijom može izvršiti mnogo ja i utjecaj na donositelje odluka nego kroz stru ni samostalni rad. U velja i 2011. godine grupa OCD-a, došavši u posjed mjerila za zatvaranje pregovora u *Poglavlju 23 – Pravosu e i temeljna prava*, obznanjuje svoje zajedni ko mišljenje o spremnosti RH na zatvaranje

pregovora u odnosu na pravosu e i temeljna ljudska prava, te zaklju uje kako RH nije spremu zatvoriti poglavlje 23.3 Upravo ovaj primjer pokazuje koliko je važno iz perspektive OCD-a imati uvid barem u onaj dio pregovora koji govori o mjerilima otvaranja i zatvaranja poglavlja. Taj dokument mora biti ne samo pod nadzorom EU ve i gra ana zemlje koja pregovora.

Ovaj izvještaj snažno je odjeknuo u institucijama Europske unije i zemljama lanicama, a gotovo je u potpunosti bio marginaliziran u doma oj javnosti. Izvještaj daje novi vjetar u krila OCD-ima i postavlja ih kao relevantne sudionike u stvaranju op eg dojma o provedivosti brojnih reformi integriranih u doma e zakonodavstva tijekom pregovora. Koaliciju su predvodile upravo one organizacije koje su tijekom posljednjih 10 godina uspjele institucionalno oja ati, što im je omogu ilo organizaciju posla na na in da dio vremena svojih zaposlenika usmjere upravo na ove zagovara ke aktivnosti. Koalicija funkcioniira na *ad hoc* bazi, bez projektnog financiranja, a iz mjeseca u mjesec broj lanova i podržavatelja koalicije raste. U lipnju 2011. godine RH zatvara i posljednje poglavlje, te i OCD shva aju da se radi o politi koj odluci iju odgovornost sada ne snosi samo RH ve i Europska unija.⁴ RH ubrzo dobiva i datum ulaska u EU, te OCD-ima postaje jasno kako je preostalo još malo vremena do kraja politike „mrkve i batine“, te još fokusiranije vrše pritisak na doma e i EU institucije u svezi s provedbom reformi i poboljšanjem kvalitete ljudskih prava i s demokratizacijom u RH. Dio prijedloga koje iznose OCD Vlada prihva a gotovo preko no i (npr. ukidanje Zakona o golfu, unaprje enje Zakona o pravu na pristup informacijama), ali ipak, veliki dio preporuka i prijedloga i dalje ostaje neispunjeno, ne nailaze i više niti na podršku Europske unije (npr. unaprje enje Zakona o besplatnoj pravnoj pomo i, obešte enja civilnim žrtvama rata i dr.). Ne inzistiraju i samo na partikularnim tematskim prijedlozima, koalicija predlaže i uspostavljanje u inkovitog mehanizma nadzora svih obveza koje proizlaze iz Poglavlja 23 unutar hrvatskog Sabora, uz angažman lanova/ica parlamentarnih stranaka, predstavnika/ca akademske zajednice, stru ne javnosti i organizacija civilnog društva, te uz blisku suradnju sa zastupnicima Europskog parlamenta i stru njacima Europske komisije.

Ovaj nadzorni mehanizam trebao bi imati status posebnog izvjestitelja institucijama Europske unije, na polugodišnjoj osnovi, barem tijekom tri godine po završetku pregovora.⁵ Iz ovoga zahtjeva jasno je kako postoji strah unutar OCD-a da e pristupanjem RH EU do i do nagloga prestanka provo enja reformi, što bi u kona nici moglo rezultirati padom kvalitete demokracije i zaštite ljudskih prava u RH. Proces pristupanja EU iznimno je intenzivan i kompleksan proces, koji uistinu prestaje s odre enim datumom. Ostaje otvoreno

pitanje kako će se taj nagli prestanak reformi reflektirati na živote građana RH.

U tom smislu pred OCD-ima stoje novi veliki izazovi ulaskom RH u EU. S jedne strane, strahuje se od mogućeg porasta nacionalizma, koji će zaživjeti na nedovršenim procesima suočavanja s prošlošću, pomiješanim s očekivanim većim dolaskom stranaca u RH kroz svjetske procese migracije stanovništva. S druge strane, govori se i o zaokretima tematskih prioriteta kojima će se OCD-i u RH morati baviti kako bi odgovorili na potrebe građana, a to su svakako pitanja vezana uz zaštitu radnih prava i opiranja privatizacijama javnih dobara ili pitanja migracija vezanih uz klimatske ili socijalne promjene u svijetu. U tom smislu doći će niz novih tema na koje će OCD morati odgovoriti, tj. morat će, kao i do sada, odgovoriti na nove društvene nepravde koje će se prelamati preko tehnologija građana RH.

Posebno je zanimljivo kako će se razvijati daljnja suradnja OCD-a u regiji. Naime, do danas, a od početka oružanog sukoba na teritoriju bivše Jugoslavije, upravo su OCD imale intenzivan kontinuitet suradnje, ak i u onim trenucima kada su bile zatvorene granice među novonastalim zemljama i kada je prevladavao dominantno neprijateljsko raspoloženje prema drugim narodima. Tih godina kada je i došlo do osnivanja velikog broja OCD-ova s bilo koje strane granice, OCD su imale gotovo identičan spektar problema kojima su se bavile: teške povrede ljudskih prava, ratni zločini, korupcija i sl. Ak i u poslijeratnom periodu teme su i dalje zajedničke: demokratizacija, transparentnost rada vlade, obrazovanje za mir, nenasilje, ljudska prava i sl. U novonastalim okolnostima ulaska RH u EU, s očekivanom promjenom dominantnih tema na kojima će OCD morati raditi, postoji bojazan da će se hrvatske OCD u regiji tematski udaljiti. S jedne strane, postoji prostor suradnje na prenošenju iskustva iz pregovora, ali tu se radi više o tehničkim detaljima nego o vrijednosnoj suradnji. Na OCD iz Hrvatske svakako će pasti više obveza da ja i fokusiranije monitoriraju nove vanjske politike RH prema zemljama u regiji, a taj monitoring moguće je jedino uz usku suradnju s lokalnim OCD-ima. Povjerenje, koje je stvoreno kroz višegodišnju suradnju i pružanje međusobne podrške ak i onim nemogućim ratnim uvjetima, veliki je kapital za nastavak suradnje. Želimo vjerovati kako šengenska granica tu dinamiku i tradicije suradnje ne će uspeti presjeti.

Konačno, za hrvatske OCD ostaje i dalje otvoreno pitanje kako će se pozicionirati nakon što s ulaskom RH u EU nestane politika uvjetovanja, koja je bila važan oslonac radu domaćih OCD. Teško je zamisliti gotovo preko noći odluku o marginalizaciji uloge OCD-ova, tj. njihovom utjecaju na procese kreiranja javnih politika. U tom smislu možda je upravo u prepristupnim

pregovorima i propuštena prilika da se utjecaj gra ana još ja e institucionalizira kroz razli ite zakonske i druge mehanizme u sukreiranju procesa donošenja odluka i monitoringa implementacije preuzetih reformi. Neki mehanizmi su usvojeni: gotovo svi saborski odbori otvoreni su za vanjske lanove (što se izmjenama Poslovnika Hrvatskog sabora može lako i ukinuti), usvojen je Kodeks savjetovanja sa zainteresiranim javnoš u u postupcima donošenja zakona, drugih propisa i akata, ali nije se uspjelo izlobirati da Kodeks postane zakon, ve duži niz godina postoji Savjet za razvoj civilnog društva – hibridno tijelo izme u OCD-a i državne uprave koje se tako er nije oja alo u svojim ovlastima, unaprje en je Zakon o pravu na pristup informacijama kao važan alat gra anima u borbi protiv korupcije, uspostavljen je kakav-takav gra anski nadzor nad tajnim službama i policijom i sl. Ali klju an iskorak bio bi da nakon prestanka politike uvjetovanja OCD, zajedno sa politi kim elitama, izgrade zajedni ki mehanizam internog monitoringa izvršavanja preuzetih reformi tijekom pristupanja EU. Po prvi puta i mrkva i batina bile bi „Made in Croatia“, te bi takvo tijelo, za koje se trenutno predlaže da funkcionira pri Hrvatskom saboru i da ve inu u njemu ine gra ani a manjinu politi ari, bilo svojevrstan garant nastavka procesa demokratizacije Republike Hrvatske. U narednih nekoliko mjeseci vidjet emo je li proces pristupanja EU uistinu uspio demokratizirati RH na na in da njene politi ke elite prihvate jedan ovakav prijedlog, a tek 2. srpnja 2013. mo i emo vidjeti da li je hrvatsko društvo sazrelo na na in da tretira OCD kao jedan od temeljnih stupova demokracije, ili samo kao ukras – dodanu vrijednost demokraciji.

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HRVATSKA U BIH: POLITIKA KRIZA, BILATERALNI ODNOŠI I NOVI POLITIČKI ANGAŽMAN

Bodo Weber*

Strukturalna politika i institucionalna kriza u Bosni i Hercegovini, koja se permanentno produbljava od sredine prošle decenije, a posebno eskalira nakon održavanja zadnjih opštih izbora krajem 2010. godine, prouzrokovala je i novi angažman susjedne Hrvatske u unutrašnjopolitičkim zbivanjima u BiH. Taj ponovni angažmandešavaseukontekstuskorogulaska RH kao 28. lana u Evropsku uniju, te brojnih neriješenih bilateralnih pitanja koja se u tom okviru zaoštravaju.

Mada se angažman RH u BiH bitno razlikuje od uloge koja je Hrvatska imala u susjednoj zemlji u 1990-im godinama, njega prate brojne kontroverze, dok osnovni pravci te koncepcija iza takve politike dosad ostaju prilično neodređeni.

Ovaj će tekst zato u prvom dijelu prikazati politički okvir, pogotovo međunarodnopolitički okvir krize u BiH, u kojem se odvija taj novi hrvatski angažman. U drugom će dijelu identifikovati glavne sastavnice koje (su)određuju Hrvatsku politiku prema BiH. Konačno, u posljednjem dijelu će identifikovati bosanskohercegovačku stranu bilateralnih političkih odnosa, kao i političku ulogu koju dosad igra Evropska unija.

1. Okvir krize u Bosni i Hercegovini

Autor ovog teksta krajem oktobra ove godine za nekoliko dana imao je tri iskustva koja dobro odslikavaju prirodu strukturalne krize Bosne i Hercegovine. Sreća je jednog od autora Dejtonskog mirovnog sporazuma, bliskog saradnika Richarda Holbrookea. Taj penzionisani američki diplomat autoru je naglasio kako je sporazum trebao imati kratak rok upotrebe, te da je za njegovo sprovo enje, uključujući i ostanak Dejtonskog ustava BiH, svojevremeno bilo planirano za maksimalan vremenski period od 5 godina. Sama injenica da je Dayton i 17 godina poslije potpisivanja još uvijek živ, te da Dejtonski sporazum danas najviše brani ona strana koja ga je 1995. godine najviše napala, banjaluka, govori o tome da je u poslijeratnom periodu nešto u međunarodnoj politici ozbiljno krenulo u pogrešnom smjeru.

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Drugi doga aj bio je posjeta gdje Ashton i Clinton u Sarajevu. Mada su se obje dame maksimalno trudile da demonstriraju angažman i odlu nost me unarodne zajednica, sama posjeta pretvorila se u tužan simbol neuspješne politike EU i SAD u posljednje vrijeme. Na jednoj strani je bila visoka predstavnica EU, koja je > mada izabrana kao kompromisni, slab kandidat – ve prošle godine pretrpila kritiku ministara vanjskih poslova skoro polovine država lanica Unije zbog još slabijeg nastupa nego što se mislilo. Na drugoj strani je bila supruga bivšeg ameri kog predsjednika Clintonu, najviši diplomata ameri ke administracije, koja je dolaskom potpredsjednika Bidena u maju 2009. u Sarajevo najavila poja ani ameri ki angažman. Dok je Clintonova svojom posljednjom posjetom Sarajevu u augustu 2010. godine izjavom adresiranom na Banjaluku upozorila da ne ulaze u avanturu secesije jer “SAD ih ne e priznati”, prakti no je signalizirala da se SAD uistinu ne namjeravaju više ozbiljno umiješati u BiH. Zajedni ka posjeta najviših diplomata Unije i SAD-a tako se pretvorila u simbol preokreta u politici Zapada prema BiH iz 2005. godine – predaja vodstva sa SAD na Evropsku Uniju – pri emu se to evropsko vodstvo do današnjeg dana nije dogodilo.

Tre i doga aj je bio susret autora s predstavnikom Evropske komisije nadležnim za Hrvatsku u Direkciji za proširenje, na jednoj konferenciji o nau enim lekcijama u euro-integracijskom procesu Hrvatske. Doti ni gospodin, koji je etiri godine ranije autoru u jednom razgovoru objasnio da se komisija isklju ivo bavi uskla ivanjem hrvatskog pravnog sistema sa pravnom ste evinom EU, a ne implementacijom reformi jer birokratski briselski aparat za to nije stvoren > na ovoj je konferenciji, sasvim suprotno, govorio o samoodrživosti reformi u RH, te o odnosu politi kih i tehni kih kriterija Komisije u integracijskom procesu. Taj primjer, kao možda nijedan drugi, slikovito pokazuje kako integracijski *toolbox* EU, za razliku od raširene percepcije, uopšte nije jedan fiksni set uslova i kriterija nego jedan improvizaciski set alata, jedan *work in progress*.

Zašto je sve ovo bitno? Zato što je problem promjene prvobitno svjesno nefunkcionalne dejtonske strukture države BiH trebalo riješiti putem prelaska sa „dejtonske faze“ na „evropsku fazu“ poslijeratnog razvoja BiH. No, taj prelazak uopšte nije desio; umjesto njega, desio se prelazak na „briselsku fazu“ u svom najgorem smislu rije i – kao farsa „evropske faze“: Zbog odsustva liderstva Evropske unije, odnosno liderstva unutar EU, te zbog sve manje politi ke volje unutar Unije za bavljenje Bosnom i Hercegovinom, „bosanski problem“ prepušten je Evropskoj komisiji. A Evropska komisija, koja u odsustvu te politi ke volje nije u poziciji da sama riješi problem,

nalazi se u nemogu oj misiji, u pokušaju > od po etka osu enom na propast > da se strukturalni problemi BiH riješe isklju ivo kroz *acquis communitaire*.

Nemogu nost te misije, odnosno politika kvadrature kruga, najbolje s vidi kroz dominantnu terminologiju Evropske komisije: u njoj preovla uju pojmovi *process* (proces) i *progress* (napredak). Pojam „proces“ jedan je od osnovnih pojmoveva u sociologiji, drugi je „struktura“, a „napredak“ ima svoju suprotnost u pojmu „nazadovanje“. Komisija, me utim, te pojmove koristi rijetko kad, ili nikako (kao nazadovanje). No, u društveno-političkim kretanjima u Bosni i Hercegovini od sredine prethodne decenije vidimo uglavnom dominacija parastruktura nad procesom, te stagnaciju i nazadovanje a ne napredak. Zato u istom periodu vidimo sve ve i jaz izme u društveno-političke realnosti na terenu u BiH i narativa Evropske unije o toj realnosti.

2. Nova hrvatska politika prema BiH

Gdje je Hrvatska u tom evropsko-bosansko-hercegovačkom košmaru u svom odnosu prema BiH, odnosno kakva će biti politika Republike Hrvatske kao budućeg lana Evropske unije prema BiH? Prerano je dati konačnu ocjenu, najprije zbog toga što je na vlast u Zagreb krajem 2011. godine došla nova vlada, koja je najavila da će otvoriti novu stranicu u odnosima sa susjedom pošto će se osnovne koordinate vanjske politike RH skorim ulaskom u EU bitno promijeniti.

Ipak, Hrvatska je skupljala prva iskustva s novim angažmanom u BiH u posljednje dvije godine, odnosno sa stupanjem predsjednika Josipovića na dužnost, te s njegovom i angažmanom njegovog ureda prema BiH. Josipovićeva inicijativa regionalne saradnje i pomirenja, njegove česte posjete Bosni i Hercegovini i sve češći kontakti s političkim predstavnicima iz BiH, pogotovo s bh. Hrvatima, predstavljali su svojevrsni pokušaj „odlaska s Balkana“: kao najvjerniji sljedbenik politike *ownership* i „EU integracije ueber alles“, ured predsjednika je nastupio kao da je Hrvatska već ušla u Uniju. No, taj angažman je završio na sasvim drugom kraju – u pokušaju posredovanja u krizi oko formiranje federalne vlade nakon opštih izbora oktobra 2010. godine ured se koristio sredstvima direktnog miješanja u unutrašnjopolitičke stvari susjedne zemlje, a bez željenog efekta – uključujući hrvatskih stranaka u BiH u vladajuću koaliciju.

Ta epizoda, kao i niz otvorenih bilateralnih pitanja koja se poslije jedne decenije zamrznutog stanja sad pokušavaju riješiti na brzinu – jer bi ulazak u EU bitno mijenjao troškove nerješavanja za Hrvatsku, a djelimično i za BiH – moguće u identifikaciji glavnih sastavnica

koje će (su)odrediti buduću politiku Zagreba prema Bosni i Hercegovini.

Na jednoj strani vidljivo je nastojanje zvanih nog Zagreba da prekine s nasljeđem agresije Republike Hrvatske na Bosnu i Hercegovinu, koje je na djelu već od mandata prethodne vlade Jadranke Kosor. Tako je 2010. izmijenjen Izborni zakon RH kao dio paket-aranžmana s tadašnjem opozicijom, a u vezi s referendumom o ulasku u EU. Smanjen je broj saborskih zastupnika koji se biraju iz famozne „dijasporske“ izborne jedinice – institucije koju je Franjo Tuđman 1995. uveo da bi trajno osigurao politički utjecaj hercegovačkog lobija u Hrvatskoj te ostanak HDZ-a na vlasti u Hrvatskoj – sa 12 na 3. Istovremeno, vlada Kosorove pokrenula je, a akutelna Milanovićeva vlada nastavila promjenu postojećeg Zakona o prebivalištu. Cilj je „zatvoriti rupe“ u tom zakonu, koje su mnosvručno bosanskih Hrvata sa hrvatskim pasošima dosad omogućile da imaju prijavljen (fiktivni) boravak i u RH i u BiH, te da na osnovu toga uživaju socijalne beneficije iz obje države. U kombinaciji, ove mjeru će instituciji dvojnog državljanstva bh. Hrvata oduzeti pravobitni karakter podrivanja suvereniteta države Bosne i Hercegovine, te je smjestiti u normalne evropske okvire.

Na drugoj strani, Hrvatska nastavlja koristiti stanje ne-države u BiH da bi izbjegla rješavanja otvorenih bilateralnih pitanja, čime i dalje održava elemente polukolonijalnog odnosa RH prema BiH, pogotovo prema Federaciji BiH, a koji poti u iz 1990-ih godina. Tako Hrvatska i dalje blokira implementaciju Aneksa G međunarodnog sporazuma o sukcesiji država nasljednica bivše Jugoslavije u vidu varanja imovine građana i prava lica iz BiH u Hrvatskoj, naspram Bosne i Hercegovine koja je sporazum davno implementirala. Isto tako, Hrvatska nastavlja sa neformalnom praksom korištenja necarinskih barijera protiv uvoza iz BiH, što je mjeru nelegalna po regionalnom ugovoru o slobodnoj trgovini CEFTA. U obaslužujući Zagreb koristi hrvatske stranke u BiH da sprječe formiranje bosanskohercegovačkog državnog interesa i uvođenje kontramjera Sarajeva.

Važno je napomenuti da je motivacija zvanih Hrvatske koja određuje kako element kontinuiteta tako i diskontinuiteta sa 1990-im godinama prvenstveno ekonomski interes, dok su političke pretenzije prema susjednoj zemlji iz tog perioda nestale.

3. Uloga Bosne i Hercegovine i Evropske unije

A Bosna i Hercegovina? Zemlja, odnosno njene političke elite kroz nastojanje Hrvatske da redefiniše svoju politiku prema susjedu, uglavnom nastavljaju svoj autistički, autodestruktivni put. Najslikovitiji primjer je kašnjenje bh. vlada da

državu institucionalno pripreme za promjene trgovinskog režima sa Hrvatskom koje nastupaju sa ulaskom zemlje u EU, i to prvenstveno u sferi izvoza poljoprivrednih proizvoda. Ono što je evropskim diplomatima u Sarajevu ostalo potpuno nerazumljivo jeste politi ki otpor tim politi kim zahtjevima, i to prvenstveno, ali ne isklju ivo, iz Republike Srpske, koja insistira na tome da ne dolazi u obzir “dalje prenošenje nadležnosti sa entitetskog na državni nivo vlasti”, što prijeti da direktno našteti poljoprivrednim proizvoda im a seljacima, uklju uju i prijete e gašenje prera iva ke industrije od 2013. godine. Oni ne razumiju prvenstveno politi ki, ekonomski štetan karakter poljoprivredne “politike” u BiH, koja zapravo ima dugu tradiciju: u BiH, kao i šire na Zapadnom Balkanu, na djelu je od 19. vijeka tradicionalno tjesna povezanost “nacionalnog pitanja” sa “selja kim pitanjem”. Ta povezanost odredila je da na Balkanu tradicionalno prevladava reakcionarni, etni ki tip nacionalizma, a na drugoj strani prouzrokovala je blokadu modernizacije poljoprivrede i sela. Iza te tradicionalne povezanosti krije se nastavak politike instrumentalizacije sela kao izvora mitskog nacionalizma, te ruralnog stanovništva kao bira ke baze nacionalista. Utomovisni komodnosu stradanužnamodernizacijapoljoprivrede.

A gdje je tu Evropska unija? Evropska komisija u svojoj opštoj politici stalnog snižavanja *conditionality* naspram retrogradnih političkih razvoja u konfliktima izme u Hrvatske i Bosne i Hercegovine oko desetine otvorenih bilateralnih pitanja, uglavnom je bila odsutna kao politi ki akter. Kao što je sebe isklju ila i iz uticaja na razvoj poljoprivrednog sektora i poljoprivredne politike u BiH tokom cjelokupnog dosadašnjeg procesa euro-integracija Bosne i Hercegovine. Unato tome što je poljoprivredni sektor jedan od klasi nih elemenata politike Unije, Brisel je dosad ostavio svoj veliki potencijal neiskoriš en. Dok je još 2008. godine u partnerskom dokumentu za BiH Evropska unija zahtjevala formiranje ministarstva poljoprivrede Bosne i Hercegovine na državnom nivou, suo ena sa politi kim otporima iz Banjaluke brzo je zaboravila na sopstveni zahtjev. Ali zauzvrat nije dobila ništa – ni opremljenost regulatornih institucija u sferi poljoprivrede na državnom nivou niti ikakvu „koordinaciju“ ili „harmonizaciju“ poljoprivredne politike entiteta i kantona. Time je EU godinama izravno podupirala onu destruktivnu, entitetsku poljoprivrednu politiku koja je odgovorna za institucionalnu nepremljenost za ulazak RH u Uniju.

Šta to sve zna i za budu u politiku Hrvatske prema BiH, politiku novog lana Evropske unije? Politi ka realnost njenih odrednica > i onih elemenata diskontinuiteta i kontinuiteta sa politikom 1990-ih godina, pokazuje da ne može biti govora o “odlasku Hrvatske sa Balkana“, kako se u kontekstu ulaska Hrvatske u Evropsku uniju ovih dana esto uje. Hrvatska

e i poslije ulaska u Uniju, htjela-nehtjela, ostati zarobljena u tijesnoj vezi sa Bosnom i Hercegovinom, pa samim time i s problemom sve veće politike i ine nestabilnosti susjedne zemlje. Hrvatska je, dakle, biti priručna da razradi smišljenu politiku prema BiH. Ono što će se mijenjati jeste politički kontekst: Zagreb od prvog jula 2013. više neće moći i pristupiti bh. problemu kao bilateralnom političkom pitanju, nego će morati definisati svoju politiku prema BiH kroz učešće u kreiranju politike EU prema tom balkanskom pacijentu. Tu i leži šansa Hrvatske: kao zapadnobalkanskoj zemlji, mogu nosti njenog bilateralnog uticaja na politiku previranja u Bosni bile su prilično ograničene. Kao 28. članica Evropske unije, i jedina članica susjed s Bosnom i Hercegovinom, Hrvatska ima mnogo veći potencijalni uticaj na BiH, prvo zato što ključne rješavanja bosanskohercegovačkog problema leže u Evropskoj uniji, a drugo zato što je Unija o politici prema BiH podijeljena kao ni u jednom drugom slučaju, što Hrvatskoj otvara posebne mogunosti su-kreiranja te politike.

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UPITNA BUDU NOST REGIJE NAKON ULASKA HRVATSKE U EU

Zlatko Dizdarevi *

Na prvom mjestu, mada to može izgledati nevažno u odnosu na zna aj teme, vratio bih se na pitanje koje je, ne bez velikog razloga, na nedavnoj konferenciji u Berlinu u organizaciji Fondacije Heinrich Boll (18-19. oktobar 2012.), na temu “Implikacije hrvatskog ulaska u EU”, u samom uvodu svog izlaganja pomenuo bivši predsjednik Hrvatske Stjepan Mesić, referiraju i na naslov prvog panela Konferencije: “Finalni odlazak sa zapadnog Balkana ?” Mesić evo pitanje je bilo, “Gdje to *odlazi* Hrvatska idu eg ljeta?”

Zanimljivo pitanje; nije novo, ali je uočljivo kako se u politi kom vokabularu ono sugerira sve manje retorički a sve više politički i geostrateški. Uočljivo je da je pojam ovog tzv. *odlaska* Hrvatske sa Balkana vidno osnažen ak i od vremena kada je berlinska konferencija tek pojavila da se priprema, do dana njenog održavanja. Od pitanja: *Hrvatska – i onda?* sa pripadaju im znakom pitanja, do masovnih slutnji iskazanih kroz usta mnogih uglednih političara iz zemalja Unije, predsjednika država i analitičara, prema kojima Hrvatska definitivno *napušta Zapadni Balkan* koji, također definitivno, *ostaje* dobijeka tamo gdje je oduvijek bio, bez realne perspektive da u dogledno vrijeme “ode” tamo gdje je “otisla” Hrvatska sa istog prostora.

Smatram bitnim da razmotrimo ovu floskulu u kontekstu širenja i pozicioniranja Evropske unije na Balkan, dakle posebno sa stanovišta evropskih perspektiva ostalih zemalja regiona. Ovo već pomalo rutinsko pominjanje “odlaska Hrvatske sa Balkana” mnogo je više od puke jezičke figure. Ona je zamjenila ono što smo do sada držali za koncept kojim se Evropska unija svojim standardima i mehanizmima “proširuje” (*enlargement*) na prostore na kojima nije bila, pa tako i na Zapadni Balkan, na kojem je i Hrvatska. I nju treba glasno i precizno pojasniti, kako bi i ova konferencija imala pravog smisla. Ako je u pitanju, pojednostavljeni kazano, doista definitivni “odlazak” onih koji su otišli, i definitivni i trajni ostanak onih koji su ostali, pri čemu im se to sve glasnije i jasnije poručuje, onda imamo sasvim novu geopolitičku, geostratešku, a sutra najvjerojatnije i bezbjednosnu situaciju na cijelom prostoru o kojem je riječ.

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Onda imamo pitanje s *kim* ostaju oni što su ostali, kome e se okretati zato što se ne može preko zida iza kojeg su oni što su otišli, itd. itd. U Evropskoj uniji za sada, o igledno, ili ne postoji interes za odgovorom na ovo pitanje, što je manje vjerovatno, ili ne postoji unutrašnji kapacitet da se otvore na “hrabriji na in” pitanja politi kih usaglašavanja i dugoro ne strategije proširenja, koja formalno nije upitna, ali tu neupitnost nova realnost ozbiljno dovodi u sumnju.

Nažalost, stje e se utisak da ponovo oživljavaju neki poznati stari duhovi Evrope, koja u teškim situacijama reaguje svojevrsnom klaustrofobijom, prije svega refleksom u korist zatvaranja granica i čuvanjem svojih blaga pred “onima izvana”. Istovremeno se zaboravljuju preko no i i globalizacija, i prožimanje, i zajedni ki interesi, i kvalitet razli itosti svake vrste. To onda otvara prostore i za razne druge apetite, za teorije o “sukobu civilizacija”, za državna grupisanja po granicama religija, “povijesnih interesa” itd. Barem u Evropi znamo o emu u tom smislu govorimo. Entuzijazam spram proširenja vidno opada, ne samo unutar Unije ve i u zemljama koje su do ju er pokazivale visok stupanj opredijeljenosti za Evropu, uz osje aj temeljnog pripadanja njenim povijesnim vrijednostima. Samo po sebi, u takvoj situaciji znatno opada i utjecaj proevropskih snaga u svakoj zemlji regiona koja je iskazala svoje opredijeljenje za Uniju. Vrata za “druge” time se širom otvaraju.

Proširenje EU na Hrvatsku dešava se u izvjesno specifičnim okolnostima, i istorijskim, i teritorijalnim, i životnim, u pore enju sa velikom ve inom drugih zemalja i njihovim ulaskom u EU. Pojednostavljeno kazano, eška i Slova ka su, na primjer, zajedno postale lanice EU, pa njihovo osamostaljivanje nije predstavljalo traumati an problem ni u politi kom, ni u ekonomskom ni u komunikacijskom pogledu, u najširem smislu rije i. Ma arska, Poljska, Rumunija i Bugarska pojedina no se nisu prije lanstva u EU ni od koga razdruživale. Svaka je u Uniju unosila svoje “jasne” granice i samo vlastite probleme. Hrvatska, me utim, prolazi realno kroz dva procesa razdruživanja. Jedan je bio proces nasilne disolucije Jugoslavije, a drugi je sada, proces “razdruživanja” od svog ukupnog regionalnog okoliša, s kojim je prirodno srastala decenijama. Hrvatska je, i pored uzajamnih granica, bila vezana geografski, ekonomski, komunikacijski, jezi ki, istorijski itd. sa tri države koje ostaju izvan Unije do dalnjeg (BiH, Srbija i Crna Gora). Bezmalo podjednako tako i sa Makedonijom i Kosovom u regionu, s kojima nema zajedni ku granicu. Sa etvrtim susjedom na granici, Slovenijom, kao državom u EU, Hrvatska je imala i ima sporadi no ak i više problema nego sa drugima iz regiona.

Ulaskom Hrvatske u EU granica Unije dolazi direktno na granice BiH, Srbije i Crne Gore, što novu realnost inačici bitno složenijom i posebnom u odnosu na jučer.

Nova realnost, snažno ovisna o postojećim specifičnostima, zahtjevima i specifičnim rješenjima unutar primjene standarda Evropske unije, temeljem kojih će i Hrvatska, ali i EU uređivati svoje odnose sa regionom koji nije još u Uniji. To je, naprsto realnost. Region Zapadnog Balkana postaje naprsto prirodno dijelom koordinatnog sistema Europe u nizu egzistencijalnih aspekata, i nedostatak osjećanja za tu injenicu sasvim sigurno bi proizveo krajnje neugodne posljedice po dio regiona koji ulaskom Hrvatske ostaje izvan Evropske unije ali, i kratkorođeno i dugorođeno, i po samu Uniju. Neki posljednji razgovori o konkretnim i praktičnim pitanjima kao što su, recimo, granice, komunikacije, promet roba pa i ljudi, ne potvrđuju, nažalost, da o ovoj injenici unutar EU postoji do kraja iskristalizirana i zajednička svijest. Kao ni svijest o tome da će neki problemi nastali temeljem birokratsko-administrativne striktnosti u odvajanju onih koji "odlaze" i onih što "ostaju", postati veliki problem i za jedne i za druge, pa tako i za EU.

Poznato je, recimo, da o potrebi ratifikacije podavno potpisanih sporazuma o granici na moru između BiH i Hrvatske postoji bilateralna saglasnost između dvije države i, zajedno, sa EU. Ipak, zbog nedovršene ustavne arhitekture u BiH ratifikacija može biti osporena od strane jednog entiteta u BiH, ili čak samo jedne stranke. Da li, pri tome, ostavljena do kraja nedefinirana morska granica Hrvatske i EU prema prostoru koji nije EU, koja sa Hrvatskom postaje morska granica Unije, jeste doista samo unutrašnja stvar Bosne i Hercegovine i Republike Srpske, ili će sutra postati problem cijele Evropske Unije?

Slijedeće je pitanje pruge između Sarajeva u BiH i Luke Ploče u Hrvatskoj. Cijelom dužinom ova je pruga na evropskom koridoru Vc koji spaja Budimpeštu i Jadransko more. Ona prolazi i teritoriju BiH i Hrvatske, znači i uskoro teritoriju EU. Da li je nova EU "rampa" na toj pruzi, na granici između BiH i Hrvatske, samo problem ove dvije države, i može li se rješavati samo bilateralno? Može li se Bosni i Hercegovini onemogućiti da tom prugom, izgrađenom svojevremeno u Jugoslaviji za potrebe BiH i Hrvatske, ali i cijele regije, transportuje i dalje svoje robe do Luke Ploče i dalje u svijet i podjednako tako preko te luke uvozi robe sa trećim, pa i neevropskih prostora u Bosnu i Hercegovinu. Kakvog smisla uopće ima ta pruga bez Luke Ploče, ili Luke Ploče bez te pruge potpuno "prohodne" cijelom trasom bez barijera.

Mora se shvatiti da ovakva "presjecanja" teritorije EU granicama BiH,

poput one u Neumu na moru, nisu standardna pojava na prostorima EU, pa upravo zato traže i nestandardna rješenja. Tim bi se rješenjima na mnogo fleksibilniji način spajao region sa EU, umjesto da ga se odvaja tehničkim novim "željeznim granicama". Ako se to ne u in u preostalih desetak mjeseci, onda e se, na mnogo bolniji na in nego što je samo retorika, shvatiti ko to i gdje "odlazi", a ko i zašto "ostaje" tamo gdje je oduvijek bio. Naravno, ne smije se zaboraviti da kompletну ovu sferu snažno pritiskuje i unutrašnja lokalna politizacija, naj eš e pogubna za dugoro na i globalna rješenja. Zato se otvaraju i problemi koje danas imamo u potpunoj politizaciji pitanja izgradnje mosta na Pelješcu, koji je, uz poštivanje me unarodnih standarda, unutrašnja stvar Hrvatske i pitanje novca a ne ništa drugo, podjednako kao i mogu eg koridora u zale u Neuma ili famozna 2 školja u malostonskom zaljevu, ideja o "skretanju" koridora Vc u Neum umjesto Plo a, itd.

Spuštanje onoga što se kolokvijalno u BiH ve naziva "željeznom zavjesom" izme u EU i regionala, dovest e, van svake sumnje, do širokog spektra politi kih i ekonomskih posljedica u zemljama regionala, ali i u samoj Hrvatskoj. Zemlje regionala u srcu Evrope a izvan EU e, jasno, morati da se okre u mnogo više partnerima izvan EU, posebno Istoku i tzv. Tre em svijetu, a svoju šansu u tome ve vide Rusija, Turska, Kina i mnoge druge zemlje. Za neke je ta šansa prevashodno ekonomska, za neke sasvim izvjesno postaje i mnogo više od toga. Stari geostrateški apetiti u svijetu, kao što vidimo danas, ako želimo da vidimo, bude se ne samo prema Istoku ve sve otvoreni i prema Balkanu. Vrijeme je kada striktna nacionalna logika kao ekskluzivni osnov politi kog konstituiranja, uz otvorene pritiske vjerskih emocija, uz istorijske uspomene, snažno pritiskuju svakodnevni život. Ujedno, koncept spašavanja sistema i kapitala preko le a sve siromašnijih gra ana, teško na Balkanu prolazi. Evropa jeste prirodni put i za sada još uvijek preovla uju a želja ve ine ljudi u regionu. Ali, nekonzistentnom politikom proširenja, gdje se esto usko interesno – pa i temeljem dvostrukih standarda – balansira izme u politi kih uslova i striktno tehni kih kriterija za prijem, dolazi do slabljenja globalnog utjecaja EU na region. Nije daleko ni realnost u kojoj e se zemlje bez jasne perspektive priklu enja okretati prvenstveno, pa i isklju ivo onima koji im pruže ili ak samo obe aju ruku pomo i, na ovaj ili onaj na in.

Razli iti, esto dramati ni izazovi unutar BiH, Srbije, Makedonije, na Kosovu, mogu se rješavati u koordinatnom sistemu EU integracija i politike proširenja, u ovisnosti o svakoj situaciji posebno, i to na planiran, organiziran pa i institucionaliziran na in. Ali, nikako se ne smije zaboraviti, mogu i po receptima s drugih strana. Apetiti u tom pogledu sve su o igledniji i zato

uopšte nije nebitno kakav se signal Evrope u ovom asu šalje prema regionu. Neki od tih signala, odaslati i iz Njema ke i Francuske, Austrije itd. povodom pitanja “šta poslije Hrvatske”, mogu ubrzo iznenaditi, pa i zabrinuti Evropu. Zato volja i konkretan napor EU da se otvore vrata za, recimo, integracije zemalja kandidata i prije prijema u razne oblasti djelovanja EU, mogu da budu presudni. Ne samo zato što se ovim ostvaruje najbolji vid priprema za sutrašnji život u Uniji, ve i više od toga, da se sa uva povjerenje u samu politiku i proces proširenja. U Turskoj je, recimo, to povjerenje sasvim opalo, ali je Ankara našla u tome povoda i razloga da definira nove dugoročne ekonomske, ali i geostrateške ciljeve, koji snažno kalkulišu sa zemljama Zapadnog Balkana, mimo EU. Retorika je u vezi s tim jedno, a stvarnost drugo. Pozicije Rusije spram dijelova Balkana i “toplog mora” odavno su poznate, a njihovo dimenzioniranje ponajviše ovisi o tome koliko e EU pružiti mogu nosti i nade tim dijelovima Balkana u okviru svoje politike i realnosti.

U ovom asu, u vremenu koje je ostalo do 1. jula 2013. godine, ini mi se najvažnijim krajnje ozbiljno, energi no i uz mnogo više odlu nosti u prihvatanju realnosti sa svim specifičnostima, “zatvoriti” neka prioritetna, a ve dugo otvorena pitanja izme u Hrvatske, zna i sada EU, i susjednih zemalja, te jasno nazna iti pravce i mogu nosti sveukupne regionalne saradnje na Zapadnom Balkanu u kontekstu nove zbilje sa Hrvatskom. To e omogu iti da se fokus odnosa u regionu prebaci sa teoretičiranja o tome ko je i da li je neko negdje *otisao*, a ko i gdje *ostao*, na uspostavljanje mehanizama normalnog uzajamnog funkcioniranja, proisteklog iz prirode zajedni kih interesa, u okviru novih uslova i standarda. Sve drugo predstavljat e oja avanje uzajamnih tenzija u regionu, pomjeranje centara odlu ivanja, te ra anje novih uporišta kriminala, podsticanja nezakonitosti svake vrste. To e svakako ubrzano hraniti i retrogradne snage i projekte, te raspirivati stara žarišta sukoba. Onda to doista ne e biti samo problem onih koji su “ostali”, ve izvjesno i svih onih koji misle da su negdje “otisli” ili pobegli, odnosno problem EU u cjelini. Nastavak procesa proširenja mora zato biti interes i Evrope i Zapadnog Balkana, a ne milost Evropske unije prema Zapadnom Balkanu. Ako se to tako ne shvati, alternative e se brzo “aktivirati” ali, sasvim sam uvjeren, na štetu interesa Evrope podjednako kao i zemalja Zapadnog Balkana i regiona u širem smislu.

ZAKLJU CI I PREPORUKE

Vjeruju i da je to promišljanje **evropskih tema**, mogu e jedino kroz **otvoreni društveni dijalog** na Konferenciji *Politike evropskih integracija*, koja je održana 2.i 3. novembra u Sarajevu, zaklju eno je:

1. *Proces evropskih integracija ne treba marginalizirati nego demistificirati, posebno s aspekta dosadašnje integracijske politike EU prema zemljama u regiji.*

Upromoviranju evropskih, univerzalnih ideja, od Evropske unije se o ekivalo **brisanje** nekih **razdvajanja** koja su nastajala kroz historiju; me utim, prakse kao što su kontrola migracijskih tokova, nepropustivost granica, o igledna kriza multikulturalizma, porast nacionalisti kih politika, diskriminacija manjinskih zajednica, posebno Roma, **potiskuju u drugi plan** ono što EU politi ki ujedinjuje, a to su njeni ideali: sloboda, jednakost, ljudska prava, socijalna sigurnost i stabilan mir. Višegodišnje, ponekad i svrshodno, a ponekad i bolno '**discipliniranje regionala**' natjerala nas je da se na konferenciji zapitamo u kojoj mjeri su predstavnici EU principijelni u sprovo enju demokratizacije ovog prostora, posebno ako imamo na umu sve jasnije izjave o tome kako je EU umorna od proširenja i kako je preuzela obaveze koje ne može ispoštovati.

2. *Spektakularne naracije o procedurama prijema, zahtjevima i kriterijima su, s jedne strane, slabile i slabe političku identifikaciju sa EU, a s druge strane, hrane i legitimiraju etnopoliti ke prakse u regionu; stoga se u regionu prepoznaju euroskeptična i eurofilična mišljenja.*

Evropsko insistiranje na funkciji granice, npr. u slu aju Hrvatske i Slovenije u vezi s teritorijalnim razgrani enjem mora u Piranskom zalivu, podstaknulo je **nacionalno mobiliziranje**, pa smo svjedoci da je jedno pravno-tehni ko pitanje bilo dobra prilika da se 20 godina dvije prijateljske zemlje nadme u koja e uspješnije nametnuti vi enje ovog problema, njegovih prioriteta i na ina rješavanja istog. Nažalost, ti spektakularni politi komedijski diskursi prepoznaju se danas u vezi s granicom izme u BiH i Hrvatske kod Neuma, a vjerujemo da e ih biti i u nekim drugim slu ajevima.

3. *Svjesni da je skori ulazak Hrvatske u EU važan trenutak koji e uticati na politi ku i društvenu dinamiku regionala, zaklju ujemo je da je niz otvorenih pitanja koja mogu uticati na demokratizaciju politi kog ambijenta u kojem svi živimo.*

Zna ajne su izjave, posebno za BiH, kojoj je EU tako er **temeljni politi ki imperativ**, da se Hrvatska nakon ulaska u EU ne ese **distancirati od regionala**. Taj

novi moment u vanjskoj politici Hrvatske prema regionu ohrabruje i obavezuje Hrvatsku da politikom pomirenja ‘slomi krug’ osvete, odnosno ucjenjivanja, koje je moglo a osjetiti na vlastitoj koži kada je Slovenija blokirala njene pregovore sa EU.

4. Kroz različita iskustva Hrvatske, Bosne i Hercegovine i Srbije, rasvijetljena je odgovornost i domaćih političkih elita, te su sagledane mogućnosti za efikasnije djelovanje civilnog društva u regiji. Opsjednuti domaćim nacionalistima kim ideologijama, zaključeno je da smo dugo kao region bili lišeni javne evropske dimenzije.

Razgovarajući o tome što je **evropska vrijednost za sve nas**, na konferenciji smo zaključili da u ulazak Hrvatske u EU imati političke i ekonomske implikacije na BiH, kojoj će od naredne godine šengenska zavjesa biti mnogo bliža.

*5. Priželjkujemo da politički diskursi o evropskim integracijama budu pokretača snaga emancipacije i da ih ne kreiramo, po principima Eurosonga; kritici su sagledani mnogi procesi, s naglaskom na tome da je **evropska opredijeljenost** regionu neophodna.*

U duhu toga zaključeno je da današnju evropsku krizu treba razumjeti i kao **priliku** za novo i drugačije promišljanje evropskog političkog identiteta.

*Kreatorima politika upu eno je nekoliko politi kih,
privrednih i društvenih preporuka:*

1. EU treba da insistira na ispunjavanju obaveza koje je BiH preuzela u sklopu procesa integracija, a poseban imperativ je provedba presude Evropskog suda za ljudska prava (tzv. presuda Sejdic-Finci) i potpuno ispunjavanje obaveza iz Mape puta te aktiviranje Sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju koji je BiH potpisala još davne 2008. god.
2. EU i Evropska komisija treba da podržavaju i insistiraju na pregovorima iskljucivo sa državnim tijelima, umjesto u estalog preferiranja pregovora sa strana kim liderima zemlje. Tako "mehanizmi koordinacije" treba da omoguće efikasniji proces pregovora i ni na koji način ne smiju dovesti u pitanje ili oslabiti kapacitet Bosne i Hercegovine kao države.
3. Nastaviti s konstruktivnim pristupom u rješavanju sporova i otvorenih pitanja između BiH i Hrvatske. S obzirom na specifičnosti nekih od tih pitanja (pitanja Luke Plo e i granice Neuma) potrebno je da uloga EU u rješavanju ovih sporova bude konstruktivna.

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION POLICIES

Publishers: The Heinrich Böll Foundation and Political Science Association of BiH

Publisher: Mirela Grünther e evi

Editor: Nermina Mujagi

Proofreading: Ferida Duraković

Translation into English: Amira Sadiković and Amir Šuliman

Layout: Compis d.o.o.

Copies: 500

Printed by: Tipografija d.o.o.

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION POLICIES

Sarajevo, 2012.

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INTRODUCTION

Considering that the process of European integration in the Western Balkans, which is manifested in political practice through the accession of countries to the European Union (EU), raises a number of questions that need answering, the Heinrich Böll Foundation > Office for Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Political Science Association of BiH realized a project entitled “European Integration Policies”, as part of which a conference of the same title was organized on 2-3 November 2012 in Sarajevo with this publication resulting from it, which we wholeheartedly recommend to you.

The European integration process is a unique opportunity for the modernization and democratization of not only BiH, but the entire region as well. In that respect, this conference is an expression of efforts to use that opportunity for engaging in constructive dialogue on the European integration process, which has become an essential part of our social, political and economic reality. The conference was organized to present to the public different positions, comments and opinions, as well as experiences from the European integration process, together with implications of the accession of certain countries from the region for their neighbours remaining outside the boundaries of the EU.

At the height of Croatia’s accession to the European Union, it is necessary to clarify just how ready the region is for facing the challenges that the accession of this country will bring, especially if we know what political and social implications Croatia had to face when Slovenia, its immediate neighbour, joined the EU. Serbia and Macedonia are waiting to be given a date for starting accession negotiations with the EU. Negotiations with Montenegro started on 29 June. Albania has applied for membership in the EU. The issue of adopting the visa-liberalisation roadmap is now taking centre stage in Kosovo. On the path to European integration, BiH has not moved beyond the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement in 2008.

Due to delays in carrying out constitutional reforms necessary for progress and development of BiH, many analysts and experts already claim that BiH will be unprepared for the accession of Croatia to the EU. Once that happens, trade between BiH and Croatia will unfortunately be impeded, because Croatia will exit the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), which is the basis of its foreign trade. Legal-property issues, as well as the issue of dual citizenship, can also be a stumbling block if not regulated on time; then there is the issue of labour force treatment, employment, social insurance, pensions,

etc. The issue of the border status of Neum also remains unresolved between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. These are all issues requiring immediate regulation and resolution if disputes are to be avoided, i.e. the spectacularisation of these issues, which could disturb the already “shaky” neighbourly relations between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Since paternalistic relations between countries in the region are more than apparent (Slovenia wished to help Croatia and then used the first opportunity to block its negotiations on accession to the EU over unresolved issues concerning the border in the Gulf of Piran), we were interested to see why such superior positions appear in political and media discourses. What is the role of ‘small states’ in the European Parliament towards their neighbours, and what is the role of the EU in that context? The analyses and experiences of European parliamentarians and the experiences of Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and BiH were of great value to. It was important to discuss how responsibly the political elites behave, the role of the public, civil society and the media in co-shaping the ‘new’, ‘European’ political culture.

On the other hand, the accession of Croatia to the EU could represent an opportunity for BiH, as well as the entire region. While certain authors think that with the accession of Croatia to the EU a new ‘iron curtain’ will descend, i.e. that due to the current instability in the euro-zone and the situation in Greece and Spain there would be no further accession of new states to the EU any time soon, other authors think that just the opposite will happen and that the Western Balkans region can be integrated with the EU through a ‘domino effect’.

We are aware of the fact that this project will not solve the problems we are facing on the integration path, but we will remind of what has been achieved so far and how it was achieved, and we will also – which is very important – provide useful recommendations to policy leaders and policy makers in BiH. We hope that these recommendations will contribute to a faster and better integration process.

Mirela Grünther *e evi*, The Heinrich Böll Foundation
Nermina Mujagić, The Association for Political Sciences in BiH

Sarajevo, December 2012.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AND THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS

Željko Komšić *

I would like to thank the organizers of this conference, Association for Political Science in BiH and the Heinrich Böll Foundation, for inviting me and for giving me an opportunity to exchange with you my views and understanding of the European integrations policy in the situation Bosnia and Herzegovina is now.

In the invitation for the conference, you outlined several remarks and theses that I should comment.

You expressed the opinion that integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the EU is the main political imperative. That truly is so when you look at the official documents and strategic determinations of this country's institutions. However, many things in this country, including those determinations, which we can see also on the level of the political rhetoric, do not come to life in the current moment of our lives.

Stabilization and Association Agreement has not yet entered into force:

- > we have broken many deadlines from the Interim Agreement;
- > political leaders are not able to reach a consensus regarding the implementation of the Sejdić -Finci judgement;
- > during this year, we adopted only one “European” law and we passed a decision on the establishment of only one institution for implementation of that law;
- 1> since the liberalization, we did not achieve a single strategic step forward to the EU.

Finally, we did not prepare for Croatia’s entry into the EU, and that is a historic moment, which will influence the political and social dynamics within Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, that influence is such that our producers and exporters will be placed in a more severe position, not by their fault, not by the fault of Croatia, but exclusively by the fault of our institutions, but because they lack promptness and because they politicize all processes.

Also, I agree that we need to work on the Europeanization of our areas, normalization of social relations and democratization of the political ambience;

* BiH Presidency Member

however, sadly, exactly the reverse process has been going on since the last general elections.

We have not normalized social relations because they are in collision like never before and on several levels, ethnical, political and existential, while the country should function to solve the irreconcilable collisions in the society.

We have not democratized the political environment; it is less democratic now than it was ten years ago. Political leaders have simply taken over democracy from the citizens and are keeping it hostage to their own interests. I truly believed that the period from 2006 to 2010, that is, the period from the fall of the “April package” to the general election of 2010, was the peak of the political crisis in Bosnia ad Herzegovina. Sadly, it turned out that it can be worse, and we are still to see the responsibility of the political elites.

And finally, when we talk about the “Europeanization” of these areas, it will not happen if implemented by the elites, but by the entire society, the way that they will start thinking and acting in Bosnia and Herzegovina the way they would think and act if they were in some country of the European Union. In that sense, representatives of the EU, or popularly said ‘international community’, should also be held responsible here, for they have been trying to install in BiH something they would never accept as a solution in their own countries. All they need to do is be consistent in insisting on the fulfilment of the EU standards instead of serving us the semi-solutions that have been blocking us for several decades.

Here I primarily refer to the implementation of the Sejdi -Finci judgement. You know, everybody here is trying to use this judgement for their personal political goals and for making arrangements of deceit and for ensuring better pre-election positions. Political leaders are dealing with everything but with the essence of the Sejdi -Finci judgement, and that is that all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina are equal in the whole of the country’s territory, regardless of whether they are constitutive or Others or national minorities. Only if all citizens are equal, then the peoples of BiH will be equal too.

When the region is concerned, the European integration process and the past integration policy of the EU towards the countries of the region proved stricter than in the previous cycles of expansion. The way things are now, I think that the rest of the Western Balkans which is not in the EU, that is: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania need to turn to each other more, to cooperate more economically and not count on the expansion in

the following ten years, but they also need to work on the implementation of the EU standards and improvement of life of their citizens.

Political and economic implications of association of Croatia to the EU to Bosnia and Herzegovina will be considerable. Our border with Croatia will become a border with the EU, and that will change the regime of import, export, transport, travel and many other things that will influence the lives of our citizens. Whether or not we will manage to use some of the theoretic possibilities for attracting investments through stationing of companies which will possibly move out of Croatia into BiH, once the country joins the EU, because of the lower standards and access to the CEFTA market which Croatia will leave, is, again, up to us. However, one needs to keep in mind that we are at the very bottom of Europe in terms of criteria of simplicity of starting a business.

I also need to mention here our path to the NATO membership and express my disappointment with the stagnation in this process. I am personally of the opinion that NATO is the essential strategic priority of our country that needs to make us more serious and bring us stability and safety, primarily in the mind of people, citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, so that we could turn to other themes and the EU integrations. NATO was almost a preparation stage of stabilization, which follows the association.

Again, agreement between the political leaders has been achieved – in principle, the Agreement on Registration of the Perspective Military Property was achieved, but then, nothing; the agreement failed and we remained with the “conditional” membership in the Membership Action Plan. At the same time, the agreement was acceptable to all and in accordance with this country’s Constitution.

After these very pessimistic views, let me also express my belief in this country’s democratic potential and into openness of social dialogue, which will overcome the short-term political interests and which will contribute to the true democratization of the state and society. However, we all need to participate and show that a different Bosnia and Herzegovina is possible.

EU EXPANSION POLICY: ACCESSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA TO THE EU AND BIH

Stjepan Mesi *

I would like primarily to thank you for the invitation to attend this conference – important not only for Bosnia and Herzegovina, not only for relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, but also for the entire region. In addition, I would like to thank for the opportunity to express my views to the expansion policy of the European Union, and then – even only through indications – to the effects of the expected Croatian association to the Union to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I shall start by an observation that could seem superfluous to anyone who knows me and who knows my political affiliation. I am a full supporter of the European unification process and am of the opinion that the united Europe is not only our desire but also our fate. And I have one more opinion: I think that the end of that process, which also entails association of all south-east countries from the Old Continent into a united Europe, is a task of this, the present generation.

I thought it necessary to say and emphasize that again, for I think that exactly such a view gives me the right to a dose of criticism – for the European Union, as well as for the way in which we relate towards the Union. Criticism is, of course, utterly in the function of clarifying certain relations and situations in the Union and in our countries, specifically: in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in other countries of the region.

I hereby express my opinion unburdened by any state functions, but keeping in mind the experience from my two terms of office as President of Croatia. Thus, I am not speaking, nor am I in a position to speak on behalf of the Republic of Croatia, others are called to do that today, but I am speaking without having forgotten the politics I practiced as I served as the Croatian President and of the knowledge I had acquired then.

Countries of the region, of the South-East Europe, of the Western Balkans, it does not matter how we name them – countries formed in the area of the former Yugoslav federation gained independence at the time when then-united Europe, as part of the democratic world, lived in a kind of euphoria because of the fall of the system, wrongly called communism – both here and in the rest of the world. The process of EU enlargement is the immediate product of that euphoria, for – that was the estimate –

* *Former President of the Republic of Croatia*

countries that freed themselves of communism should have been rewarded.

Still, that was a conditioned reward. Until that time, membership in the North Atlantic Treaty, in the military-political alliance formed for the purpose of defence against a possible attack of the Soviet Union, was not in any way brought into connection with membership in the European Community, as it was called then, after it had started living its life under the name of the Common European Market. Some of the countries were also NATO members, but not members of the European Community and vice versa. After 1990, the situation changed.

For the so-called transitional countries, former states of the real-socialism, and, subsequently also for the former Yugoslav states, an unwritten, yet very firm rule was introduced: entrance to the NATO comes first, although NATO lost its purpose after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but it had for that reason transformed and became something different, and then – after completing the accession negotiations which were very simple for the first new members, although not very short, membership to the unifying Europe followed.

In order not to cause confusion over NATO: I was of the opinion that membership to NATO was very much necessary for Croatia, after the experience of bloody wars in which Yugoslavia fell apart, but also after the period of a complete and utterly dangerous politicization of the armed forces. For those same reasons, I think that NATO membership is necessary for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Whether or not will we, as members, agree with every action of the Treaty is another issue, just as long as our only obligation is a decree to help any member of the Alliance if attacked. I thought it was important to mention that so to avoid any – I repeat – any misconceptions.

I shall now return to the European unification. Its source is in the European Coal and Steel Community, whose makers clearly stated that their goal was unification of people not of countries. Still, unifying people on a continent divided into countries is possible only if the state borders are erased. Technically, that has been done. One can travel the European Union today without seeing or feeling the borders.

However, those borders have remained, in the minds of people. The spirit of the national still clearly prevails over the European universalism.

Slavery to the national, frequently to the nationalistic even, together with such a blind and deadly slavery to the system of neoliberal capitalism is in the root of all problems the European Union is facing today, together with the two of our countries – Croatia, soon to become a member of

the European Union and Bosnia and Herzegovina as a country aspiring to the candidate status. If that is not clear to us, nothing will ever be clear.

In short, I would primarily like to state that, so far, the process of expansion of the Union is necessary and unavoidable, if we by any means take seriously the idea of European unification. However, that process has not been uniform and from the year 1990 it has been under a strong influence of political calculations, which have barely taken into consideration economic legitimacy. Or, to make myself clearer: the expansion process in the form of a bonus for membership at the North Atlantic Treaty did not primarily seek an answer to the question: has this or that country really, and I stress that, really fulfilled all the conditions that qualify it for membership at the European Community, later: the Union.

The main criterion was: are they ours; that is, translated into a language we all understand well: are they suitable. If they were suitable, and they would become that as soon as they would get out of the system named communist, that is, socialist, and as soon as they held multi-party elections, it was enough – I shall not name the countries – to take over the obligation in the association negotiations that something would be done in order to get a pass. Hence: something was promised but it was never done!

Of course, after a while, it had become clear to the old members of the Union that it was not the way to move forward, so they started formulating stricter conditions and they started seeking acts not words. Croatia started the negotiations after the accession of two countries that caused “burns” to the European Union. They were accepted with the condition of continuation of monitoring after the accession, but there has been little use of that. One can only conclude that it is not the way it should have been. Means of pressure were used only in the conditions of economic crisis and that was a wrong choice of activity.

Why am I saying that? Because pressure is used to force the implementation of a completely new and wrong policy trying to solve economic crisis through austerity measures, and that inevitably means termination of production and which inevitably through suffocation of production and blocking the development, with additional killing of the welfare state. Only production, new jobs and development may provide exit from the crisis, while survival of the welfare state can be a guarantee of internal peace and stability.

Common European currency – the Euro – is another story. As a symbol of collectiveness and transformation of Europe of nation states into a common, one

and unique Europe, the Euro is more than welcome. However, superb economists are saying it was introduced too early and that it was in fact imposed to the countries at a very different degree of development. The present crisis that is shattering the Eurozone, they say, is by large a consequence of that hasty decision.

And all that was not followed by the same tempo and enthusiasm of formation of the European awareness; awareness of the common interests, common needs and the necessity of solving together, in solidarity, problems of individual member countries, within that European commonness.

Croatia was lucky to have led accession negotiations after the EU had definitively understood that promises are not a qualification for membership. We were asked to do very concrete things, many of them, just as Bosnia and Herzegovina will be asked to do them. I say on purpose that we were lucky because otherwise – ad I am almost certain of that – we would have succumbed to the temptation of promising without executing.

Of course, one can always ask: could we have “achieved” a postponement or an exception in the accession negotiations? I think we could have and I think we did not use that enough. That is my impression and if this is truly so, then I recommend to all future candidates to learn from us about that as well, that is, to learn from our experience.

One day, when we find ourselves under the wings of the Union, it will be a matter of our political will and wisdom to – together with the others – work on correcting all that is not good in the Union – starting from the rule of a bureaucratic apparatus from Brussels, all the way to the “fight to the last bullet” for the wasted system of neoliberal capitalism, to the damage of the social state, that is, citizens.

And, finally, we reach the issue of relations between our two countries in light of the upcoming accession of Croatia to the European Union. I think this is where we made most mistakes, not only as far Bosnia and Herzegovina is concerned, but also as far as the entire region is concerned. One could not have expected from BiH, such as it is, to give incentive to the Croatian engagement. No, that should have been our incentive. For, if all that should come into force by Croatian accession to the EU is fulfilled, we will – and I say this openly – jeopardize the important results and achievements of regional cooperation which we had opened and built with a lot of effort.

It is paradoxical in this all that lowering the “iron curtain” of Schengen on

the Croatian border is a threat used by exactly those who – among other things – had estimated Croatia's preparedness for membership in the EU in accordance with the ability and the will to cooperate with countries of the region. And we all need that cooperation. Not only for political reasons, for overcoming the effects of the bloody wars in which our former state fell apart, but also to please the needs of our national economies, that is, of what is left of them.

We in the region are turned towards each other.

Perhaps it is someone's interest in the Union to turn us into a market of second-class goods. Our interest is certainly not that. Our interest is mutual cooperation, even more than that – joint participation in the third markets. Of course, cooperation with present members of the Union is our interest, but there is little we can say to the highly developed countries, apart from the fact that we have no products to offer them - at least not in the extent that we could make a living out of that.

Thus, what remains is the region and the third world countries. Those are the two components we should jealously defend, even at the cost of disaccord with the common European foreign policy – if such a thing ever existed. All this that I have said is my personal opinion. I have no abilities to influence the current policy. I do have a right, however, to state that the job will not be done by Croatia's accession to the European Union.

On the day Croatia becomes 28th member of the Union, a new, great task, a new field of action will stand before it: to harmonize the membership with the interest and needs of cooperation with the countries of the region, and it will have to keep repeating to the Union that the process of European unification cannot and will not be over for so long, until all countries of South-East Europe become members.

Croatia is going nowhere by entering the Union. Croatia is entering the Union to become a member of a great European family of countries, frequently divided, just as is the case with many other families, but also to keep the door open for other countries of the region, that is, of former Yugoslavia. Croatia is entering the Union to become a part of the millennial undertaking which simply cannot be brought into question, but also to keep reminding us of the words of the founders: we are not forming coalitions of states, we are uniting men.

Croatia is not entering the Union to separate from anyone.

I think this should be the message from Zagreb to everybody in the region, as well as to Europe.

ACCESSION MAY BE THE CARROT, BUT NEVER THE BAIT

Marije Cornelissen*

‘Brussels’ does not exist. Okay, perhaps it does in a form. As a rather nice capital of a rather small country in Europe, where quite a lot of people from other EU countries live and work. But ‘Brussels’ as it often appears in the discourse and the media does not.

In my own country, the Netherlands, the image of ‘Brussels’ as a depersonified entity is often evoked by lazy journalists and sceptic politicians. Lazy journalists who think their readers won’t be able to handle mention of a separate Parliament, Commission and Council. Politicians who think their voters won’t be able to handle the truth that a small country like the Netherlands on its own is not equipped anymore to control the internationalising economy. In their discourse, ‘Brussels’ is an evil entity that wants to gather as much power as it can, to use it to swindle the poor unsuspecting Dutch out of their money and jobs and to undermine the pride we have in our once powerful little country. Once being a century or four in the past. In accession countries on the Western Balkans, the image of ‘Brussels’ is somewhat similar. It is an evil entity that has hatched a megalomaniac masterplan to snatch any recently gained sovereignty away from Balkan countries, to impose its neoliberal rule and to force its progressive values on the unsuspecting population.

As a European politician working in Brussels, I am always baffled by the amount of power and long-term vision that people seem to think the EU has. I am almost sorry to say that EU politicians have too little power, too little cooperation and too little agreement amongst themselves to even be able to hatch a masterplan stretching across decades, let alone implement it. The image of ‘Brussels’ as a unified entity with a master plan is a myth.

‘Brussels’ consists of three different institutions, populated by actual people, chosen or appointed, that change with each election. First and foremost for accession countries, there’s the European Commission. The Commission has civil servants on the ground in each of these countries. It tells accession countries what the benchmarks are and what needs to be done to comply with them, it gathers information about compliance and implementation, and it reports to those in the EU who take decisions about next steps in the accession process. The Commission doesn’t formally take

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the decisions on whether a country may take the next step in the accession process, but it wields power as the source of information that these decisions are based on. Their advice is of vital importance. I've always said that if people and politicians in accession countries choose to listen to anyone, they should choose to listen to the European Commission. Not because they are without fault, they certainly are not. But because they are the least political of the EU institutions, the least influenced by opinion polls and populism.

Then there is the European Parliament, of which I am a Member. We talk a lot about the enlargement process and all accession countries, we do a report on each country each year, we visit as often as we can, we talk to every journalist willing to put a microphone under our noses, we send stern letters to governments of accession countries, we maintain a network with civil society. And we have almost no decision-making power at all. We in the Parliament can decide that negotiations should be opened with Macedonia until we're blue in the face, but the EU treaties give us no power to do anything about it. The only things we do get to co-decide on are visa liberalisation and the final decision on accession when a country has finished its accession process, like Croatia recently. Listening to the Parliament is usually quite nice for accession countries. The majority is pro-European and pro-enlargement. In our debates, politicians try to emphasise some of the criteria according to their political affiliation, like I tend to do with LGBT rights and women's rights and more right-wing colleagues do with organised crime and corruption. But on the whole, we as a Parliament will applaud any step forward, however tiny.

The European Parliament can shame and blame, can shape the debate, but it cannot take the decisions. That power lies with the Council. And unfortunately, the Council is the most political and least European of the European institutions. Far from having a concerted master plan, the Council has no concerted or long-term plan at all. The people populating the Council dealing with enlargement are the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EU countries. They spend most of their days debating with their national parliaments, talking to their national press and checking the national polls. Only once a month at most they come to Brussels to debate foreign policy with their counterparts in other EU countries. While Commission and Parliament stay roughly the same for five years, a new face pops up in the ever changing group of ministers each time there are national elections somewhere. At the moment, these are mostly right-wing christian-democrat or right-wing liberal ministers. They cater to what they think their national electorate wants to hear. Tough against corruption, hesitant about visa liberalisation, keep Turkey out.

They have to decide unanimously, so each of them has veto power. Greece can block Macedonia, Cyprus can block Turkey, Slovenia can block Croatia. And five countries can block recognition of Kosovo, for reasons that have nothing at all to do with Kosovo. People and politicians in accession countries listening to Council need to always keep in mind that they are not the real audience of the remarks by ministers. The real audience are the voters back home. A clear example is visa liberalisation. The Dutch government was the one demanding an ‘emergency brake’ in case there would be too many misguided asylum seekers, and is now one of the most vocal countries in the debate on possible suspension of visa-free travel for Serbia and Macedonia. Very strange, considering that the Netherlands has had all of eleven asylum requests from Balkan citizens last year. But not so strange when considering that the right-wing government thinks this will gain votes with their sceptic electorate.

I believe that conditionality, consistency and credibility are the keys to a successful accession process. The process should be as technical as possible: these are the conditions for the next step, it is up to the accession country to fulfil them, and once they are fulfilled, the next step is taken. The ball should always be kept in the court of the accession country’s authorities, leaving only them responsible for reform and progress. A BiH politician lately said with great disdain that ‘the European Commission is populated by bureaucrats’. I personally thought that was a great compliment. The Commission should be populated by bureaucrats that say ‘these are the conditions, fulfill them and you may count on the next step’, without being influenced by undue political considerations.

The Commission tries to work that way, but is undermined from three sides. The first is Council. Council undermines conditionality by taking political decisions, not criteria-based ones. Macedonia can fulfill conditions for the opening of negotiations all it likes, but the name issue that has hardly anything to do with the accession process is dragged into it and blocks its progress. Serbia on the other hand can leave a few criteria unfulfilled in the visa liberalisation process, but got it anyway in the first tranche to support pro-EU forces in the country.

The second undermining force are the governments of accession countries. They tend to be less than open about what exactly the conditions for a next step are and what is expected of them. Croatia kept the benchmarks confidential until the negotiation process was fully over, even though there was no reason to do so. No negotiation position would have been endangered by being open, since the benchmarks once decided are non-negotiable. For NGOs and media, let alone citizens, it is very difficult to find out what their government should do to reform and align their legislation to EU laws.

Therefore many conditions, benchmarks and criteria seem to suddenly pop up and are seen as new and unfair, undermining the trust that citizens could have in the accession process. I am often confronted with that feeling in Balkan countries. In Serbia for instance, many people thought their country could immediately accede once Mladic was caught. Both the government and the European Commission had done far too little to properly explain all the steps and conditions before accession. It is no wonder that people feel let down and betrayed by both when their expectations are managed so badly.

The third undermining force is the European Commission itself. In my view, the Commission mixes enlargement and diplomacy far too much. It tries to solve diplomatic issues by making them part of the accession process or by having the same people manage the accession process and conduct diplomatic relations. While on the surface it might seem a good idea to use enlargement for a diplomatic breakthrough, in the longer run it undermines the credibility of the process.

Diplomacy and the accession process are different in nature. Diplomacy is about give and take, compromise, equal sides trying to settle differences by negotiation. The accession process is about criteria that need to be met, no negotiation possible, about the EU being clear on what needs to be done, no compromise possible. By mixing the two, both become political and country-specific. Politicians in accession countries get the idea that accession criteria are soft and open for compromise. Citizens get the idea that decisions are taken ad-hoc and arbitrarily. The Council of Ministers is reinforced in its idea that its okay to take political decisions instead of criteria-based ones.

This does not mean that diplomatic problems shouldn't be solved. The Macedonian name issue needs solving, the Bosnian constitution needs overhauling, the Albanian parliament needs reforming, the status of Kosovo needs settling. But issues that are not directly part of the accession criteria need a different arena to solve them. In the European Parliament, the Greens have therefore introduced the idea of an EU arbitration mechanism, where bilateral issues can be solved outside of other processes, for instance the name issue, but also issues like Neum and Ploce if they are not solved before the accession of Croatia. These issues should not be allowed to poison the accession process and hinder much needed reform. Furthermore, the European Commission has not only Commissioner Füle for enlargement, but also High Representative Ashton for foreign affairs. He should manage the criteria-based accession process, she should be involved in diplomatic negotiations. With Kosovo, this does happen now. The dialogue with Serbia is led by Ashton, not Füle. But chances are that

Serbia will be rewarded for cooperation in the dialogue by Füle with a next step in accession, disregarding the other criteria that are yet to be met by Serbia.

There is of course in many cases a link between diplomatic or political issues and accession criteria. Good neighbourly relations are a Copenhagen criterion, and so the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo is needed to fulfill that criterion. Effective administration and functioning democratic institutions are a Copenhagen criterion, and so constitutional reform in BiH is needed to fulfill that criterion. But while solving a political problem may be a prerequisite for fulfilling the criteria to take the next step, it should not replace those criteria. It too often does now. Serbia proposed an aggressive resolution on Kosovo in the UN, in itself unrelated to accession, and was rewarded with a next step in accession for taking it off the table. BiH politicians manage to form a government and vote a budget, in itself unrelated to accession, and moves are made to close OHR without all conditions met. This confusing of diplomacy and enlargement is making the accession process too country-specific and arbitrary, leaving too much space for emotion and manipulation, ultimately undermining the credibility of the process. I believe that the next accession step may always be a carrot, but never the bait. Bait is not actual nourishment, it is a means to a different end. Using a next step as bait means starting your reasoning from the country. A reasoning along the lines of ‘What needs to be done in BiH to turn it into a copy of an EU member state as much as possible, and which next step in accession can we use to make sure that is done?’. A carrot is actual healthy food, it is an end in itself. Using a next step as a carrot means starting your reasoning from the EU Treaty, legislation and values. A reasoning along the lines of ‘How can we assist BiH in its wish to become an EU member state, that is ready to handle all the obligations and rights that go along with membership?’.

After all that, let me conclude by saying that I am a staunch supporter of the enlargement process, flaws and all. Even though it doesn't always seem that way, the pace of progress and reform in all Balkan countries is a miracle, especially for vulnerable groups. There is a very long way still to go, but I'm in awe when I meet women's rights groups, LGBT activists, Roma people, environmental action groups and other civil organisations and see how their position has improved within a decade or less. They have taken what the accession process has to offer with both hands and are taking leaps forward. I want to concentrate on ways to make the enlargement process as useful as possible for those who want progress, who want to become EU citizens because of the finest thing that the EU has to offer in my view; its fundamental rights.

EU: AN AMBULANCE COMMUNITY AS THE LAST STAGE OF ETHNONATIONALISM?

(A Eurosceptic Thematic Perspective)

Žarko Puhovski*

Seen from a (several decades' long) Balkan waiting room, the European Union for a long time seemed an important orientation parameter, the closest approximation of what the post-communist communities had officially stated as their *credo*. In almost all segments of post-Yugoslav societies, it was considered unquestionable that it was a community of countries guaranteeing material stability, together with the guaranteed human rights, political freedom, social security, and stable peace (which, considering the local post-war context seemed absolutely important).

1. With the approach of factual “Euro integration”, the image started changing, not as much because of the changed perspective (although, certainly, because of that as well), as because of the objective changes in internal and external functioning of the EU itself, which started happening in the past ten years. Regardless of the extent to which the Yugoslav societies got closer to the membership, they are still outside the EU (with the exception of Slovenia), so its internal functioning was – and has remained – for them the most important factor of evaluation of the past ideals.

1.1. From the standpoint, which – in spite of all the differences – political communities that inherited Yugoslavia share indisputably, the first traumatic moment occurred when Slovenia joined the EU. In that, the primacy of Slovenia as a candidate, because of its relative development, was never put into question; what caused the shock was the fact that its membership significantly hardened (personal and economic) contacts with all other former Yugoslav republics. For, this time – unlike the previous occasions – one could not speak of the local “hard core nationalism”, etc., but it was generally about the “directives from Brussels”. Thus, it turned out that “the community of European states” is not necessarily in the function of promotion of free communication between peoples, but, quite the contrary, the best case is: it will most probably be a lot worse before it becomes a lot better.

1.2. A true shock followed, however, in the period in which the EU – literally – proved to be an ambulance community (the term comes from Latin expression *ambulare* – to walk). It walked easily through the largest part of

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the former Yugoslav territory and settled in Bulgaria and Romania which – as states and societies – in many respects lag behind not only Croatia, but also some other post-Yugoslav countries (for example, in Serbia, it is possible to see *gastarbeiter* from Romania, so the EU has lost the position of importer and became, in part, an exporter of labour).

1.2.1. Reasons for this decision – with some special interests of the “influential members” of the EU – were prevailingly geostrategic. The goal was to (legally, which in reality means: physically) to fence the EU territory from Russian (and other eastern) interventions, hence a kind of political-geographic black hole within the EU was created (unlike Switzerland, which – probably due to Rousseau’s longitudinal influence – represents a kind of a pink hole). This hole, created by the fencing-off, was understood also as a kind of a socio-political swamp area that should be gradually meliorated in order to make it suitable for further integration. The first step of this melioration was conducted through the South East Europe Stability Pact. It seems that the benevolent helpers did not mind the fact that the “region” needed (and as soon as possible) a lot more than stability (for example, development, which, by definition, always destabilizes the existing situation).

1.3. Ever since the EU has elegantly jumped over “the former Yugoslavia minus Slovenia plus Albania”, a growing number of analysts and politicians, diplomats and journalists, has started observing the former promised land more critically. Not much criticism is needed to realize the problem of “double criteria” – a label used by the general lack of education (of course, this is about the denial of criteria in general, for single-mindedness is at the very essence of the notion criteria).

1.3.1. Accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU showed that “insistence on the highest criteria for accession to the EU” has been nothing but a phrase used to cover (otherwise completely legitimate) political decisions of the Union leadership, as well as the internal nationalistic conflicts. That could be seen even earlier, when the Baltic countries and Hungary (when, for example, political minorities were the issue), or Slovakia (when the issue concerned the democratic institutions) acceded to the EU;

1.3.2. On the other hand, the repetitive official warning of Bosnia and Herzegovina that “such a divided country is not suitable for association to the EU” cold-bloodedly “forgot” that a country that had been significantly longer (perhaps even deeper) divided than BiH acceded to the EU (only partially!) – Cyprus.

1.3.3. For example, Serbia was clearly told to stop assisting political and social structures in the north of Kosovo, which Priština does not control,

if it waned to achieve any progress in the accession negotiations, while, at the same time, a country (Turkey) which has been occupying a part of the territory of the new EU members (Cyprus) is still in the process of (unsuccessful) accession negotiations.

1.4. Differences in standards imposed to the candidate countries in comparison to the true situation in the very EU (even in the “old” EU) are even more drastic; discrepancy is sharpened to the extent that it, perhaps, even justifies a radical attitude of the countries joiners in accordance with the famous Marxist formula: “I do not want to belong to any club that will have me as a member” (of course, the fact that this is Groucho, not Karl Marx, only additionally illustrates the problem). For, with time it has become more obvious that the reform progress in the candidate countries (especially in their societies) is not, by itself, sufficient to gain membership, while, at the same time, practice within the EU frequently lags behind all that the candidate countries have long implemented. In a word, only (“fulltime”) membership is not a guarantee that the countries (let alone societies) are truly changed in the sense that is necessary – both at the level of the rule of law, as well as on the level of a functional state of prosperity, etc.

1.4.1. The need of further democratization is a determinant of all the discussions on accession of new members, but the EU was also significantly marked by a democratic deficit, by the fact that the European Commission until recently represented the highest concentration of political power without the parliamentary control in the world (with the exception of Politburo of China’s Communist Party’s Central Committee), and the situation now does not match the standards of parliamentary democracy. Further democratization of the EU is impossible, simply because there is no European people (or better still: folk) in order to be able to develop a network of institutions which should control each other – allegedly to compensate for the citizens.

1.4.2. In the process of association, the so-called “liberalization of labour legislature” has always been asked from the candidate country, which is, in fact, a platitude which is used to hide the fact that the employers are always protected more poorly than in the tradition from which the ex-Yugoslav communities have emancipated, at least, one can say that the EU is not a role model in that (in situation of the current social crisis, this is exactly what brings the issue of functionality into question – which is offensively demonstrated by millions of protesters in most of its members).

1.4.3. “Divergence from nationalistic concepts” is constantly emphasized as presupposition of the future integrations, but the Greek nationalist policy has a deadly role (from within the integrated Union) in the political life of

the so-called FYROM (the very same Macedonia to whom Greeks ban using its own name).

1.4.4. “Protection of ethnic minorities” is constantly emphasized as a *conditio sine qua non* for accession of the new members, even though the “old Europe” apparently does not exaggerate in the protection of minority rights (Germany and France, for example, are not even signatories of the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities – with the explanation that there are no national minorities in those countries). Discrimination of the Roma people (nationalistic, even racist) is a daily event in most of the EU member countries, so that – politically and legally – they live a better life in certain countries that will for a long time wait for the association than they do in the EU. In other words, the Balkans should be a lesson that discrimination of other nations is not allowed – provided that they have a country behind them, which is not the case with Roma people, as it is known.

1.4.5. EU demands to “sharpen the fight against corruption in the candidate countries” most probably deliberately neglect the fact that an important aspect of the local corruption is imported, frequently from the EU (frequent scandals with the Finnish company Patria, or with the German Daimler are a good illustration of that).

1.4.6. At an entirely superficial level, this impropriation between practice at the club and what has been lately expected from the candidate countries was clearly shown in (generally, a reasonable) the demand to Serbia to recognize Kosovo before becoming a member of the Union – five members of which do not recognize Kosovo.

2. Previous negotiations are mostly considered in public a part of the arsenal of words of the “Eurosceptics”, for, even in this sense, this is about a clumsy use of foreign words. Logically, it is about a trinity – Europhiles, Eurosceptics, Europhobes; and we are talking here about two emotionally burdened standpoints – the one which is afraid of the integrations and the one which likes them, and the only rational standpoint is the third: sceptical.

2.1. Eurosceptics are not – contrary to the claims of the clumsy – against the EU; they have doubts, meaning, they consider the sense of the upcoming integrations. Such a standpoint in the post-Yugoslav context means an emphasized awareness of:

- 2.1.1. a democratic deficit of the EU;
- 2.1.2. the EU’s social deficit (even of the class favouritism);
- 2.1.3. an inconsistent politics of the EU towards the “region”;
- 2.2. However, the Eurosceptic perception also understands that:

- 2.2.1. all post-Yugoslav countries are objectively in the EU already (they are its political and, even more, market objects);
- 2.2.2. EU has a significant and positive role in (more or less) “democratic taming” of the local nationalisms, militarism and patriarchalism;
- 2.2.3. As a concept, the EU enables internal division between the proponents of the domestic primitivism (in the “barbaric genius” paradigm – by a decivilizer Ljuomir Mici who, indicatively, ends with the “aeroplane without an engine”) opposed to those who in all respects care about the improvement of the living conditions, be it material, cultural, legal and health.

3. On a positive side of the upcoming integrations, the following seems unquestionable:

- 3.1. The European identity has been traditionally marked by pluralism of the nationally-oriented political communities, while their presupposed unity of values has always been in coherence with linguistic, cultural and traditional diversity; modern “Europe” was institutionally developed from general acceptance of the concept of the democratic state of prosperity;
- 3.2. Supra-national political integration in Europe (unlike economic) is thus limited by a dual basic demand – to preserve national and traditional pluralism and to sustain the determined level of democratic order;
- 3.3. Constitutional structure of today’s European Union necessarily relativizes these demands – which is, at least in part, inevitable. The problem is, however, in that this relativizing is taking place without a suitable democratic legitimization.

4. Entry into the EU is thus in a gap between constantly changing political demands from Brussels and an unambiguously present need to change the situation in the “Western Balkans” from scratch. In the process, the past experience has been:

- 4.1. the real deficits of the society and the community are interweaving, in findings of the Eurocrates, with their lack of knowledge, internal disagreements and prejudice;
- 4.2. passing an exam (in front of examiners with questionable competences) is called “negotiations”;
- 4.3. reasonable, undoubtedly justified demands for changes have the same political status with caprices of governments of the member countries, even certain diplomats;
- 4.4. the final decision, independently of the complicated homework, will be reached on completely political, even probably on daily-political grounds. For example, independently of certain political “flops”, Croatia

will become a member of the EU in several months – even though the country is not ready for membership in all aspects (of course, without considering numerous deficits of the previous candidates). Because, that has been the only success the Eurocrates will be able to present to the public in a long time. Other countries of the region will wait for at least a decade even if they were – by a miracle – at the supposed level of the progress, for the EU simply does not have industrial capacity for further expansion (the question is, how it would react if Switzerland and Norway suddenly decided to apply for membership).

5. Certainly, the EU is in many ways the desired, although at the same time late perspective for post-Yugoslav state ikebana. Criticizing it makes no sense if aimed to make the local situation seemingly less in arrears, but it does have an immanent purpose – from the standpoint of the values which (ideally) defined Europe (partly at least opposite geography). Those values are in many ways compromising by the behaviour of the EU in recent crisis, as well as by its recent statement the EU babbles out: “Europe” without any awareness of the “rest of the continent” (even at the level of a *think tank*). Still, even that presents a frame for the desired change, but, as it seems, only if the changes are approached with at least some healthy scepticism, supported by experience.

FISCAL POLICY OF THE EU AND WESTERN BALKANS AS THE BASIS OF (DIS)INTEGRATION

Fikret auševi *

1. *Fiscal Policy of the EU as the Basis of Political Economy of Integration*

Economic and financial crisis that marked the past five years of the world economy was initiated by a crisis of the so-called *arm-length* financial system in the Anglo-Saxon civilization circle. However, deepening the world economic crisis in the past two years has been for the most part tied to the problems of management of public finances of the EU, that is, of the Eurozone. Transformation of the European Economic Community into the European Communities and then into the European Union demanded a higher degree of waiver of political and economic sovereignty by the EU member countries, for the purpose of creating a political-economic community which would have potential for competitive bidding with the United States of America and the Far East countries during the 21st century. After the introduction of the single currency (Euro), the central issue of the economic management became the issue of harmonizing the unified monetary policy with fiscal policy. In 1999, the monetary policy became supranational (Eurozone), while the fiscal policy remained at the national level.

Achievements in the science of economy in the field of macroeconomic management in the open economy, with liberalized financial markets, suggest that it is impossible to lead a consistent and simple monetary policy without at least one unified segment of fiscal policy at the level of integration of the countries that emit the single currency. Sustaining the value of the Euro in the near and distant future will directly depend on the interest and trust of financial investors to invest into financial properties denominated in Euros. That is why securities that should be emitted by the Community (Eurozone) are one of the necessities for a long-term sustainability of the Euro stability, of the Eurozone financial institutions' competitiveness and of the stability of financial servicing of the real sector in this community. *However, accepting at least a part of the single fiscal policy (indirect taxation) at the Eurozone level as a base for emission of Eurozone bonds and reduction of the system risk is primarily the issue of political economy of unification of this part of the world.* Unified fiscal policy necessarily means additional abandonment of economic sovereignty. Abandoning this section of economic sovereignty concerns the basic rights of Western European

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democracy and (in)capability of the elected representatives of government in the countries comprising the Eurozone to efficiently manage public finances.

2. Fiscal (Lack of) Discipline of the European Union

In June 1998, the European Central Bank was founded as the youngest among the leading central banks in the world. It was formed from the European Monetary Institute, which inherited the role of the European Fund for Monetary Cooperation. Six months later, a single European currency was introduced – Euro, the first single currency in one of the most developed world groups of countries. That resulted in one of the main goals of the European integrations, which was initiated by the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community, which later became the European Economic Community and then the European Union.

Stabilization of public finances and achieving fiscal discipline in the EU member states was established as one of the priorities, that is, one of the bases for introduction of the single currency. In that sense, the Maastricht Treaty (February 1992) determined fiscal and monetary criteria as precondition for entry into the single currency zone – the Eurozone. The Treaty came into force on 1 December 1993. Two fiscal criteria that needed to be fulfilled and were determined by the Maastricht Treaty, concerned the permitted budget deficit of 3% of GDP (as the maximum level), while the alternative fiscal criteria concerned the overall public debt. The overall public debt, formally allowed by the Treaty, was determined at the level of 60% of GDP.

When the European Central Bank was formed, and when the single European currency was introduced (January 1999), more than half of the countries, Eurozone members at that time, had the overall public debt significantly higher than the permitted 60% of GDP. The record-high government debts in 1998 were in Italy (122%) and Belgium (124%). Greece was accepted into the Eurozone in 2001 – since that was the year in which the country fulfilled one of the two fiscal criteria. Namely, Greece reduced the budget deficit to under 3% of GDP, while its public debt at the time was approximately at the level of public debts of Italy and Belgium (about 120% of GDP).

Entry of the Eurozone member countries was strictly conditioned by the first criterion – reduction of budget deficit to under 3% of GDP, with obligation of the countries that had significantly higher debt than the determined criterion (60% of GDP) to gradually reduce it to acceptable and sustainable frames. Italy and Belgium were obliged to reduce the public debt to the

level of 90% of GDP by 2005. Belgium reduced its public debt to under 10% of GDP by that year, while the public debt of Italy was 104% of GDP.

In October 2002, the then-President of the European Commission Romano Prodi gave the famous interview to the French *Le Monde*, in which he emphasized that the fiscal criteria agreed in Maastricht were too rigid. Prodi called those rules, confirmed by the European Stability Pact, “...*these stupid rules...*” At the time, that is, in the last quarter of 2002, three most developed European countries and Eurozone members (Germany, France and Italy) were flouting the criteria of keeping the financial deficit under 3% of GDP. These countries justified their budget deficits by nonexistence of dangers of breeching the fiscal criterion of the budget deficit above 3% of GDP. Their argument consisted of the claim that it would be a far greater damage to have a recession than budget deficits of under 4% of GDP.

3. Fiscal (Lack of) Discipline in Western Balkan Countries and Influence of the Global Crisis on the Region

In the five-year period that preceded the global crisis, from 2003 to 2008, the Western Balkan countries were fiscally more disciplined than the majority of the Eurozone countries, by using budget balances at the percentage of GDP as criterion. In the period from 2003 to 2005, Bosnia and Herzegovina realized the budget surplus at an average level of 2.5 % of GDP. In the period from 2005 to 2007, Montenegro was even more successful – actually, it was the most successful country of Western Balkans. In 2007, it realized the budget surplus at the level of 6.1 of GDP. In 2005, Serbia realized the budget surplus, while the country’s budget deficit in 2003 or in 2007 was less than 2% of GDP. In the entire period, the highest budget deficit was recorded in Albania – both in the pre-crisis period and in 2009, year of the crisis. The average deficit of Albania in the period of 2003 – 2007 was at the level of approximately 4.2 of GDP, while it reached 7.4% in the year of recession.

Unlike the fiscal discipline/lack of discipline, as measured by the budget deficit in percentages of GDP, the total public expenditures as percentages of GDP in the pre-crisis and in the period of crisis were at the level of 42% of GDP in BiH, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro in the period of 2003 – 2006. In 2007 and 2008, BiH had the highest public expenditures (47.5% of GDP was the average in those two years). The lowest public expenditures were recorded in Albania (unlike the budget deficit). Total public expenditures in this country averaged the level of 26% of GDP. The highest

public expenditures in BiH and proportionally high public expenditures in other former Yugoslav countries are a consequence of the fact that these countries, primarily BiH, suffered immense war devastation – both in terms of casualties, as well as in terms of physical capital and infrastructure.

A considerably high fiscal discipline measured by the budget balance, the Western Balkan countries (with the exception of Albania) realized, however, in most part because of the sudden expansion of the credit activity of banks: credit expansions that were approved to the companies and loans approved to the households. Thus, through two dominant segments of creating GDP (population expenditures and business investments), credit activity created conditions for the growth of GDP and, in such a way, the increase of fiscal capacity of these countries.

One explicit example of the direct relation between the growth of fiscal incomes and budget surplus with credit activity of the banking sector is Montenegro. This country was an absolute record holder, not only in the Western Balkan region, but also among the six of the world's leading countries, in expansion of the credit activity in 2006 and 2007. In the following two years, credits approved to the households grew per 198% and 155% respectively, while the company credits grew per 102% and 187% respectively. The enormous growth of the purchasing power on both accounts suddenly increased the tax basis, so Montenegro increased the budget surplus from 2.1 % (2005) to 6.4% GDP (2007). Effects of the Global Financial Crisis on the credit activity and fiscal incomes in Montenegro and Serbia differed. In 2009 and 2010, loans that were approved to the households decreased per 11.4% and 6.1% respectively, while the company credits decreased per 17.5% and 9.4% respectively. Budget surplus of 6.4% GDP from 2007 turned into budget deficit of 5.3% GDP in 2009.

Unlike Montenegro, credit increase rates in Serbia for households and companies were significantly reduced, but the trend of *credit growth rate* was preserved. In 2009 and 2010, household loans increased by 8% and 23.5% respectively, while credits for companies increased by 18.4% and 27% respectively. The consequence of such trends at the Serbian credit market was softening of the effects of external shocks and a significant current account deficit. However, budget deficit in Serbia increased from 1.9% to 4.5%, due to a reduced purchasing power and decrease of trade exchange. Because of such trends, Serbia, just like BiH, signed a *stand-by agreement* with the IMF. In the last quarter of 2011, Serbia signed a new *stand-by agreement* as a precautionary credit line in case the potential negative effects of the Eurozone crisis appear. It is important to emphasize that the credit activity in Serbia was significantly

lower in intensity in 2011, as compared to the previous year. Although the credit growth rate increased, it was almost ten times lower than the previous year. In Montenegro, the trend of decrease in the credit activity continued.

In Albania, the average credit growth rate at the approved households was 69% in the period 2005 – 2007, and 56.6% at the approved companies. Budget deficit of Albania was reduced from 4.9% (2003) to 3.5% of GDP (the 2005 – 2007 average). In 2009 and 2010, credit activity of the banks was significantly reduced. Credits approved to households increased only per 3.8% and 1.3% respectively in those two years, while the company credits increased per 13.8% and 14.7% respectively. Budget deficit of Albania was more than doubled – from 3.5% (2007) to 7.4% of GDP (2009). In the period 2005-2007, the average credit growth rate in Macedonia for households was 45.4%, and for companies 23.3%. According to the data, expansion of credits approved to the households in Macedonia was comparable with the credit expansion in BiH and Croatia while credit rates approved to households increased significantly more compared to the two countries mentioned. In this three-year period, Macedonia realized budget surplus at the level of 0.6% of GDP. In 2009 and 2010, household credits increased at the rate of 3.1% and 5.1% respectively, while company credits increased at the rate of 3.4% and 8.5% respectively. Macedonian budget surplus in the period of crisis turned into a budget deficit of 2.3% of GDP (2009).

4. Fiscal Discipline and the Controlled Fiscal Expansion to Western Balkans

Fiscal discipline based on the reduction of non-productive expenditures, especially of administration expenditures and, in some cases, of unjustified increase of social welfare expenditures, is useful and will be necessary. However, not a single country almost has managed to exit the recession, that is, to prevent the transformation of recession into a depression by sharp reduction of public expenditures – especially expenditures for new work places and for connecting with the surrounding economies. Of course, I refer here to capital expenditures, whose business environment quality needs to be improved, in addition to connecting the countries of the region, for that would create grounds for the realization of joint business ventures and development of clusters at the interstate level. Some of the countries of the region, like Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, as well as Croatia in part, still have dominant or significant shares in ownership of large and profitable companies. That ownership may be used as a guarantee for emission of state securities exclusively intended for financing of the development projects.

The Western Balkans region has significant development potentials in the field of road, railway and energy infrastructure at the interstate level. Sadly, these potentials have not been used. Regional projects of infrastructural development can significantly contribute the decrease of economic development risk between Western Balkan countries and the European Union. Financing of these projects through emission of state securities with the date of maturity of 10 to 15 years denominated in the national currencies may contribute to the initiation of a higher degree of economic cooperation in the region and to the reduction of the economic development gap. In order to reduce the expenses of financing the capital investments through emission of state securities, increasing the degree of trust of the financial investors in such properties and lowering the demanded yield would be necessary.

New, quality-improved financial instruments would not bear any risk, that is, they would be less risky, and would, at the same time, increase profitability (they would lower the need of keeping significant excess reserves) of the commercial banks in the region and would initiate acceleration of the economic growth and development of Western Balkans, but they would possess a new quality which enables a lower degree of the systematic risk. In other words, emission of state securities should be ensured through a special guarantee fund for Western Balkans. The main goal of the fund would be to guarantee emission of state securities of the Western Balkan countries for the purpose of financing or co-financing infrastructure development projects and business clusters. Interstate infrastructural development projects would have priority in receiving guarantees from this fund, as well as projects that would be realized on the public-private partnership principle.

Emission of state securities and their purchase by commercial banks, which dominate the Western Balkans region, would enable a more successful portfolio management. Interest rate of the bonds would be tied to the average interest rates of state securities of the same maturity rates in the Eurozone and increased by risk premium in the region. However, the risk premium would be lower as compared to the existing risk premium, which is calculated in the emitted state securities of the Western Balkan countries, since the EU grant would guarantee its emission. The guarantee fund would have an option of transforming the debt into the share capital of state-owned infrastructural companies, whose capital would be used as a deposit for emission of securities, or for a right to “the golden share” in large companies, the purchase of which would guarantee the payment of accrued interest and principal to the emitted Euro-Balkan securities. Also, on the grounds of formation of this fund, the

guarantee fund and the EU would have a right to directly control the policy management of the public incomes and revenues, that is, the explicitly determined right to manage fiscal policy of countries from the region.

In spite of the fact that the economic crisis triggered by irresponsible fiscal policies still exists, not a single economic theory or practice, that is, historical experience with economic crisis, do now show that sharp measures of fiscal restriction will lead to the exit from recession. That particularly concerns countries in which unemployment rates exceed 20 per cent – and majority of the Western Balkan countries fall into this category. This text is not about an irresponsible and prodigal fiscal policy, but about a goal-oriented and controlled fiscal expansion, used exclusively for financing of capital projects that are aimed at developing cluster-based business connections. Infrastructural networking of the region is very important, and that is why there is space for joint cooperation. However, the development of infrastructure by itself will not be a sufficient condition for a long-term economic sustainability. Infrastructural networking of the region should be the basis for exchange of economic growth models. From the growth based on the domestic demands, to the growth based on joint export projects in which companies from several countries of the West Balkan region would participate.

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BALKANIZATION AS EUROPEANIZATION

Asim Mujki *

Even though the term “Europeanization” is mainly understood today in the Western Balkan countries and wider as a process which has recently begun and which is unconditionally tied to the processes of accession of this part of the continent to the European Union, Europeanization – in wider terms understood as ‘Westernisation’ or ‘modernisation’ – started much earlier. I am of the opinion that the dominant cursory, pragmatic, utterly ahistorical views of that long-term historical process, that are shared by the important political and intellectual actors from both sides of the Schengen border, stand as a considerable obstacle to the process of accession, that is, enlargement, thus bringing frustration and misunderstanding to all. Maria Todorova stated that the process of westernisation or modernisation of «the Balkans in the 19th and 20th centuries included the spread of rationalism and secularisation, the intensification of commercial activities and industrialisation... the formation of the bourgeoisie and other new social groups in the economic and social sphere, and above all, the triumph of the bureaucratic nation state» (Todorova, 1997: 13). The 19th century westernisation of the Balkans is described in detail by Stavrianos:

The influence of dynamic Western European states was not solely restricted to their colonial estates. It also spread to other, economically and militarily weaker areas that had not been annexed for any reason. That was the case with the Ottoman Empire (...) Even though the Sultan's territories were still under his control, they came under the influence of the new imperialism. Both the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan countries were subjected to an intensive economic penetration from the West, embodied in the government loans that lead to a financial dependence and construction of a railway network that had increased the foreign indebtedness, which directly resulted in the influx of industrial goods from the West. The emergence of this new imperialism... transformed the Balkans and the Middle East from what had then been considered as a profitable area for investment and speculation into the central point of international rivalry» (Stavrianos, 2000: 415, 416, 417).

Thus, a very important element of Europeanization – in the 19th, but in the 20th century as well: since we cannot resist drawing parallels between the Balkans today and that of the 19th century, especially in the images of the influx of industrial goods from the West, debt bondage, investments and speculations

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of the capital, etc. – is the integration of this part of the world into a functional network of capital and its flow. The influx of capital also demanded a safe environment, represented at that time of historical development in the shape of a classical nation state. Stavrianos describes that in the following way:

New political institutions also emerged, embodied in the rise of modern state structures of the Western type. Political liberation created a more fluid social structure that was more open to the foreign forces and innovation. Political liberation also brought about the rise of a modern state, which replaced the old feudal master. The state rapidly created an enormous bureaucracy and army, each of which created enormous expenses and increase of the public debt. The hatred of the peasant towards his feudal masters now turned against the bureaucrat, the tax collector and the gendarme. (Stavrianos, 1997: 419, 420).

Inconveniences of the capitalist shaping of the new political communities in the early 20th century benefitted from inconveniences of, let us call it, the ethnic makeup of the imagined territories of the nation state. The notion of a nation state area meant, amongst the national elites at the turn of the 19th century, a state community with a dominant, ethnically homogenous majority, on the recognised principle of the Westphalian state. The introduction of the nation state as the second important element of Europeanization (westernisation, modernisation, etc.) in the area of ‘hopelessly mixed races’ which had literally shared the same space, came across an enormous obstacle which it seems to be facing even today in the process of modernisation – incongruity between the ethnic and administrative boundaries. In the early 20th century, this hopeless ethnic mixture served as a tool for diverting the subjects’ hatred from the capital city where the bourgeois elites still in their infancy ruled towards the ethnically different, thus serving as fuel for territorial expansion and shaping of the nation state. That was the Balkan Wars era, from 1912 until 1913. This is how Lav Trocki plastically described the ‘nationalisation’ of the Balkan area of hopelessly mixed races: “Serbs in old Serbia, in their national undertaking of correcting the data in ethnological statistics that do not go in their favour, are simply destroying the Muslim population in villages, towns and entire districts” (Trocki, in Balje, 2012: 55). By strange irony, the project of Europeanization of the Balkans, which meant the influx of capital and creation of the nation states through the Balkan wars, in which everyone fought everyone and in which widespread atrocities were committed, was pejoratively characterized by the Western press and intellectual imagination as Balkanization – a term that has remained to this day and which relates to the territorial fragmentation accompanied by enormous amounts of violence.

The term balkanization, which quite rapidly entered use, overshadowed its true meaning, which emerged from the process of Europeanization. In the pejoratively understood term balkanization there seems to be nothing of the Balkans but of the European. Dominik Schnapper reminds us of that deep, European context when he states: “All nations were born in war. Their leaders had annexed provinces that were later shaped into a national territory with the help of violence, and later with the help of the imposed culture. Nations are immersed in conquest and aggression by the results of history. ‘Unity is always achieved through brutality.’ However, with time, nations become ‘natural’ and the ‘objective truth’ of their history ceases to be the object of the living experience of its new members” (Schnapper, 2008: 73). In support of that, Delanty, for example, claims that “the European idea has essentially strengthened, not undermined the ideology of nation” (Delanty, 1995: 8).

The call for the creation of nation states with a homogenous ethnic majority on an imagined national territory that had come accompanied by the flow of capital, only partially succeeded in the Balkan area of hopelessly mixed races – those are the small peoples, with a very weak bourgeois layer, which is by definition the bearer of national integration, with too many disputable, relatively small territories which are a permanent source of conflict and denial, that is, all that falls under the definition of balkanism. Mass crimes, ethnic cleansings, territorial recompositions never brought about the ‘final solution to the national issue’, which has spread until today, exempting the five decades’ long rule of the communist ideology, and was reactivated during the anti-communist revolution of 1989.

Hence, balkanization should not be understood as opposition to Europeanization, on the contrary, it is its essential, although oppressive and tacit part. It is, in a way, an unpleasant mirror of Europeanization, that is, of nation states as its components, a ghost from a turbulent past that haunts, disturbs to the extent that it has to be named some other way, something like *balkanization*. The spirit of nation-building reached the area of Western Balkans rather quickly: it had already been present in the language reform of Vuk Karadžić, in the Illyrian movement of Ljudevit Gaj. It triggered nation-building processes through homogenizing narratives, especially in Serbia and Croatia during the 19th century, which collided and overlapped and which were resolved whenever primarily geopolitical reasons permitted in the European way, best described by Otto von Bismarck – through blood and iron: firstly during the Balkan wars and then in the Second World War, and then after the pan-European democratic revolution of 1989, which was also the formation of capitalist relations and reaffirmation of ethno-national identity after a long period of communist rule.

What is disturbing in the nation-building process in the Western Balkans is that geopolitical reasons made it a kind of a late recapitulation of ontogenesis of the European nation state in both its segments – firstly as the initial forced accumulation of capital, secondly as a violent process of political, economic and cultural uniformization of the desired nation state. If we keep that in mind, then the term balkanization is nothing but an empty signifier, that is, a fantasy of immaculate conception, which projects the murky sludge of its past onto its primitive, febleminded cousin from the country. Thus, balkanization can be understood as the truth about Europeanization revealing how the West treated its heterogeneities in the past. Balkanization is a concealed oppressive mechanism of modernization, that is, a non-emancipatory side of Europeanization, which primarily reveals its true nature towards the Other and the different.

This form of Europeanization needs to be understood in this dual sense – as a capitalist re-appropriation inevitably accompanied by the ethno-national re-appropriation on the one hand, and as ‘harmonization with European values’, with the dominant legal and political standards that are based on the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens, that is, that are based on the liberal-democratic imaginary and republican principles of government. Breakdown of the communist block and its subsequent Europeanization, followed this dual pattern in detail. In the countries of Eastern and Central Europe which had deposed communism, a capitalist re-appropriation occurred – in various forms of the so-called ‘privatization’. Also, in each of those countries, re-affirmation of the classical nation state occurred, first and foremost in the form of ethno-national re-appropriation of its nation state, in the sense that the dominant ethno-national host was reiterated in each of those countries (Poles in Poland, Hungarians in Hungary, etc.), to whom institutions of the nation state belong. With this taking place, ethnic conflicts started breaking out in the first half of the 20th century in countries with a higher percentage of national minorities, (Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia, Russians in Lithuania), while multinational federations dissolved (CSSR). All these countries in Eastern and Central Europe are more or less stable nation states today, i.e. liberal-democracies.

Dissolution of the Yugoslav federation could not have occurred without problems, exactly because of the aforementioned hopeless mixture of races, that is, because of the incongruity of administrative and ethnic boundaries. Ethno-national re-appropriation in the area, as part of a the wider ethno-national re-appropriation in Europe, brought about a number of new Balkan wars, or we may say today with a higher dose of cynicism, revolutions for national liberation, which meant just as it had been the case during the first

Balkan wars, ethnic engineering and removal of the Others, with the goal of defining the ethno-national space and finding the final solution of one's own nation state. Slovenia more or less successfully completed the re-appropriation of the nation state, the collateral damage of which was the administrative deletion of the Others, who were denied all their civil and political rights. After the military offensive "Oluja" – in the ecstasy of the defensive war – Croatia reduced the number of national minorities to the controllable level and will now enter the union of European nations as a liberal democracy and a stable nation state. Unfortunately, the Western Balkans remains, especially its neuralgic point – Bosnia and Herzegovina, i.e. several countries of the region that did not have the strength or were not successful in their ethno-national re-appropriations – and here I also mean Serbia, Macedonia and the still unresolved Albanian issue. There remains an entire archipelago of unfinished national identities, para-countries, cantons, communities, regions, mutually opposed and hostile, in essence without any power to finish the processes of ethno-national re-appropriations of their own imagined nation states. Above all, Bosnia and Herzegovina remains, as a lethal combination of the European otherness, *par excellence* viewed as the Ottoman-communist country, that is, a country which both in its Ottoman-Islamic and communist element belongs to the Other in the self-definition of the European identity, and that had been overemphasized in ethno-national imagination of its neighbours, with the goal of legitimizing their own ethno-national re-appropriation of its territories.

Hence, the Western Balkans is a far greater challenge for the European Union than it may seem at first, than Brussels is willing to admit while constantly repeating messages of love, peace and tolerance. European processes have been conceived in the Balkans and Europe has to face them. The Western Balkans concerns the European identity. If Europeanization remains an uncritical two-sided historical process such as it is now, then a further ethno-nationalization in the Balkans may lead to new divisions and ethno-national appropriations. Ethno-national re-appropriations of countries mean new circles of homogenizations and ethnic mobilizations. The resulting victories in form of the new, stable nation states with controllable minorities that can be tolerated, victories of liberal-democracies, could just as well be pyrrhic victories.

On the other hand, there remains, in my opinion, a decisive issue not only for the future of the Western Balkans but also of the EU itself: are we able to perceive Europeanization without ethno-national re-appropriation, without the model of a nation state, perhaps in the sense of a post-national constellation? Are we able to perceive Europeanization exclusively in its emancipatory liberal-

democratic dimension? It seems to me that those issues surpass the importance of BiH or of the Western Balkans. I believe that they depend upon the previous answer to the question about the necessity of re-appropriation of capital. One can even determine that there is hope for such a re-conceptualization of Europeanization, for the nation state is increasingly becoming unnecessary to capital; it is becoming its nuisance. Hardt and Negri remind us:

The republican form of government which historically appeared as dominant with the main goal of protecting and serving the property had long functioned as adequate support to capital, initiating its development, regulating its excesses and guaranteeing its interests. The republic of property, however, is no longer a good servant to capital. Instead, it is becoming an obstacle for production (Hardt, Negri, 2011: 301).

An obstacle to circulation of capital and to production is exactly the corpus of liberal-democratic values. I want to believe that this imaginary is strong enough for an emancipatory reconstruction of Europe, from Reykjavik to Istanbul.

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EU INTEGRATION POLICIES IN THE WESTERN BALKANS IN THREE IMAGES

Tanja Petrovi *

This paper will first present three dominant characteristics of association policies of the (Western) Balkan countries to the European Union – performativity of discourse, arbitrariness of the association process and the paternalist relationship towards candidate countries; in the second section I shall present how the concepts shaped through the three discursive and political mechanisms reflect upon the internal political processes in the candidate countries in the region, upon their mutual relations, as well as upon the notions of self, the region and Europe. It is important to keep in mind that the images and notions formed by the use of language are much more than discursive resources – they are the basis for legitimizing political and economic relations and a resource for reshaping the symbolic geography in today's Europe. In no way should we forget the warning of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe that a discursive structure is “not a merely ‘cognitive’ or ‘contemplative’ entity: it is an articulatory practice which constitutes and organizes social relations” (Laclau and Mouffe 1987, 81).

1. 1. *Performativity of the European Discourses*

Political discourse of the European Union is highly metaphorical; discursive patterns are characterized by formalization, repetition, predictability and ritualization. Professor of German studies Andreas Musolff studied the most frequent metaphors in discussions about the European Union, using an extensive corpus of political speeches in Great Britain and Germany. Metaphors and concepts highlighted by this author can also be found in discourses about association of the Western Balkan countries to the European Union. Primarily, those are metaphors concerning family, then metaphors related to the conceptual domain of journey and of buildings/structures (Musolff 2004).¹

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¹ I wrote extensively on these metaphors in Petrović 2009 and 2012.

However, those metaphors have a different role in political categorization and argumentation in discourses that concern the European Union, and they form completely different relations than the ones formed when they are used in the political statements about the Western Balkans. These metaphors and their discursive realizations deserve special attention, for their use shapes the image of Europe and determines the place of the former Yugoslav republics in that image. Metaphorical characteristics of the political discourses related to the association of the Western Balkan countries to the European Union, alongside their formalization and repetitiveness, bring about the “increase of the performative dimension, while the content-related dimension is open for new meanings” (Yurchak 2006: 24). Performativity of discourse in the sphere of politics, on the other hand, forms the frame in which political statements do not necessarily entail the author’s responsibility for what he said. These characteristics of discourse need to be considered in a wider, neo-liberal context, in which, as Dominic Boyer and Alexei Yurchak (2010: 183) stated, “a thematic and genre-related normalization of ways and styles of political action and representation” occurs.

1. 2. Arbitrariness of the association processes

In the association discourse, that process is presented as the *European way* and *European perspective*. They are presented as guaranteed to the candidate countries, but that same discourse also characterizes “the paradox of postmodern ambiguity” (Busch i Krzyżanowski 2007): it is a discourse in which a number of conditions for association to the EU are in many respects arbitrary, while the very process of association and transition is represented as a path with a clearly defined beginning and end (Fairclough 2005, 4; Majstorović 2007). The European politicians praise each step on the way, but praise is always followed by a statement that the goal is still far, while reasons for that are not named precisely. Statements about Serbia made by German Foreign Affairs Minister Steinmeier may serve as a good illustration of such discourse: (1) The current Serbian government has clearly taken the European course... We all see attempts of reform undertaken in your country. Of course, a lot more needs to be done, not only here in Serbia, but in entire region; (2) I feel it in each sentence when we talk [with members of the Serbian government]. Of course, there are many more obstacles to overcome and the authorities in Belgrade know that as much as I do. However, the course is right, and the willingness is also there – those are crucial conditions for a plan to succeed (*b92.net*, 27. 1. 2009).

A Serbian portal bringing hoax news articles *njuz.net* makes effective parodies of this conditioning discourse: the portal announced on 12 October 2011 a “news

article” entitled “Serbia receives recommendation for becoming candidate for EU candidate country status” and on 28 June that same year, the portal announced that “the EU and the US have announced a tender for coming up with a new condition for accession of Serbia to the EU, after it recognizes Kosovo”.

1. 3. *Paternalism*

Numerous studies have shown that paternalism and the image portraying the societies in candidate countries as children are constant in the European association discourse (Velikonja 2007, Petrović 2009, Moćnik 2012). European politicians frequently emphasize that the Western Balkan societies should *prove their maturity*. Such representation is linked to the very nature of the association processes, with the *road to Europe/EU*, along which the *Western Balkan* countries should undergo a transformation from non-European to European countries. They need to *become mature* in the process, meaning they need to undergo a transformation from immature children to responsible, adult persons.

The notion of the Western Balkan countries as children reproduces and legitimizes a paternalistic relationship of the EU: children are not fully responsible for their own behaviour, they are irrational and they need help, control, education. Generally, it is a characteristic of a colonialist discourse and different metaphors of authoritarian paternalism, characteristic of relations between the Balkan societies and the EU periphery as well: as Slovenia itself was *a child* by 2004, having become a member of the EU it took over the role of *a parent helping children in the Western Balkans*, while Serbia sees Kosovo as its own child, incapable of *becoming mature* (of becoming a civilized, *European* society) unless under its own wing, etc. The colonialist moment in these discourses is, as expected, the most prominent in the Western Balkan societies in which the presence of the international community is most prominent, like Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. These societies are treated as the “new” and “empty” spaces – as a *tabula rasa* open to all possible experiments in the construction of a democratic society “from the ground”. The international community addresses the people in those areas not only as people without a past, that is, like children (see Buden 2012), but also as people without any autonomy and possibility of being political entities, and also frequently as children without the ability of making clear judgments. Philosopher Slavoj Žižek, for example, cites and example from Kosovo, where the international campaign for coexistence of Serbs and Albanians was implemented through a poster depicting a dog and a cat, with the inscription “If they can live together, why can’t you?” (Žižek 2010).

Mirror images

2. 1. Europe as an empty signifier

Uncritical adoption of metaphors and other discursive patterns and their repetition in different spheres of social life in the societies of former Yugoslavia is not merely a routinization which will eventually “deaden political awareness” (Billig and Macmillan 2005, 459) and reduce the story of Europe to political platitudes, but this noncritical and general usage prevents any possibility of articulation of a different image of Europe which could be more acceptable for citizens of these societies. In that way, Europe is becoming an empty signifier that anyone can reach out to, regardless of the political position, while discourses on Europeanism become a (cheap) means for gaining political points. Furthermore, any distinction in the views of the left and the right regarding accession to the EU has been erased on the level of concrete political activities.

One illustration of that is Party of Serb Unity (Stranka srpskog jedinstva) led by Dragan Marković Palma, who is also the Mayor of Jagodina. That party is an ideological successor of war criminal Željko Ražnatović Arkan, but still it rejected the possibility of negotiating with the nationalistic parties of Vojislav Koštunica (DSS) and Velimir Ilić (Nova Srbija) after the 2008 parliamentary elections, and together with the coalition “For a European Serbia” (“Za evropsku Srbiju”) and the Socialist Party of Serbia, it enabled the establishment of a pro-European government. This is how Marković explained the decision: “I am a pragmatic man and an entrepreneur and that is why I know that patriotism cannot fuel a tractor. I decided to join the coalition with the Democratic Party because of their commitment to accession to the EU.” Today, Marković is promoting his municipality as *Europe in miniature*, although it is very hard to find anything European in his politics, characterized by candid homophobia, discrimination on the basis of origin and control of all areas of political and economic life.

2. 2. European colonialism “our way”

This conditioning is easily transferred from the European to the local context, where patterns are copied, internalized and used as an important means for redefinition of mutual relations in these areas. Local holders of power who assume the right of shaping the very same discourses in which they themselves are objects, become the ones closer to EU membership. In doing so, they most frequently use the trope of offering assistance, which is one of the constants of colonialist discourse, as well as the trope of blocking the association process,

just like in the case of the dispute we witnessed in 2009 between Slovenia and Croatia over the maritime border between the two countries in the Gulf of Piran.

As far as internal politics is concerned, the very nature of the association process liberates the political elites of responsibility and this process becomes another way of gaining political points. Since the dates mentioned by the European Union in the process of integration of certain Western Balkan countries are not obligatory for the EU itself, they cannot be taken seriously due to constant changes and emerging new conditions and local politicians reach out for dates without taking any responsibility for what they say. Authors of news articles on the *njuz.net* portal effectively criticized this mentioning of dates through a parody: in the news article entitled “Serbia could join the EU”, a “statement” of the then-Prime Minister Mirko Cvetković is cited, saying “if we continue with reforms and the realization of the plan, Serbia could become a member of the European Union as soon as 2016, and most certainly by 2027; still, experts argue that it is realistic to expect this to happen in 2019, while Brussels considers the year 2022 as most probable – the Prime Minister added”. The news article further states that “the Office for Harmonization and Accession announced that Serbia should join the European Union by 2026, while the year 2017 is more realistic. Still chances are that we will become an EU member after 2020”. Nenad Slović, head of the team of experts, stated for the *Njuz* portal that Serbia “will most probably become a full member of the European Union in 2025” and added that “the crucial year for Serbia is 2023, for, according to our findings, that is when we could finally join the European Union”. “The news” ends in a conclusion that “the European Union could accept Serbia as a member already in 2024 and we could become its full member in 2021”.

2. 3. *Citizens as children*

The European image of the Western Balkan societies as immature children is tightly connected to ideological construction of the socialist past as non-European: Boris Buden described in detail the symptoms and consequences of this image in his book *Zone of Transition* (2012). He emphasizes that the phrase “children of communism” is not a metaphor and he points out that the image *transition to democracy* as a radical reconstruction begins from nothing. “After 1989, Eastern Europe resembles a desert inhabited only by children, immature people, incapable of democratically organizing their lives without foreign guidance” (Buden 2012: 51-52). To illustrate the way in which this representation is transposed and used within the Western Balkan society in

the “Europeanization” processes, I will again use the example of Jagodina and its mayor Dragan Markovi Palma. For many in Serbia, Jagodina is “a success story” and “a city of future”, while foreign media mainly portray it as a bizarre island, extreme manifestation of the “Balkan” abnormality and a grotesque of the Serbian transition. Just as the image of Jagodina as a city of future and the narrative of Palma’s modernization have little to do with reality, neither does the message sent by the foreign media – Jagodina and its mayor are not out of the norm and are not an unplanned consequence of democratization and Europeanization of Serbia, and the two narratives – the “external” and “internal” – are not opposed to the extent as it may first seem. Jagodina is no “wonder of transition” in a positive or in a negative sense. On the one hand, as already pointed out by Saša Ilić (2012), Jagodina “maintains the global political order of Serbia in miniature”. On the other hand, the situation in this town is a consequence of the adopted European narrative of citizens from former socialist societies as children: Palma’s “reconstruction” of Jagodina starts from nothing – in it, everything that had existed prior to his arrival to power is ignored, while knowledge, experience and affinities of citizens are erased together with the memory of the socialist modernization, by imposing a new vision of the modern, in the shape of distasteful structures and projects like the Aqua Park, the ZOO and the wax museum.

Citizens of Jagodina are not political entities, but children that need to be taken care of – the mayor as the host and the *father of the nahiyyah* (Živkov 2011) is doing that in the best possible way: he provides them with jobs, he lets them “see the world”, he finds them a spouse and takes care of their offspring. He has everything under control and “knows his children” to the extent that he can publicly state that *there are no homosexuals in Jagodina*. Just how little space there is in this town for individual activities of citizens has been felt by those who have tried to implement a personal business or cultural initiative. There have not been any alternative cultural programs in years, and it is impossible to start a business without the blessing of the authorities, which, as a rule, implies membership in the Jedinstvena Srbija party. In the logic of post-socialist transition, “the question of future is considered to have already been answered” (Buden 2012: 52). The question of future has already been answered in Jagodina as well – Jagodina *has already become* the city of future. And also a city without a past, just as the logic of transition “sees no sense in the issue of the past. The children of communism are (...) exactly because of that turned into children so that they could no longer remember the past” (Buden 2012: 52-53). The child, as the “leading political image of post-communism” has been brought to an extreme in Jagodina. Palma’s

party was crucial for forming a pro-European coalition at the 2008 elections. At his conventions, he welcomes the ambassadors from the most important European countries. They are, together with Željko Ražnatović Arkan's widow regular guests at religious holidays, weddings and other feasts Marković organizes in his native village of Konarevo. Former President of Serbia, Boris Tadić, Marković's coalition partner, stated on an occasion that "there is no European Serbia without a European Jagodina" (www.reuters.com, 18 May 2012). This town is by no means an out-of-the-norm town, rather the ultimate achievement of "Europeanization" of the post-Socialist Serbia.

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ELEVEN THESES ON THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE DAYTON BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Nerzuk urak*

1. Has 17 years of the Dayton BiH been enough to draw the bleak conclusion based on the opinion that the only possibility for BiH to survive as a state is its inability to be a state? We can draw many conclusions from our reality that will convince us that only the fact that BiH is dissolved within is keeping it from dissolution. Does that mean that only the fact that BiH is not really a state within keeps it from disappearing from the map of states?
2. If we accept the previous elaborations as arguments based on rationality, not emotions, then we can move from the zone of political correctness to the zone of sharp, radical speech on entities that are *de facto* preventing the possibility of constitution of a self-sustainable political community. Who are those entities? They are the entities that were involved in advocating the peace agreement for BiH. They include the USA, the EU, i.e. the key countries of the European geo-strategic nucleus, the Contact Group, Serbia, Croatia and the domestic Dayton political elites. These entities are prisoners of the ever *increasing fictionalization of reality*. (Toffler, 1998) That *increasing fictionalization of reality* has been supported by the aforementioned actors through an idea which belongs to political pathology. That is the idea of immutability of the Dayton constitution of the country, or of its mutability if and only if the internal political actors desire that. Such an irritating reduction is in collision with the imperial structure of governance foreseen for BiH under the peace agreement.
3. A defensive pattern of *the international empire* applied in BiH is some kind of *epistemological and ontological arrogance* (Toal, 2007) which may produce and which produces the feeling of construction of a new status among the thinking citizens of BiH – the status of lower beings. Why? The constitution of the state on the premises of a peace agreement which demands the permanent engagement of the US as the true architect of the Agreement (and we have long been in a phase of absence of primary activity by the US) produced an unusual situation: the country demands a *deus ex machina*, but there is no descending entity to bring the increased antinomies to a progressive compromise. On the contrary, they have been sending messages to Washington and to Brussels that the entity of change needs to come from within, despite the fact that the structure of the political community is such that the entity of change cannot come from within.

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4. Bosnia and Herzegovina is on slippery ground: it has been authentically prevented from being a state; it cannot cease to be one. In such a schizophrenic ambience, in a frustrating tension between being and not being, the history of our present unfolds. Sadly, our present belongs to prehistory, to the ice age, for Bosnia and Herzegovina is the only country in Europe that is banned from changing. And just like in the novel *A Hundred Years of Solitude* colonel Aureliano Buendia recalls the distant afternoon when his father took him to *meet the ice* (Marquez, 2012), as an unseen wonder, people from all over the world will also come to BiH to see a political miracle: a country frozen in the American military base Wright Patterson, a country in which the entities are holy cows, immutable categories, even at the price of reduction of our lives to mere survival, to Agamben's *homo sacer*.¹ To accept the idea of immutability of the peace agreement means to accept the future that will shape the *misery of present*. The name of our future is *a worse present*.

5. The international community has agreed to an even worse present as a certain form of the future. By pretending to be absent from the country in which it confirmed its *sui generis* presence through an international agreement, it led us to the following paradox: the key actors of the international community have allowed BiH, as a trapped and unfinished state, to try to find its own forces which could raise it from the state of confusion, suspended animation, lethargy and inaction to a higher level of political activity, to the level of practical activity in which the domestic political entities would act reasonably with the goal of establishing a self-sustainable community.

At the same time, the institutional design of the state is such that it cannot achieve self-sustainability by appeals that changing the country is possible only if the domestic political actors wish to do so. The only thing domestic political actors do not wish to see happen is change (or want the kind of particular constitutional changes that would prevent the possibility of changing the Dayton Agreement) to the political matrix which regenerates nationalism as the fuel for the growth of the state bureaucracy at all decision-making levels, the growth of loyal followers of particular political ideas behind which stands a big three-headed nothing. That is the project of eliminating all sense of having a homeland and it has been largely successful.

6. Without a doubt: BiH, as shaped by the peace agreement in Ohio is a product of the US military-political mind. That mind could have envisioned a dual country because at the time of imposing the agreement it counted on strong American support for building a state into which Washington instilled

an imperialistic sense. The architect of the peace agreement Richard Holbrooke could have envisioned exactly on the basis of direct US commitment to the establishment of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina that an original political community would emerge from the ashes under strong American influence.

After the forces of internal secession prevailed on the note of the Dayton ambivalence, reading of the Dayton agreement continued in the disintegration key, through a continual favouring of entities as pseudo-states, so we ended up having two Kosovos in BiH, with tendencies that it is the sum of the two made up entity sovereignties that give sovereignty to the state. I would say that the leading political currents in our country have been trying these very days to equalize sovereignty with factuality, which could end in a triumph of the entity wills as the sovereign wills. We are close to understanding state sovereignty as a coordinative sovereignty. Coordinative sovereignty is hypocrisy worth being subjected to irony.

7. Let me be precise: the US has dropped BiH as a post-conflict community from its imperial hold. Since BiH has not been in the US national interest register for years, the Dayton political laboratory is struggling in the chains of the international agreement, for which the US bears the greatest responsibility, but still it has lowered that responsibility to the lowest possible point.

Since the US has lowered its responsibility for BiH to the lowest point possible, this country has no positive and efficient external impulse, *a priori* contained in the American ambition of creating a peace agreement. In such a situation, the European Union has assumed the key role in BiH. It is incredible that the EU (and this only shows the lack of a vision and bureaucratic dominance over analytical, creative mind based on the scepticism) agreed to accept this Danaan gift from the US. What does this Danaan gift consist of? It consists of the state laconically constructed internally by a peace agreement and can only move forward with a forceful and continual pressure from Washington; it has seized to be a fiefdom of Washington only to become a fiefdom of Brussels. Brussels is tasked with helping construct a self-sustainable BiH without the domineering role of the US, and without that dominance Brussels cannot truly help BiH in forming a self-sustainable community. That geopolitical principle has been abandoned. Washington has lent BiH to Brussels and Brussels does not know what to do with that loan because it does not possess the instrumentarium to do something truly important with the US territory in the Balkans, with the capacities of soft power as the protective sign of the European postmodern heaven. That is why BiH needs to be constructed again as an American world, as the *Pax Americane*

dominant point in the Balkans, for only that could guarantee the competence of Brussels in matters of transformation of BiH into a modern EU country. Although BiH, in its modern history, belongs to *the moral universe of European civilization* (Toal, 2000), by the Dayton peace agreement it pronouncedly begins to belong also to the moral universe of the American civilization.

However, the real question is this: is the current world order still American, and if it is not, then what is this plea for the big return of Washington to the small chess board of Bosnia and Herzegovina about? I believe that the post-American world is still a version of the American world, despite objections that belong to quality opposite insights. Today's BiH is a division of the post-American world and it would be entirely suspicious if Washington provincialized its role in the most successful US foreign policy project (from the standpoint of conflict management) in the post cold war world. The great US Nobel Prize laureate is relentless: "The supreme goal of a good society is found in the domain of foreign policy. That goal is achieving permanent peace among peoples. There is nothing more important than this goal, for nothing causes suffering, poverty and death as wars do... A good society cannot allow itself to be identified with a nation-state (with the realpolitik based on the estimate of power, *remark N.* .); it needs to recognize and support wider international forces certain country is subjected to. That is not a matter of choice – it is the imperative of time." (Galbraith, 1997: 93, 101) Since BiH is subjected to international forces, in order to construct a good society in BiH, those forces again need US leadership, which is the force that made BiH a global state in local circulation.

¹ Marina Gržini lucidly observes that "Agamben speaks of the world in which authority not based in any law rules, so that it makes decisions on life and death outside the law. What we see today is exactly the production of mere existence. The third world is now presented as the world in which people are reduced to mere existence. Still, it is important to understand that the realization that there is only mere existence in the world or in a part of the world represents a judgement on the world which is not based on any form of legality. What is more, labelling a part of the world as a world of mere existence is a form of introducing a territory without legality or a zone of mere existence, which spreads to the rest of the world from there." (Gržini , 2003) What else is the post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina if not a territory of without "shapeless legality", a zone of mere existence, the anthropological future of Europe and its countries, unless Europe accepts its presence? Am I exaggerating? I do not think so. The European Union is failing to notice that the stay in the Balkans in the form of safety management instead of human development is poisoning it by the metaphysics of the static.

8. Had Washington brought BiH to the state of sustainability then the crucial and domineering role of Brussels would be wanted, necessary, imperative and most important. This way, we have a situation where Brussels is tasked with Europeanizing a country that resists Europeanization with its deep Americanization. Since Americanization is in the stage of self-annulment, we have the following formula: normative apolitical Europeanization minus Americanization = Russia in BiH as the awakened player who has made the PIC a powerless face of the West. That is the elementary level of the grand image and there needs to be some point to it: the EU naively agreed to a political community which can only move forward with the key assistance from Washington and it knows that it does not have the instruments to behave like Washington. And there we reach the conclusion that the EU is the key generator of BiH's inability to join the European Union. There is ample evidence to support this claim. Let us go over but a few concerning the life of the EU in the Dayton BiH.

9. The European Union needs to think about the following thesis: there is not a single country in Europe where the international community, and that means also the European Union, is present more intensely than BiH, and it has been that way since 1996 to this day. Regardless of this firm fact, BiH is the country in which maximization of the European presence has produced a minimum of the European country, seen from the angle of key axiological categories in all spheres of life and labour. Primarily, it is the defeat of the European Union, and then of BiH as well. What kind of *promise of happiness* does Brussels offer us if the country in which Brussels has been intensely present is so far away from Brussels!? We could say: intensity of presence of Brussels is inversely proportional to Europeanization of BiH, that is, to fulfilment of conditions for the association process. Ethically, that should cause embarrassment on the part of the key European factors. Still, there is no embarrassment whatsoever. There is a brilliant mantra of the Brussels' bureaucratic mind: We are here to help you, but, you know, you yourselves need to, yada yada... yada yada... so that the platitude (*empty talk!*) has been reduced to the unimaginative phrase "We are here". So what? This country has obviously been condemned to degrading and disabling itself, to making its own people think worse of themselves. So, the seventeen years of agony have awoken the thought also in me, a good and emphatic creature, that we are idiots, people condemned by the West to being lower beings. Still, this *crudeness of mine is nothing but tenderness gone senseless because of offense*, (D. Sušić , 1983), for this country is most faithful to the West. The West is our golden calf. In spite of the West. In spite of the European Union.

10. The European Union has been escaping the root of the problem and is dealing with the consequences as if they were the cause. How? By thinking that

the key problem of the country is the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), not the cemented two-entity structure of the country; because it thinks that the unitary entity functions best in BiH and does not end the logic in the expected conclusion: if the unitary entity is the best functioning in BiH, does that mean that the entire country should be built as unitary? Since I am against the unitary principle in a multinational country, I call those who favour the existing Unitarianism in BiH to be executive to the end and reveal themselves either as political liars or as friends of Unitarianism. You cannot opt for a decentralized country and support Unitarianism! That political lie can only bring about another seventeen years of agony. Let us be completely clear: because of the nature of the political order, the Republika Srpska represents the sense of the Dayton BiH. Bosnia and Herzegovina exhausts its political sense only in Europeanization of the RS, which prevents the Europeanization of BiH. And that is the way it is. What can we do? We need to unmask the *growing fictionalization of reality*. Unitarization of the country that would go from Banja Luka is pointless (for example, the eastern part of the RS, both in Bosnia and in Herzegovina is a world of sorrow, misery, hopelessness; it truly is a world of mere existence. Decentralization of the RS is a demand just as important as the transformation of the federal entity.). To agree to the transformation of the Federation, which is necessary, the way that it does not concern the other part of BiH means to agree to the attitude that BiH is an excess burden to the RS. Changes in the Federation only make sense if followed by decentralization of the RS. Both Washington and pro-American Brussels can initiate that. Those are the truths so obvious that they pass unnoticed, probably because they are so obvious. Is violence the only condition to notice that obviousness? Or is it only through violence that BiH becomes a Thing worth thinking about at the centres of global power and global responsibility? Let us be unrealistic, let us look for the possible. And what is possible? A change of the paradigm: it is necessary to reach a consensus on the construction of a decentralized political community which is self-sustainable and which offers possibilities of civic loyalty. That is possible only by making, an even more decentralized state with the firmest possible embrace of Washington and Brussels, by making the most decentralized state in the world of states, if necessary. That huge gift to the citizens of BiH – construction of a decentralized state is an obligation for those who oppose change, even though they will profit the most from it.

The construction of a decentralized state in the most radical understanding of the principle of subsidiarity also includes the simultaneous construction of a state which is a state and whose decentralized structure is an expression of equity, efficiency, functionality and possibility of a *common purpose at the state*

level. The demand for an even more decentralized state contains a demand for construction of the state, not its deconstruction. If, however, the construction of an organized state again sees disapproval of the ones who want us to stay in the Mesozoic era, like friends of the dinosaurs, then the international community will sooner or later be brought into a situation to act. I call desperately for injecting a new energy to the OHR, energy that would tell the political players that not constructing a political community is pointless, that it is against the people whose interests the politicians are allegedly representing. Finally, if the High Representative is the supreme interpreter of the Dayton Agreement, the European institutions in BiH are a part of that interpretation. If, however, they are not, then what prevents the European Union from leaving Dayton and starting the construction of a state capable of being a member of the EU? What prevents it is the eleventh thesis on the European Union, which is

11. *The highest achievement of the EU normative institutionalism, which does not see Bosnia and Herzegovina as its most radical challenge but as its shabby bureaucratic activity, is noticing individuals and their civil needs without perceiving our human powerlessness caused by the lack of a state. The European bureaucrats and their bureaucratized think-tanks with their non-confrontational activities and views only support the division of the state and the society in BiH, when they should do everything in their power and beyond their power to change the situation.*²

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CIVIL SOCIETY AND ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION: EXPERIENCES FROM CROATIA

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The first official step in institutionalizing relations between the Republic of Croatia (RH) and the European Union (EU) took place on 29 October 2001 with the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement between the Republic of Croatia on one side and the European Communities and their states on the other.¹ This happened as the then Croatian Government was being replaced and as the new coalition government was sending out clear political messages on the strategic intent of Croatia to join the EU. This marked the start of development of national consensus between political parties on accession of Croatia to the EU. Until that point, Croatia's accession to the EU was not a prominent goal of Croatian foreign policy, and in the period prior to the negotiations, since the country declared independence, the civil society was one of the few champions of the so-called *European topics* on the domestic stage. Protection of the rights of minorities, insistence on the prosecution of war crimes, ban on discrimination, fight against corruption, independence of the justice system, etc., were only some of the issues the civil society was working on well before and more resolutely than the state institutions. In that context, looking at the process of accession to the European Union, from the perspective of civil society organizations (CSO) formed mainly in the 1990s, was more like looking at an ally. Today, given the time distance, we can freely say that issues concerning democratization and the protection of human rights were primarily addressed by the civil society organizations – by a small number of citizens, who were systematically pushing these issues from the margins towards the centre. It took several years for these issues to make their way into the dominant political discourses as well.

Croatia started formal negotiations with the European Union on 3 October 2005, after the political elites began to address the so-called “European topics” more resolutely, i.e. they started fulfilling the conditions that were constantly arriving from the European Union. Only two months after the beginning of negotiations, on 7 December 2005, Ante Gotovina, the last fugitive from Croatia wanted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, was arrested. For human rights organizations of the civil society this served as additional symbolical confirmation of their hard work which was marginalized

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and disputed for years. What had seemed absolutely impossible ten years ago was quickly becoming a political reality. In the following six and a half years Croatia negotiated with the EU and harmonized its legislation with that of the EU more or less successfully. During the process of negotiations, CSOs largely used the *carrot and the stick* policy, so the European Commission was recognized as a constructive ally of the CSOs, not only because of its ability to finance their work more systematically, but also because of the political influence OCDs gained as a result of the accession process. Namely, in the 1990s when the OCDs were dealing with issues related to democracy and human rights, they were labelled as traitors and obstacles to conducting the politics of the new, independent Croatia. This image may be best summarized in the speech of then-president Franjo Tuđman, who attacked the OCDs and accused them of *political dilettantism and relations with the black, yellow and red devils* and of selling themselves for *several coins like Judas*.² It took a number of years to shatter that prejudice, although the prejudice most probably still exists with some of the political elites. Still, the label “traitor” could have no longer been used that easily, simply because the political elites were now running the policy of accession to the EU, so they had to admit, whether they liked it or not, that the CSOs were several steps ahead of their time. For the so-called European issues which the mainstream politics now started addressing, the CSOs could simply say: „Well, this is what we were talking about for over a decade.” With less prejudice, but with CSOs still facing political marginalization, the ruling parties started the process of democratization of the country.

The consequence of that was that advocacy initiatives were primarily directed towards Brussels (having been lightly rejected or marginalized by the official Zagreb), and communicating with Brussels made more sense than communicating with the official Zagreb. Unfortunately, trust between the government and the associations was shattered even further in that process. On the other hand, the positioning of CSOs closer to EU institutions than to governmental institutions ensured a continuity of CSO’s independence from the ruling elites, so in that sense the process can be described as positive. Still, in the past several years the more open approach of the authorities towards the CSOs has become noticeable, so their comments are no longer viewed as malicious but rather as a constructive criticism.

The accession process was used by certain CSOs to a greater or lesser degree in accordance with their capacities and advocacy skills, with the emphasis being placed on the CSO’s contribution to the regular reports by the European Commission on Croatia’s progress in negotiations, which authorities

in Croatia finally began to read with a lot more understanding and seriousness. Initially, the negotiations themselves were not of great interest to the CSOs, since they concerned an exceptionally huge and complex area. CSO capacities, which were developed during the 1990s and afterwards, primarily concerned negotiations on *Chapter 23 – Judiciary and Fundamental Rights* and possibly *Chapter 24 – Justice, Freedom and Security*, and *Chapter 27 – Environment*. Other chapters were concluded almost without any interest of the CSO.

At the very beginning of the negotiation process, a part of the CSOs were exhausting themselves by advocating that the negotiations be declassified and that they be made more transparent in an effort to ensure that as many citizens as possible be continually informed about what is happening behind closed doors. Neither the ruling politicians nor the European Commission supported the initiative for fear that information concerning the negotiations would be manipulated through the media and that citizens would lose confidence in the EU. In addition, there was fear that parties would politicize the issue of negotiations through the media. After the initiative for opening negotiations to the domestic public failed, CSOs continued to advocate, individually or in smaller coalitions, topics in the field of democratization and protection of human rights. For the first time in this stage, they faced facts that certain standards of human rights protection were not integrated into the minimum standards promoted by the EU; what is more, the EU sets the bar below international standards on certain issues, which is especially visible in the asylum policy. Also, it had become obvious that Croatia was harmonizing its legislation with that of the EU by accepting only minimum standards proscribed by the European Union directives. In very few cases they went above the minimum standards, for example in the case of the Law on Non-discrimination, which covers wider areas and topics than required by the EU legislation.

In this period, a small number of advocacy CSOs started to strengthen, and they successfully used EU funds primarily for the development of a civil society and managed to become bigger and more visible advocacy organizations, focusing their programmes on different public policies. A negative side of the process is certainly that the smaller organizations failed to survive in the “market of donations” and many of them are slowly disappearing. Many CSOs that were formed “bottom up” in the 1990s failed to transform themselves so to adjust to the new circumstances of financing and political priorities. That especially hit the CSOs that were not active in the City of Zagreb, where most political decisions are made.

Almost at the very end of the negotiations these organizations realized that by acting in synergy, rather than conducting expert activities individually, they can achieve a much stronger impact on the decision makers. In February 2011, a group of CSOs came into possession of the criteria for closing negotiations on *Chapter 23 – Judiciary and Fundamental Rights* and announced a joint opinion on readiness of Croatia to close the chapter related to judiciary and fundamental rights, concluding that Croatia is not ready to close Chapter 23.³ This example shows how important it is from the CSO perspective to have insight into, at least, a part of the negotiations that deal with the criteria for opening and closing chapters. That document needs to be available not only to the EU, but also to the citizens of the negotiating country.

This report drew a lot of attention in institutions of the European Union and member countries, and it was almost completely marginalized at home. This report gave new impetus to the CSOs and they became relevant participants in creating a general impression on the feasibility of numerous reforms integrated into the domestic legislation during the negotiations. The coalition was led exactly by those organizations which had managed in the past 10 years to strengthen institutionally, and that allowed them to commit a part of their employees to advocacy activities. The coalition functions on an *ad hoc* basis, without project financing, and the number of members and supporters is growing month after month. In May 2011, Croatia closed the final chapter and CSOs understood that it was a political decision the responsibility for which lies not only on Croatia, but also on the European Union.⁴ Croatia was soon given a date of accession to the EU, thus it became clear to the CSOs that they had little time left until the end of the “carrot and stick” policy, and that they needed to focus more on pressuring domestic and EU institutions in relation to the implementation of reforms and improving the quality of human rights and in relation to the democratization of Croatia. The Government adopted practically over night a part of the proposal presented by the CSOs (for example, annulment of the Law on Golf, improvements to the Law on Access to Information), still a large portion of recommendations remains unfulfilled, and even end up without the support of the European Union (for example, improvements to the Law on Free Legal Aid, Indemnification of the Civil Victims of War, etc.). Without insisting on particular thematic proposals, the coalition also proposes constructing an efficient mechanism of supervision of all obligations that stem from Chapter 23 in the Croatian Parliament, with the engagement of members of parliamentary parties, representatives of the academic community, experts and civil society organizations, and in close cooperation with representatives of the European Parliament and European

Commission experts. This supervisory mechanism should have the status of a special rapporteur towards EU institutions, would report every 6-months for a minimum of three years after the conclusion of the negotiations.⁵ It is clear from this demand that the CSOs fear that once Croatia joins the EU reform efforts will suddenly come to a halt, which could eventually result in the decrease of the quality of democracy and the protection of human rights protection in Croatia. The accession process is extremely intensive and complex and it truly ends on a certain date. In what way will that sudden termination of implementation of reforms impact the lives of Croatian citizens remains to be seen.

In that sense, accession of Croatia to the EU sets new challenges before the CSOs. On the one hand, there is fear of a possible rise in nationalism because of the unfinished processes of dealing with the past, mixed with the expected increase in the arrival of foreigners to Croatia through international population migration processes. On the other hand, a shift in the thematic priorities of CSOs in Croatia is being considered in order for them to respond to the citizens' needs, including issues that concern the protection of workers' rights and opposition to the privatization of public property, as well as migration issues linked to climate or social changes in the world. In that sense, a number of new topics shall arise to which CSOs will have to react, i.e. they will have to, as they have done so far, react to new social injustices that will go over the back of Croatian citizens.

It will be especially interesting to see the further development of cooperation between CSOs in the region. Namely, to this day and since the beginning of armed conflict in the territory of former Yugoslavia, CSOs have had an intensive continuity of cooperation, even at times when state borders were closed between the newly formed countries and when hostility towards other peoples was prevalent. In those years, a number of CSOs were formed from either side of the border, and the CSOs had almost an identical spectrum of problems they were dealing with: grave human rights violations, war crimes, corruption, etc. Even in the post-war period, the topics were still common: democratization, transparency of the government activities, education for peace, nonviolence, human rights, etc. In the new circumstances of Croatia's accession to the EU and with the expected change of the dominant themes CSOs will have to work on, there is fear that the Croatian CSOs in the region will distance themselves thematically. On the one hand, there is space for cooperation on transfer of knowledge regarding the negotiation process, but that mostly concerns technical details, rather than valuable cooperation. Croatian CSOs will certainly have more obligations on monitoring the new foreign policy of the Croatia towards the countries in the region more strongly and with greater focus, but that monitoring

will be possible only through close cooperation with the local CSOs. The trust created through years of cooperation and mutual support, even at times of war, represents immense capital for continuing cooperation. We want to believe that the Schengen border will not disrupt that dynamics and tradition of cooperation.

Finally, it remains for the Croatian CSOs to determine how they will position themselves once the politics of conditioning, which was an important aspect of their functioning, disappears with the accession of Croatia to the EU. It is difficult to conceive that a decision could be made practically over night to marginalize the role CSOs, i.e. their influence on processes of shaping public policies. In that sense, perhaps a chance was missed during the accession negotiations to more strongly institutionalize the influence of the citizens through various legal and other mechanisms in together creating decision-making processes and processes of monitoring the implementation of the accepted reforms. Some mechanisms have been adopted: almost all parliamentary committees are open for external members (which can easily be annulled by changes to the rules of procedure), the Codex of Counselling with the Interested Members of the Public in Procedures of Passing Laws, Other Regulations and Acts⁶ has been adopted, the Council for Development of the Civil Society - a hybrid body between the CSOs and state administration, which also has not grown in power, has been active for years, the Law on Access Information, an important tool for citizens in fight against corruption has been improved, a form of civil supervision of the secret services and police, etc., has been introduced. Still, the key step forward would be for the CSOs to construct, together with the political elites, a joint mechanism of internal monitoring of execution of the reforms taken on during the process of accession to the EU, once the politics of conditioning stops. For the first time then, both the carrot and the stick would be "Made in Croatia" and such a body, currently proposed to function in the Croatian Parliament and in which the citizens would have the majority and politicians would have the minority, would serve as some form of a guarantee that the democratization processes in Croatia would continue.

In the following months, we shall see if the process of accession to the EU truly managed to democratize Croatia to the extent that its political elites are prepared to accept such a proposal; and it is not before 2 July 2013 that we will be able to see if the Croatian society has matured so as to treat CSOs as one of the main pillars of democracy, rather than as decoration, an added value of democracy.

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CROATIA IN BIH: POLITICAL CRISIS, BILATERAL RELATIONS AND THE NEW POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT

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The structural, political and institutional crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is being constantly deepened since the middle of the past decade and which has especially escalated after the 2010 general elections, caused a new engagement of the neighbouring Croatia in the internal political developments of BiH. That new engagement is taking place in the context of Croatia's imminent accession to the European Union as its 28th member, but also due to numerous unresolved bilateral issues which are becoming increasingly contentious under such circumstances.

Although Croatia's engagement in BiH differs significantly from the role it had in the neighbouring country during the 1990s, it is accompanied by numerous controversies, while the main directions and the concept behind such a policy remain rather vague to this point.

For that reason, this paper will present the political framework in the first section, especially the international political framework of the crisis in BiH, in which this new Croatian engagement is taking place. In the second section, the paper will identify the key constituents that (co)determine Croatia's policy towards BiH. Finally, in the last section, the BiH side of bilateral political relations will be identified, as well as the political role the EU has played thus far.

1. The framework of the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The author of this paper had three experiences in late October this year, which illustrate well the nature of the structural crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He met one of the authors of the Dayton Peace Agreement, a close associate of Richard Holbrooke. That retired US diplomat emphasized to the author that the agreement itself should have lasted a short period of time and that the maximum of five years was planned for its implementation, including the Dayton Constitution. The very fact that the Dayton agreement is still alive 17 years after it was signed and that today the agreement is primarily defended by the very side which opposed it the most in 1995 – the Banja Luka side – indicates that something went seriously wrong in international politics in the post-war period.

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The second event was a visit by Ms Ashton and Ms Clinton to Sarajevo. Although both ladies did their best to demonstrate the engagement and determination of the international community, the visit itself turned into a sad symbol of failed EU and US policy in the recent period. On one side we had the EU High Representative, who – although appointed as a compromise solution, a weak candidate – already last year came under criticism from almost half of the EU foreign affairs ministers for an even worse performance than she was expected to deliver. On the other side, there was the wife of former US President Clinton, the highest ranking diplomat of the US administration, who announced with the arrival of Vice president Biden in May 2009 in Sarajevo that there would be an increased US engagement. And while Clinton, during her last visit to Sarajevo in 2010, warned Banja Luka in her address not to enter the adventure of secession, for “the USA will not recognize them”, she practically signalled that the USA does not intend to get seriously involved in BiH. The joint visit of the highest ranking diplomats of the EU and the US thus turned into a symbol of a shift in the West’s policy towards BiH from 2005 – the US handing over leadership to the EU – but with Europe not taking over that leadership to this day.

The third event was a meeting between the author and a representative of the European Commission’s Enlargement Directorate responsible for Croatia, which took place at a conference on lessons learned in the process of European integration of Croatia. This same gentleman, who insisted in a conversation with the author four years prior that the Commission deals solely with the harmonization of the Croatian legal system with the EU *acquis communautaire*, not with the implementation of reforms because the bureaucratic machinery of Brussels was not made for that – spoke completely opposite at this conference, about the self-sustainability of reforms in Croatia, as well as the relationship between the political and technical criteria of the Commission in the integration process. This example, perhaps better than any other, shows vividly that the EU integration *toolbox*, opposite of what is commonly believed, is not a fixed set of conditions and criteria, rather an improvisational set of tools, a *work in progress*.

Why does all this matters? Because the problem of changing the initially deliberately non-functional Dayton structure of BiH should have been resolved through a transition from the “Dayton phase” to the “European phase” in the post-war development of BiH. However, that transition has not happened; instead, transition to the “Brussels phase” took place in the worst possible sense of the word – as a farce of the “European phase”: Because of a lack of EU leadership, i.e. leadership within the EU, and because of the decreasing political will within the Union to deal with Bosnia and Herzegovina, the “Bosnian problem” has been left

to the European Commission. And the European Commission, unable to solve this problem alone due to a lack of this political willingness, is facing a mission impossible in the effort – doomed to failure since the beginning – to resolve the structural problems of BiH through the *acquis communitaire* exclusively.

The unfeasibility of such a mission, i.e. the policy of squaring the circle, is best illustrated by the European Commission's dominant terminology: the terms *process* and *progress* prevail. The term “process” is one of the fundamental sociological notions, the second is “structure”, while “progress” has its opposite in the term “regression”. However, the Commission rarely uses these terms, if ever (like regression). Still, since the middle of the past decade what we are witnessing in the socio-political developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the dominance of para-structures over process, as well as stagnation and regression, not progress. That is why we are seeing an increasing gap in this period between the socio-political reality on the ground in BiH and the narratives of the European Union about that reality.

2. New Croatian policy towards BiH

Where is Croatia positioned in that European-BiH nightmare, in its relationship towards BiH, that is, what will the policy of Croatia, a future member of the European Union, be towards BiH? It is too early to pass the final judgement, primarily because a new government has come to power in Zagreb in late 2011, which has announced that it would turn a new page in relations with the neighbour, as the main coordinates of Croatia's foreign policy will significantly change with the upcoming accession of Croatia to the EU.

Still, Croatia started gaining its first experiences with the new engagement in BiH in the last two years, i.e. with President Josipović taking office, and his engagement and the engagement of his Office towards BiH. Josipović's initiative for regional cooperation and reconciliation, his frequent visits to Bosnia and Herzegovina and increasingly frequent contacts with political representatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially with the Bosnian Croats, represented an attempt to “leave the Balkans”: as the most faithful disciple of the *ownership* policy and “EU integration ueber alles”, the President's Office acted as if Croatia had already joined the EU. However, that engagement ended at a completely opposite end – in an attempt to mediate in the crisis surrounding the establishment of the FBiH Government after the 2010 general elections, the Office employed means of direct interference in the internal affairs of a neighbouring country, without the desired effect – involvement of Croat parties in BiH in the ruling coalition.

That episode, as well as a number of outstanding bilateral issues that are now being tackled in an attempt to resolve them as quickly as possible after a decade of being held on the ice – since accession to the EU would significantly change the cost of the failure to resolve them for Croatia, but also partially for BiH – could help identify the main constituents which will (co)determine the future policy of Zagreb towards Bosnia and Herzegovina.

On the one hand, one can see the efforts of the official Zagreb to break away from the legacy of aggression of Croatia against Bosnia and Herzegovina, which are being made since the time of former PM Jadranka Kosor's Government. As a result, the Croatian Election Law was changed in 2010 as part of a package-arrangement with the then-opposition, and in relation to the referendum on accession to the EU. The number of MPs elected from the famous “diaspora” electoral unit – a concept introduced by Franjo Tuđman in 1995 in order to ensure permanent influence of the Herzegovina lobby in Croatia and to keep his HDZ party in power – was reduced from 12 to 3. At the same time, Kosor's Government initiated and Milanović's Government continued to change the existing Residence Act. The goal was to “fill in the gaps” in the law, that had enabled a large number of Bosnian Croats with Croatian passports to have (fictitious) residence in both Croatia and in BiH, and to enjoy social benefits from both countries on that basis. Combined, these measures will strip the concept of dual citizenship for BiH Croats of its original character of undermining the sovereignty of the state Bosnia and Herzegovina and place it within the normal European framework.

On the other hand, Croatia continues to use the circumstances of a non-state in BiH in order to avoid resolving outstanding issues, and by doing so maintains the elements of a semi-colonial relationship towards BiH, especially towards the Federation of BiH, that date back to the 1990s. Thus Croatia continues to block the implementation of Annex G from the international agreement on the succession of former Yugoslavia in the form of returning property to citizens and legal entities from BiH in Croatia, as opposed to Bosnia and Herzegovina which implemented the agreement a long time ago. Also, Croatia continues the informal practice of using non-customs obstacles to prevent imports from BiH, which is an illegal measure according to the regional agreement on free trade CEFTA. In both cases, Zagreb is using Croat parties in BiH to prevent the establishment of the BiH state interest and the introduction of counter-measures by Sarajevo.

It is important to emphasize that the motivation of the official Croatia, which governs both the continuity element, as well as the discontinuity element

with the 1990s, is primarily of an economic nature, while political pretensions towards the neighbouring country from that period have disappeared.

3. The role of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the European Union

What about Bosnia and Herzegovina? The country, i.e. its political elites largely continue their autistic, auto destructive path through the attempts of Croatia to redefine its policy towards the neighbour,. The most vivid example is the delay of BiH governments to institutionally prepare the country for changes in the trade regime with Croatia, which will take place when Croatia enters the EU, primarily in the sphere of export of agricultural goods. One thing that left European diplomats in Sarajevo completely puzzled is the political resistance to those political requirements, primarily, but not exclusively, from the RS which insists that “any further transfer of competences from the entity to the state level” is out of the question, a move that threatens to directly harm agricultural producers, farmers, including the dreaded possibility of the processing industry being shut down in 2013. They do not understand primarily from a political perspective the economically damaging character of the agricultural “policy” in BiH, which, in fact, has a long tradition: in BiH, as well as in the Western Balkans, this traditional connection between “the national issue” and “the issue of farmers” has existed since the 19th century. That connection ensured that the reactionary, ethnic type of nationalism is the most dominant in the Balkans, and it also blocked the modernization of agriculture and villages. Behind that traditional connection hides the continuation of the policy of instrumentalizing the village as a source of mythical nationalism and of the rural population as the constituency of the nationalists. The necessary modernization of agriculture falls victim to that subservient relationship.

And where is the European Union in all that? The European Commission has been mostly absent as a political actor with its general policy of constantly lowering *conditionality* towards the political developments in conflicts between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in relation to a dozen outstanding bilateral issues. It has done so in the same way as it has excluded itself from influencing the development of the agricultural sector and policy in BiH during the entire process of integration of BiH with the EU so far. Despite the fact that the agricultural sector represents one of the classical elements of EU policy, Brussels has thus far left its great potential unused. And while the European Union called for the establishment of the BiH Ministry of Agriculture at the state level in a partner document in 2008, it quickly forgot about its own request in the face of political resistance from Banja Luka. In return, however,

it gained nothing – it did not get equipped regulatory institutions in the field of agriculture, nor did it get any kind of “coordination” or “harmonization” of the agricultural policies of the entities and cantons. By doing so, the EU directly supported this destructive, entity agricultural policy, which is responsible for the lack of readiness of institutions for Croatia’s accession to the EU.

What does all that mean for the future policy of Croatia towards BiH, for the policy of a new member of the EU? The political reality of its determinants – and of those elements of continuity and discontinuity with the policies from the 1990s, show that there can be no talk of “Croatia’s departure from the Balkans”, which can often be heard these days in the context of Croatia’s accession to the European Union. Croatia will remain trapped, whether it likes it or not, in a tight relationship with Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the problem of the growing political instability of its neighbouring country. Croatia will have to come up with a well thought-out policy towards BiH. One thing that will change is the political context: starting 1 July 2013, Zagreb will no longer have to approach the problem of BiH as a bilateral political issue, but will have to define its policy towards BiH through participation in the creation of the EU policy towards the patient of the Balkans. That is where the chance for Croatia lies: the possibility of bilateral influence on the political turmoil in Bosnia was rather limited for Croatia as a Western Balkan country. As the 28th member of the European Union, and the only EU member state neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina, the potential influence of Croatia on BiH will be much stronger, primarily because the key to resolving the BiH issue rests in the European Union, and secondly because the EU is divided on the issue of policy towards BiH as on no other issue, which opens up enormous opportunities for Croatia to part take in the shaping of that policy.

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QUESTIONABLE FUTURE OF THE REGION AFTER CROATIA JOINS THE EU

Zlatko Dizdarevi *

Firstly, even though it may seem irrelevant considering the importance of the topic, I would like to return to the question former Croatian President Stjepan Mesic asked with good reason in the introductory part of his presentation at a recent conference in Berlin, organized by the Heinrich Boll Foundation (18 – 19 October 2012) on the topic “Implications of Croatia’s Accession to the EU”, in reference to the title of the first panel “Final Departure from the Western Balkans?”. Mesic asked, “Where is Croatia *going* next summer?”

An interesting question; not a new one, but it can be clearly noted that it is being asked less in a rhetorical, and more in a political and geostrategic sense. We were able to see how this notion of so-called Croatia’s *departure* from the Balkans visibly strengthened since the time when preparations for the Berlin conference were only beginning to the time of it being held. From the question: *Croatia – and then?* with the appropriate question mark following it, to premonitions expressed by many distinguished politicians from the EU member states, heads of state and analysts, according to whom Croatia was definitely *departing the Western Balkans*, which, also definitely, would *remain* forever where it has always been, without any real perspective of “going” where Croatia “has gone” from the same area.

I consider it important to discuss this platitude in the context of the enlargement and positioning of the European Union in the Balkans, especially from the standpoint of the European perspective of other countries in the region. This somewhat already casual mentioning of “Croatia’s departure from the Balkans” is much more than a mere figure of speech. It has replaced all that we used to consider a concept of *enlargement* of the European Union through its standards and mechanisms to areas where it was not present, including the Western Balkans where Croatia is situated. I think we need to clarify it, loud and clear, in order for this conference to have true meaning. If it denotes, speaking in simple terms, the definitive “departure” of those who have left, and the definitive and permanent stay of those who have remained, then we will get a completely new geopolitical, geostrategic, and tomorrow perhaps even a security situation in this entire region.

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Then there is the issue of with *whom* will those who have remained be left to stay, to whom will they turn because they cannot cross the wall on the other side of which are those who have left, etc. It is obvious, at least for the time being, that there is either no interest in finding an answer to this question in the European Union, which is less probable, or that there is no internal capacity to “more decisively” raise issues of political harmonization and of the long-term enlargement strategy, which is, at least formally, not in question, yet it is being seriously brought into question by the new reality.

Unfortunately, there is a feeling that certain familiar old ghosts of Europe are rising again, and that in difficult situations Europe reacts by a form of claustrophobia, primarily by reacting on reflex, closing its borders and preserving its wealth from “the ones on the outside”. At the same time globalization, intertwining, common interests and quality of all forms of diversity fall to oblivion overnight. That opens space for various other appetites, for theories on “the clash of civilizations”, for the state groupings along religious lines, “historical interests”, etc. At least in Europe we know what we are talking about in that sense. Enthusiasm for expansion is clearly declining, not only within the Union, but also in countries that have shown a high level of commitment to Europe until recently, coupled with a basic sense of belonging to its historical values. Naturally, in such a situation, the influence of pro-European forces in every country of the region that has shown commitment to the European Union is also significantly decreasing. This leaves the door to “others” widely open.

The accession of Croatia to the EU is happening under specific circumstances, including historical, territorial and those concerning everyday life, as compared to the majority of other countries and their accession to the EU. For example, the Czech Republic and Slovakia joined the EU together, so their independence did not represent a traumatic problem in neither political nor in economic or communicational terms. Hungary, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria did not dissociate from anyone prior to their accession to the EU. Each of them brought into the EU their “clear” boundaries and only their own problems. Croatia, however, is going through two processes of “dissolution”. One was the process of violent dissolution of Yugoslavia, and the other process, the one unfolding now, is the process of “dissolution” from its entire regional environment, with which it had naturally grown together for decades. In addition to sharing the border, Croatia has been tied in geographic, economic, communicational, linguistic, historical and other ways with three countries that will remain outside the European Union until further notice (BiH, Serbia, Montenegro). It was almost the same with Macedonia and Kosovo

with whom Croatia does not share the border. With its fourth neighbour, Slovenia, an EU member state, Croatia had and sporadically continues to have even more problems than with other countries of the region. With Croatia's accession to the EU, the EU border will come directly to the borders of BiH, Serbia and Montenegro, which will make the new reality significantly more complex and exceptional as compared to what it was prior to that.

It is based on the new reality, strongly dependant on the existing specificities, demands and specific solutions within the application of EU standards, that Croatia, but also the EU will organize their relations with the region that is still outside the EU. That is simply the reality. The Western Balkans is simply becoming a part of Europe's coordinate system through a series of existential aspects, and the lack of sensitivity for that fact would almost certainly produce utterly unpleasant consequences for the part of the region that will remain outside the Union with Croatia's accession to the EU, but for the European Union as well, both on the short run and the long run. Some recent talks on concrete and practical issues, such as borders, communications, transport of goods and people, do not confirm, unfortunately, the existence of a fully clear and common awareness about this fact. There is also no awareness concerning the fact that some problems that resulted from the bureaucratic-administrative strictness in separating those "departing" and those "staying" will become a major issue for all of them, including the EU.

It is known, for example, that there is bilateral understanding between two states and the European Union on the need to ratify the agreement signed long ago about the maritime border between BiH and Croatia. However, due to the unfinished constitutional architecture in BiH, one of the BiH entities, or even only one party may challenge the ratification. Is then this incompletely defined maritime border of Croatia and the EU towards an area that is not within EU, which will with the accession of Croatia become the maritime border of the EU, truly an internal issue of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Srpska, or will that become a problem of the entire European Union tomorrow?

The issue is similar with the railroad between Sarajevo in BiH and Port Ploče in Croatia. This railroad is entirely situated on the European Vc corridor, connecting Budapest and the Adriatic. It passes through the territory of both BiH and Croatia, i.e. soon to be EU territory. Is the new EU gate on this railroad, on the border between BiH and Croatia, only a problem between these two states, and can this issue be solved only bilaterally? Can Bosnia and Herzegovina be enabled to continue transporting its goods along the railroad,

which was built in the former Yugoslavia for the needs of BiH and Croatia, as well as of the entire region, to Port Ploče and further into the world and also to import goods from third, even non-European areas into Bosnia and Herzegovina. What is the sense of this railroad without Port Ploče or what is the sense of Port Ploče without this railroad “operational” in its full length?

It needs to be understood that it is entirely uncommon for the EU to have its territory “cut”, as is the case with it being cut by the BiH border, in Neum for example, and that is precisely why there is a need for non-standard solutions. Such solutions would connect the region with the EU in a more flexible manner, instead of separating it with the new “iron borders”. If that is not done in the next ten months, then the fact who is “leaving” and who and why is “staying” where they have always been will be fully understood in a way far more painful than rhetoric could ever be. Of course, one must not forget that this problem is further aggravated by internal local politicization, which is often detrimental to long-term and global solutions. That is why we are seeing issues emerge today resulting from the full politicization of the Pelješac bridge issue, which is an internal affair of Croatia, provided that international standards are respected and it is only a matter of funds, as well as the politicization of the corridor in the Neum hinterland, or the famous two islands in the bay of Mali Ston, the idea of “diverting” the Vc corridor to Neum away from Ploče, etc.

Lowering of what is colloquially already called in BiH the “iron curtain” between the EU and the region will bring about, without a doubt, a wide spectrum of political and economic consequences in the countries of the region, as well as in Croatia itself. Countries of the region, located in the heart of Europe but outside the EU will have to turn a lot more to the partners outside the EU, especially to the East and the so-called Third World, and Russia, Turkey, China and many other countries already see their chance in that. For some, that chance is primarily economical, and for some it is quite certainly a lot more than that. The old geostrategic appetites in the world, as we can see today, if we want to see it, are awakening not only towards the East, but more openly towards the Balkans as well. This is the time when firm national logic, as an exclusive basis of political constitution, with open pressures of religious emotions, with historical memories, is strongly pressuring the everyday life. At the same time, the concept of saving the system and capital over the backs of the increasingly poor citizens will hardly be supported in the Balkans. Europe is the natural way and still the prevailing aspiration of the majority of people in the region. However, an inconsistent enlargement policy, where in many cases only interests prevail – even through the implementation

of double standards – balancing between political conditions and strictly technical criteria for accession, leads to the weakening of the EU influence on the region. The reality in which countries without a clear accession perspective will turn primarily and exclusively to those who offer them, or at least promise them, a helping hand in one way or the other is not far away.

Different, oftentimes dramatic challenges within BiH, Serbia, Macedonia and Kosovo, can be solved within the coordinate system of EU integration and enlargement policy, depending on each individual situation, in a planned, organized and even an institutionalized manner. However, one must keep in mind that this can also be done according to recipes from the other sides. Appetites in that sense are becoming increasingly obvious and that is why the signal sent from Europe at this point is important. Some of those signals, sent from Germany, France, Austria, etc., in relation to the question “what after Croatia” may soon surprise, even create concerns for Europe. Therefore willingness and a concrete effort of the EU to open the door for, let us say, integration of the candidate countries into various forms of EU activities even before their accession can prove vital. Not only because this would serve as the best possible preparation for their future life in the EU, but also because this would preserve the trust in the enlargement policy and process. In Turkey, for example, that trust has decreased drastically, but Ankara has used that as a reason to define new long-term economic, as well as geostrategic goals, which significantly count on Western Balkan countries, outside the EU. The related rhetoric is one thing but reality is something else. The positions of Russia towards certain parts of the Balkans and the “warm sea” have long been known and their dimensioning mostly depends on the extent to which the EU will offer a possibility and hope to these parts of the Balkans within its policy and reality.

At this moment, in the time remaining until 1 July 2013, I think that the most important thing to do is to “close” certain priority issues between Croatia, i.e. the EU, and the neighbouring countries in a serious and energetic way and with much greater determination in accepting the reality with all its specificities, as well as to clearly determine directions and possibilities of overall regional cooperation in the Western Balkans in the context of the new Croatian reality. That will allow the focus of relations in the region to be shifted from theoretical debates on who has *gone* from somewhere and who has *stayed* and where, to the creation of mechanisms of normal, mutual functioning based on common interests within the new conditions and standards. Everything else will lead to the heightening of tensions in the region, the displacement of decision-making centres, as well as the birth of the bases of criminal activities

and the instigation of all kinds of illegal activities. That will certainly quickly give rise to retrograde forces and projects, and will flare up old conflicts. Then, it will truly not be the problem of only the ones who “remained”, but also of those who think that they have “gone” or ran away somewhere, that is, it will be a problem of the EU as a whole. Hence, the continuation of the enlargement process needs to be an interest of Europe and the Western Balkans, and not an act of mercy of the European Union towards the Western Balkans. If this is understood otherwise, alternatives will soon be “activated” and I am quite convinced it will be at the expense of interests of Europe, as well as the Western Balkan countries and the region in a broader sense.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In firm belief that the consideration of **European themes** is only possible through **open social dialogue**, the following conclusions were made at the conference *European Integration Policies* held on 2 and 3 November in Sarajevo:

- 1. The European integration process should not be marginalized, rather demystified, especially from the aspect of the EU integration policy towards the countries of the region thus far.*

In promoting European, universal ideas, it was expected that the European Union would **erase** certain **separations** formed during the course of history; however, practices such as the control of migration flows, impermeability of borders, apparent crisis of multiculturalism, rise of the nationalist policies, discrimination against minority communities, especially of the Roma, **push to the sidelines** everything that unites the EU politically, namely, its ideals: freedom, equality, human rights, social security and stable peace. The sometimes purposeful and sometimes painful '**disciplining of the region**' that has been going on for years has forced us to ask ourselves at the conference to what extent have the EU representatives been acting according to the principles while carrying out the democratization of this region, especially having in mind the now very clear statements coming from the EU that it is experiencing enlargement fatigue and that it has taken on an obligation it cannot fulfil.

- 2. Spectacular narratives on accession procedures, requirements and criteria have on the one hand weakened and continue to weaken the political identification with the EU, while on the other they feed and give legitimacy to ethnopolitical practices in the region; that is why Euro scepticism and Europhilia can now be seen in the region.*

Europe's insistence on the function of borders, for example, in the case of Croatia and Slovenia in relation to the territorial demarcation in the Gulf of Piran, triggered **national mobilization**, and as a result we are now witnesses how a single legal-technical issue served as a good opportunity for two friendly countries to compete for over 20 years on who would more successfully impose their vision of the issue, their priorities and ways of resolving it.

Unfortunately, these spectacular political-media discourses are recognized

even today in relation to the border between BiH and Croatia in the vicinity of Neum, and we believe that they will occur in some other cases as well.

3. Fully aware that the imminent accession of Croatia to the European Union is an important moment that will influence the political and social dynamics of the region, we have concluded that a number of open issues remain and that they could influence the democratization of the political environment in which we all live.

Statements in which the EU emphasizes as the **main political imperative** that Croatia will not distance itself from the region are significant, especially for BiH. That new moment in Croatia's foreign policy towards the region encourages and obliges Croatia to use the policy of reconciliation to 'break the cycle' of revenge, i.e. blackmail, which it was able feel on its own skin when Slovenia blocked its negotiations with the EU.

*4. By analyzing the different experiences of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, we were able to shed light on the responsibility of the domestic political elites, but also to go over the possibilities for the more efficient engagement of the civil society in the region. Obsessed by the domestic national ideologies, it has been concluded that we, as a region, have for a long time been **deprived of a public European dimension.***

Discussing the meaning of **European value for all of us**, we concluded at the conference that the accession of Croatia to the EU next year would have political and economic implications for BiH, which will be significantly closer to the Schengen curtain as of next year.

*5. We hope that political discourses on European integration will serve as a driving force for emancipation and that we will not be creating them on the principles of **Eurosong**; many processes were reviewed critically, with emphasis being placed on the fact that the region needs a **commitment to Europe.***

In that spirit it was concluded that today's European crisis should be understood as a new **opportunity** for a new and different understanding of the European political identity.

**Several political, economic and social recommendations
were outlined for the policy creators:**

1. The EU needs to insist on the fulfillment of obligations BiH accepted as part of the integration process, while special emphasis needs to be placed on the implementation of the European Court of Human Rights judgment (the so-called Sejdić-Finci judgment) and the comprehensive fulfillment of obligations from the Road Map, as well as the activation of the Stabilization and Association Agreement signed by BiH back in 2008.
2. The EU and the European Commission need to support and insist on negotiations with the state institutions exclusively, rather than frequently giving preference to negotiations with the country's party leaders. Under such an approach, the "coordination mechanisms" need to facilitate an efficient negotiating process and should in no way undermine or weaken the capacities of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state.
3. The constructive approach towards resolving disputes and outstanding issues between BiH and Croatia needs to be continued. Considering the specificity of some of these issues (the issue of Port Ploče and the border in the area of Neum), the EU needs to play a constructive role in efforts aimed at their resolution.



Fondacija Heinrich Böll je njemačka politička fondacija koja je po svojoj orientaciji bliska stranci Savez 90/Zeleni. Njen osnovni zadatak jeste političko obrazovanje građana/građanki u zemljama u kojima djeluje s ciljem unapredjenja demokratskih potencijala, društveno-političkog angažmana građana i građanki i razumijevanja među narodima. U svom radu orientiše se prema osnovnim političkim vrijednostima, kao što su zaštita okoliša i održivi razvoj, demokratija, solidarnost i nenasilje. Ohrabrujuće riječi Heinricha Bölla: "Umiješati se jeste jedini način da se ostanerealističan.", moto su djelovanja Fondacije.

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The Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina works as part of the Regional Office for South-East Europe, located in Belgrade.

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